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Summary 
 
 
Horizontal purchasing collaboration is a popular practice in the public sector in many 
countries. Despite this fact, developing countries and Uganda in particular, have 
hardly adopted this practice. 
 
Whereas studies have been carried out on horizontal purchasing collaboration in the 
public sector in developed countries, there is still a remarkable lack of literature on 
public procurement in the developing countries context. The developing world context 
is characterised by individualism and an “ownership culture”. This may provide an 
explanation for the lack of well-established functioning horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in developing countries and Uganda in particular. This thesis takes a 
behavioural approach line to horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
 
The overall research goals of this thesis are threefold. First, to understand what is 
happening with respect to behavioural aspects in horizontal purchasing collaboration 
in developing countries (Uganda). Second, to understand why and how the 
behavioural aspects influence horizontal purchasing collaboration. Third, to know 
how to apply the understanding of the behavioural aspects in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in developing countries (Uganda). Whereas the first two goals seek to 
understand what and how horizontal purchasing collaboration is and why it is so, the 
third goal goes further to prescribe how the horizontal purchasing collaboration 
process should be handled and how the behavioural factors should be improved. 
 
To better understand the status of horizontal purchasing collaboration, we carried out 
a series of studies in Uganda to provide us with empirical data. Two exploratory 
studies and a case of an existing collaborative arrangement were carried out to gain a 
deeper understanding of issues that seemed novel about horizontal purchasing 
collaboration. From these exploratory studies and the literature, we derived 
hypotheses which we tested by a large scale survey. 
 
From the exploratory studies, we found out that Procuring and Disposing Entities 
went into collaboration with others, even when they were not aware of the benefits to 
get, mainly because of the urgency of the deals they had to undertake. This is more 
relevant for the developing countries which do not put emphasis on planning and end 
up with emergencies. This insight adds “urgency” to the list of known factors 
essential to initialise horizontal purchasing collaboration. We found out that 
contractual issues that involve individual entity secrets in the final stages of the 
procurement cycle inhibit horizontal purchasing collaboration. We also found out that 
once horizontal purchasing collaboration starts with a few items, it will eventually roll 
out to others that had not been thought of as suitable, thus suggesting an incremental 
approach to the implementation of horizontal purchasing collaboration.  
 
In our in-depth case study, we found that the frequency of inter-institutional meetings 
is important, in developing positive feelings towards each other. This is not different 
in developed countries.  
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Unlike in the previous studies in the developed countries, we noted that contrary to 
findings from the developed countries, free riding may not be an important motivator 
for entities not to collaborate.  
 
To understand causal relations, we gathered additional empirical data through a 
survey. From that survey, we established that affective commitment (pride in the 
collaboration), more than instrumental commitment (fear of costs of switching off 
from current collaboration) and normative commitment (based on strong values and 
beliefs) cause variability in commitment. This could be because pride is more 
important in the initial phases of collaboration compared to the fear of switching 
costs; which would be minimal at the initial stage, even so as the not yet evolved 
values and beliefs. 
 
We also conclude from the survey that competence of the collaborating entities is 
important in determining trust and building horizontal purchasing collaboration. This 
finding makes sense in the developing countries where collaborating entities do not 
have enough qualified personnel, so entities find it necessary to collaborate with those 
that have expertise. The finding about sharing information causing more variability in 
the level of collaboration than incentives alignment and decision synchronisation is 
interesting. We attribute this to the willingness by officers to openly share information 
as public sector transparency practice requires.  
 
 
We found out that the correlation between commitment and the level of collaboration 
is lower than the correlation between trust and the level of collaboration. But this may 
not be surprising, given the existing literature that trust refers to feelings about the 
relationship and commitment represents a manifestation of actions within the 
relationship. This implies more or less that trust can exist from the start of 
collaboration onwards, while commitment (as manifested by actions) is more likely to 
develop over time. We surveyed relatively new collaborations, with fewer exposed 
actions and experiences. 
 
Our finding that the higher correlation between dependence and the level of 
collaboration compared to correlations between trust, commitment or reciprocity with 
the level of collaboration is insightful. We found out that perhaps entities in 
developing countries practice collaboration, not mainly because of trust, commitment 
or reciprocative reasons, but more importantly because the other entities provide 
important and critical resources for which there are few alternative sources of supply.  
 
The results of the survey indicated a moderate significant correlation between the 
level of collaboration and benefits to the individual entity. The moderate correlation 
especially for collaborations that are still emerging, signals the need for collaborating 
entities to build trust and commitment and develop a critical minimum mass in 
carrying out pooled activities together to realise significant benefits.  
 
We note that there is a difference between correlations of behavioural variables 
(commitment, trust, dependence, and reciprocity) with the level of collaboration and 
the benefits of collaboration. The lower correlation of the behavioural variables with 
the benefits of collaboration than with the level of collaboration may be attributed to 
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the moderating role of the level of collaboration. This finding is important to the 
managers of collaborative initiatives, especially in the initial phases. It is a signal to  
managers that to achieve the benefits of the collaboration, the managers should try to 
increase the level of collaboration. 
 
To complete the practical recommendations, we went on to develop a model to advise 
how horizontal purchasing collaboration should be handled.  Based on the social 
exchange theory, we suggest that collaborating entities should engage in joint actions 
to be able to get what they individually lack. Based on the institutional theory, we 
suggest that constant information flow to collaborating entities, ensuring that promises 
are met, winning top management support, and instituting a problem solving process 
will improve the level of behavioural factors. Based on the resource dependence 
theory, we suggest that collaborating entities should respond to issues as they arise, 
set and meet deadlines, be consistent, and increase disclosure.  
 
Since we acknowledge that the level of collaboration is important, we use theory to 
suggest how behavioural factors can be improved. To confirm the relevance of our 
suggestions, we carried out a practical check of the suggested guidance. From the 
practical check of our results, we derived that the collaboration should be carefully 
planned at the beginning, so that it has the momentum to proceed through the next 
stages. Collaborations in developed and developing countries require various 
stakeholders at different development stages of the collaboration. An important 
difference between collaborations in developed and developing countries is that in 
developing countries like Uganda, it is important to involve donors at all the phases of 
the collaboration. Donors need to be involved to the greatest extent in the emergence 
stage, because they provide resources and want to be sure of the method that will be 
used to utilise them. 
 
Basically, in developing countries, horizontal purchasing collaboration should be 
targeted more at sharing the burden of individual procurement benefits whereas in 
developed countries, the focus is more on additional benefits. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction - Introduction 
 
 
The benefits of collaboration are well-documented in literature. They include sharing 
information, reducing procurement costs, learning from each other, bundling 
purchasing volumes, and using scarce resources efficiently (Johnson, 1999; Nollet and 
Beaulieu, 2005; Schotanus, 2007; Tella and Virolainen, 2005). The very existence of 
cooperatives, the pooled procurement of essential medicines by the Caribbean states,  
collaboration of thousands of hospitals in the USA, the formation of group purchasing 
organisations, the inter library purchasing schemes, all indicate that collaboration has 
been recognised by the purchasing profession. It could even be an important trend of 
the future (Carter et al., 2000; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003; Walker et al., 2003). 
Considering the advantages of collaboration, developing countries and Africa in 
particular which lag behind in the development of their economies, are qualified to be 
the home of collaboration. They are qualified for collaboration because their costs of 
operations are high. Each procurement unit does not have high volumes to justify 
discounts and does not use the limited resources and knowledge optimally.   
 
Purchasing collaboration is not well established in developing countries. Previous 
research indicates that behavioural aspects may play an important role for the 
explanation of this phenomenon (Boddy et al., 2000). Additionally, with the sub-
Saharan African societies which tend to be less dynamic and more resistant to change 
compared with industrialised societies (Tigineh, 2000), there are good reasons to 
worry about when developing countries and African countries in particular aim to 
attain the level of collaboration required to make a substantive development record.  
 
It is not clear what the precise role of behavioural aspects is in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in developing countries (Boddy et al., 2000). In addition, it is not known 
whether these behavioural aspects can be influenced in a positive way. Therefore, the 
need to understand the level of the current horizontal purchasing collaboration in 
developing countries exists. We aim at making a contribution through explaining the 
behavioural aspects of horizontal purchasing collaboration and by suggesting a 
working guide on how to handle horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing 
countries. 
 
This chapter helps the reader understand the topic being studied and justifies why we 
studied the topic. We start with a general definition of horizontal purchasing 
collaboration and continue by briefly showing its advantages and disadvantages. We 
then include the rationale of the study. To put our study into context, we include a 
background to the study, which leads to the problem statement. Next, we discuss the 
focus of the study. Then we briefly explain each of the main constructs of the study 
(trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence). Finally, we include the research 
outline to guide our readers on the organisation and presentation of the rest of the 
contents. 
1.1  Definition of horizontal purchasing collaboration 
 
In the literature, there are many definitions of horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
Hendrick (1997) defines it as an arrangement where two or more independent 
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organisations join together, either formally of informally, or through an independent 
third party, for the purpose of combining their individual requirements for purchased 
materials, services, and capital goods to leverage more value added pricing, service, 
and technology from their external suppliers than could be obtained if each firm 
purchased goods and services alone. 
 
Simatupang and Sridharan (2005) define it as a process of sharing information, 
decision synchronisation, and incentives alignment. Rozenmeijer (2000) also defines 
it in a similar way, but he does not include the incentives alignment dimension. Other 
scholars have explained it with almost similar views (e.g., Carter et al., 2000; 
Doucette, 1997; Johnson, 1999; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003, 2005). 
 
In this dissertation, we define horizontal purchasing collaboration as according to 
Schotanus (2007). Schotanus defines horizontal purchasing collaboration as the 
operational, tactical, and/or strategic cooperation between two or more organisations 
in one or more steps of the purchasing process by pooling and/or sharing their 
purchasing volumes, information, and or resources in order to create symbiosis. This 
broad description allows us to study various levels of horizontal purchasing 
collaboration.  
 
1.2  Advantages and disadvantages of horizontal purchasing collaboration 
 
Collaborative purchasing arrangements exist to attain a certain goal (Kamann et al., 
2004; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003; Rozenmeijer, 2000). The benefits of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration have been well documented in the literature. Various 
benefits of purchasing collaboration are:  
· Sharing information and more accurate information (Nollet and Beaulieu, 
2005; Schotanus, 2007; Tella and Virolainen, 2005); 
· Reducing procurement costs (Johnson, 1999; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005; Tella 
and Virolainen, 2005); 
· Sharing resources/processes (Schotanus, 2007); 
· Learning from each other (Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005); 
· Bundling purchasing volumes (Schotanus, 2007) leading to price reduction 
(Johnson, 1999); 
· Ability to attract new suppliers (Johnson, 1999); 
· Greater management (human resource) capabilities (Johnson, 1999); 
· Counterbalancing suppliers (Bakker and Walker, 2008). 
 
Besides, sometimes the ever changing business context (like internationalisation, 
developments in information and communication technology, government regulation 
and increased public attention to the way business is done) makes horizontal 
purchasing collaboration worthwhile, because it may enable entities to operate and 
manage large scale and/or complex tasks.  
 
We note that horizontal purchasing collaboration may not be interesting in all 
circumstances. In general, the failure rate of collaborations has been reported to be 
high, as far as two thirds (The Economist, 1999). Various disadvantages according to 
Johnson (1999) of horizontal purchasing collaboration that make it not interesting are: 
· High coordination cost; 
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· Complexity of collaboration activities; 
· Difficulties in standardisation and compliance; 
· Free riding; 
· Governance of the collaboration. 
 
Schotanus and Telgen (2007), in addition to the above further identify the following: 
· Set up costs for the collaboration; 
· Loosing flexibility, since products/services purchased must have a high 
similarity among group members; 
· Loosing control by individual members; 
· Supplier resistance; 
· Anti-trust legislation.  
 
All together, horizontal purchasing collaboration may be worthwhile in a lot of 
situations. However, as we discuss in this thesis, several disadvantages related to 
behavioural issues may be particularly relevant for developing countries.  
 
1.3  Rationale for the study 
 
Collaborative purchasing is an especially interesting concept for public organisations 
(Schotanus, 2007). Schotanus notes that there is no or almost no mutual competition 
between public organisations, thus there are few or no issues regarding confidentiality 
of information. In addition, public organisations have similar structures, networks, 
purchasing needs, a common environment, and a common goal to maximize the value 
of the taxpayers’ money. These factors make it easier to collaborate and explain why 
collaborative purchasing is quite common in the public sector of many countries.  
 
Although collaborative purchasing is a popular concept in many countries, we note 
that it has not been practiced in most of the public Procuring and Disposing Entities 
(PDEs) in Uganda. Where it has been practiced, it is in a few processes. We also note 
that the number of collaborative initiatives in Uganda does not increase much. This 
may make organisational units lose benefits of collaborative purchasing as mentioned 
above.  
 
There is a substantial total value of purchases by public organisations, but research 
has largely ignored public purchasing (Johnson, 1999). Although several studies have 
been carried out on horizontal purchasing collaboration in the public sector in 
developed countries (e.g., Johnson, 1999; Laing and Cotton, 1997; Nollet and 
Beaulieu, 2003; et cetera), there is still a remarkable lack of literature on public 
procurement, in scientific analysis and accumulated knowledge (Telgen, 2007). From 
the above argument, we note that literature does not provide a clear explanation for 
the lack of collaborative purchasing in Uganda.  
 
Looking specifically at the situation in Uganda, we note that whereas there is some 
literature on developed countries, it may not be relevant in the developing world 
(Meyer, 1997) and in the Ugandan context. The conceptual equivalence of 
behavioural aspects in developing countries is likely to be different from developed 
countries (Atkinson and Butcher, 2003). Theories developed in developed countries 
remain untested in the situation of developing countries (Sommer et al., 1996) and do 
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not consider phenomena such as cross-cultural dimensions (Gemunden, 1997). The 
reasons described above provide the rationale for this study. 
 
1.4  Background to the study 
 
The Ugandan public units spend a lot on services, supplies and works. For example, in 
2007/2008, about 70% of the public budget (Ushs 3046.54 billion, which is about 
1.27 billion Euros) was estimated to pass through the procurement system. Therefore 
government Procuring and Disposing Entities (PDEs), have to be accountable to the 
public1. Moreover, they are expected to minimise operational costs and not to exceed 
their respective budget limits. The fact that the public sector has to compete with the 
private sector, for example for the scarce qualified staff and limited supply of certain 
types of products, further compels the PDEs to seek for ways of operating efficiently 
and effectively. 
 
According to the 2006/2007 budget speech, inefficient procurement procedures 
resulted into Ushs 120 billion (about 50 million Euros) loss. The speech 
recommended promotion of coordination between the sectors. This would reduce on 
the number of transactions involved in the activities involved in the procurement 
cycle (Appendix E) in Uganda. Instead of each of the 271 PDEs carrying out 
transactions individually, collaborative purchasing would reduce duplications of 
efforts and activities. 
One of the factors that seem to make it more difficult to collaborate in Uganda is that 
public units tend to have an individualistic focus. Each entity is accountable on its 
own; even if it carries out a purchase transaction with others, the “ownership culture” 
can be noticed.  
We note that for developing countries, it is the behavioural dimension, rather than 
economic, legal or technical dimensions, which is less understood in the literature 
(Boddy et al., 2000; Lambert et al., 1998). So, we do not understand yet very well 
how the behavioural aspects of the exchange relationship (such as trust, commitment, 
reciprocity and dependence) impact horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing 
countries. We justify our choice of the behavioural approach to collaboration in detail 
in Chapter 3. Below, we briefly mention why these factors are of interest to our study.  
We find trust (we define trust as one’s belief that the other partner will act in a 
consistent manner and do what he or she says he or she will do) interesting to study 
because it is typically difficult to be achieved by public units in Uganda. The culture 
in developing countries and specifically Uganda is such that one unit suspects the 
other as not being trustworthy (GOU Report, 2004). 
We find commitment (the belief that the trading partners are willing to devote energy 
to sustaining the relationship) interesting to study in Uganda because in the African 
region, collaboration is weak and largely informal (Ochola, 2007). Ochola further 
names lack of commitment, as being an important reason why the formal 
collaborative initiatives are battling for survival. Also, most public units and 
horizontal purchasing collaborations are not aware of their mission and objectives 
(PPDA report, 2006), yet according to Choppin (1994), commitment will be best 
achieved when people involved in the collaboration believe in its mission and 
objectives, and when they are aware of their potential to contribute to them.  
                                                
1 Note that we sometimes refer to PDEs as entities in the rest of the dissertation. 
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Reciprocity (a state of relationship where an organisation gives something to another 
organisation in return for something else), is interesting to study in Uganda. This may 
not always be the case in developing countries and particularly in Uganda. For 
example according to the GOU report, (2006), entities keep watching the input of 
others and accordingly adjust their input. 
Dependence (the extent to which a partner provides important and critical resources 
for which there are few alternative sources of supply) is an interesting factor to 
examine in Uganda. This is because public units in Uganda, in addition to being 
specialised, lack sufficient resources to manage on their own or adapt diverse capacity 
within their individual units. They have to rely on others.  
We note from the literature that several other factors influence horizontal purchasing 
collaboration as well (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Bakker et al., 2006b; Beamish, 
1987; Bignoux, 2006; Brennan and Turnbull, 1999; Das and Teng, 2002; Enthoven, 
1994; Fryxell et al., 2002; Gambetta, 1988; Harrison, 2005; Hendrick, 1997; 
Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001; Huber et al., 2004; Klein Woolthuis, 1999; Kogut, 
1998; Leonidou et al., 2006; Liden et al., 1997; Luo, 1997; Mattsson, 1999; Morgan 
and Hunt, 1994; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005; Schotanus, 2007; Whan and Taewon, 
2005). These factors include, among other things, organisation, communication, 
allocation of gains and costs, formality of the group, knowledge on how to cooperate, 
distance between parties, and uniformity of the members.  
 
We also note from the literature (Bignoux, 2006; Brennan and Turnbull, 1999; 
Gambetta, 1988; Liden et al., 1997; Mattsson, 1999; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Whan 
and Taewon, 2005) that trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence cause the 
most variability in collaboration. We argue that this literature was developed in and 
may largely apply to the developed countries, but it is not clear whether this also 
applies to developing countries. Therefore, it is important to understand behavioural 
aspects in horizontal purchasing collaboration in the developing countries context.  
 
We acknowledge that there are factors which could moderate the relationship between 
behavioural and horizontal purchasing collaboration like structure, culture, 
governance, knowledge, legal issues, form of collaboration, size, and internal support. 
However, entities in developing countries and particularly PDEs in Uganda, being 
public, have similarities across all PDEs in Uganda and are similar to purchasing 
collaboration situations in developed countries. For example all PDEs in Uganda have 
similar structures, are governed by the same PPDA Act, staff have standard 
qualifications (though in five PDEs some staff members are more qualified and at 
higher civil service ranks). All the staff, even with diverse first degree qualifications, 
are trained under the PPDA directorate of training, go through similar training 
modules, and have similar basic knowledge in procurement; the laws and standard 
documents are similar, the size of PDEs is similar (apart from five major ones) and all 
get similar internal support from the operational structures as per the PPDA Act 
(2003). We recognise that similar studies on collaboration which have included 
culture as a moderating variable involve international respondents. Since all the 
considered PDEs under our study operate in Uganda (and 97% operate in Kampala, 
the capital city), the same environment makes culture less likely to significantly cause 
variability in horizontal purchasing collaboration. Because of these factors being 
similar across the PDEs, we do not consider them to be the focus of interest in our 
study. 
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1.5  Focus of the study 
 
The ultimate goal of the government as required by the Public Procurement and 
Disposal of Assets (PPDA) Act, 2003 is to achieve fairness, transparency, 
accountability, and value for money. To achieve this goal, various strategies have to 
be undertaken. We believe that horizontal purchasing collaboration, because of its 
associated advantages, could be one such strategy to realise this goal.  
 
As mentioned in Section 1.4, we pose that the behavioural aspects should be well 
understood and applied. This may help improving the current state of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in Uganda.  
 
In line with the introduction, background, and problem above, our main focus of this 
study is threefold: 
· To understand what is happening with respect to behavioural aspects in 
horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries (Uganda); 
· To understand why and how the behavioural aspects influence horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in developing countries; 
· To apply the understanding of the behavioural aspects to start and/or enhance 
horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries (Uganda). 
 
The first goal requires a descriptive design since it seeks to increase understanding of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration, provides a basis for improving practice, and 
gives more insights to horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda. The second 
goal requires an analytical design since it seeks to develop theory and a collaboration 
development process explains relationships between variables in the study and carries 
out a practical check on the findings of the study. The third goal requires both a 
prescriptive design and an analytical design since it seeks to explain how to apply the 
understanding of behavioural aspects, provides a practical guidance on how to 
improve behavioural aspects in horizontal purchasing collaboration, and also carries 
out an empirical check of the suggested guidance.  
 
1.6  Research outline 
 
The main goals of this research are to understand behavioural aspects in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in developing countries (Uganda), to understand why and 
how the behavioural aspects influence horizontal purchasing collaboration in 
developing countries (Uganda), and to apply this understanding of the behavioural 
aspects to handle horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries 
(Uganda). Chapters of our thesis are systematically arranged to realise these goals (see 
also Section 1.7). We summarise the outline of the dissertation in the next sections. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
We begin the dissertation with the introduction of the study. In the introduction, we 
define horizontal purchasing collaboration, the advantages and disadvantages, and the 
rationale for the study. To put the study into practical context, we include the 
background to the study. The focus of the study is included to inform the reader of 
which specific aspects the study is concerned with. We then include the relevance of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration to Ugandan entities.  
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Chapter 2: The research approach 
In Chapter 2, our objective is to justify and present the relevant methodological 
choices that enable us to realise our goals. We include the philosophical perspective 
of our research. Since our goals involve understanding, explaining relationships and 
application, we accordingly find merit in using the Van Aken (1994) design of not 
only looking at “how organisations work” (matching with our first two goals of 
understanding), but also considering “how should organisations work” (matching with 
our third goal of application). This means we have to strike a balance between rigour 
and relevance of our work. For this reason, we include an analysis of the rigour-
relevance dilemma and link this to our study. 
Chapter 3: Literature review 
After introducing our study topic and showing why we make various methodological 
choices, we consider the theoretical review of the issues we are studying. Our 
objective is to identify relevant knowledge holes in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration. We do this by considering various related theories to collaboration and 
analysing their relevance specifically to our study. We review the behavioural 
constructs and the models which have used a behavioural approach to explain 
collaboration. We develop hypotheses and derive suggestions for guidance on how 
horizontal purchasing collaboration should be handled in practice (Chapter 7).  
Chapter 4: Exploratory studies on current horizontal purchasing collaboration 
in Uganda 
In Chapter 3, we state that there are hardly any publications available on horizontal 
purchasing collaboration that may address issues particular to developing countries 
and Uganda. We therefore carried out two exploratory studies with an objective to 
better understand the issues in our study, and to further develop hypotheses. We also 
derive suggestions to how horizontal purchasing collaboration should be applied.  
 
Most of this work was presented and published in the IMP 2006 conference 
proceedings and in the Journal of Global Business Issues. This chapter and some of 
the chapters that follow are written in such a way that they can be read and understood 
on their own as in the theses of, among others, Cruijssen (2006), Glatthorn and Joyner 
(2005), Heijboer (2003), and Schotanus (2007). In Chapter 4, we aim at partly 
answering the following question: What is the state of current horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in Uganda? We use the results of this chapter as a further basis for 
hypothesis development and practical implications (Chapter 7). 
Chapter 5: An in-depth case of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda 
In Chapter 5, we consider the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) case. This is a 
relevant practical case. We found it interesting in revealing some insights to further 
develop hypotheses and use in the application of horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
 
We introduce and justify the case, then include the method we use in analysing the in-
depth case, the general and procurement related background of the JLOS horizontal 
purchasing collaboration, and the motivation to collaborate under the Sector Wide 
Approach (SWAp) framework. We include a detailed discussion of the findings, 
develop hypothesis and finally derive lessons for practical implications (Chapter 7). 
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Chapter 6: The survey 
In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, we develop hypotheses. Whereas Chapter 3 gives a strong 
theoretical base which leads to correlational hypotheses, the exploratory studies 
(Chapter 4), and the in-depth case (Chapter 5), mainly give practical insights that 
support the development of hypotheses that deal with the current level of variables 
under the study. In Chapter 6, we extend the knowledge gathered over the previous 
chapters to carry out a survey to test the hypotheses posed. We apply more relevant 
methodological options (and justify how and why) in the various survey processes 
with a high level of rigour to ensure valid results. 
 
We present the findings and discuss results of the survey, according to the hypotheses. 
We present the hypotheses that seek to know the level of existence of variables in 
Uganda first, and then proceed with the hypotheses that deal with correlation between 
the variables. After the presentation of the findings, we present a conceptual model 
with results. We then present the limitations met in the study and end with practical 
implications. 
Chapter 7: A collaboration development process model 
The previous chapters, specifically Chapter 3 (literature review), Chapter 4 (two 
exploratory studies), Chapter 5 (in-depth case study), and Chapter 6 (the survey) give 
us insights that enable us to realise our third goal of the study (application). We 
extend these insights to Chapter 7, to suggest a collaboration development process 
model. We do this by carrying out a detailed case study to fill in the missing elements 
in the known knowledge of starting and or sustaining a horizontal purchasing 
collaborative initiative in developing countries’ context.  
Chapter 8: Practical check 
From our findings, we find out that the level of collaboration is important for 
realisation of benefits of collaboration. From our model, we note that improving the 
level of collaboration is determined by an improvement in the behavioural factors 
(trust, commitment, dependence and reciprocity). We use theory to provide guidance 
on how these behavioural factors can be improved. We then carry out an empirical 
check, to test the correctness and usefulness of the suggested guidance. 
Chapter 9: Wrap up  
In Chapter 9, we aim at giving a summary of the whole thesis. We restate our research 
goals and hypotheses. For each chapter, we include a summary of the methods used 
and the major findings. 
 
1.7  Overview of the thesis 
 
We aim at understanding horizontal purchasing collaboration and how to apply it in 
Uganda. We first introduce the study in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, we explain the 
research approach in more detail. Chapter 3 (literature review), Chapter 4 (exploratory 
studies), and Chapter 5 (in-depth case) enable us to develop hypotheses and derive 
insights for the practical guidance. We then conduct the survey (Chapter 6), to test 
hypotheses posed. Again, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 enable us to get insights on how 
horizontal purchasing collaboration should be handled and improved (Chapters 7 and 
8). In Chapter 9, we wrap up the study. In Figure 1.1, an overview of the thesis is 
presented. 
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Fig. 1.1 Research outline 
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Chapter 2 – The research approach 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1, we introduced our study on horizontal purchasing collaboration. In this 
chapter, we present and justify the research strategy we adopt to realise our goals. We 
link our work to the general philosophy of science. To show how our research differs 
from other research undertakings, we present our methodological points of departure. 
 
This chapter will be a base of our research philosophy and methodological choices in 
the subsequent chapters. We include Figure 2.1 to show the position of Chapter 2 in 
the outline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 Research outline 
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For our methodological points of departure, three points are relevant. First, we use a 
methodological pluralist approach. Second, we take positivist and anti-positivist 
approaches as complementary. And third, we carry out both descriptive and 
prescriptive research. In the next sections, we discuss these three points.  
 
Methodological pluralist approach 
This study takes up both a case study design and a survey design. Our case study 
design seeks for deep qualitative data, especially by interviews, to understand 
horizontal purchasing collaboration issues. Under the case study approach, we also 
use some aspects of exploratory designs. The exploratory design is relevant since for 
public procurement some of the issues being investigated are new and no previous 
research in Uganda exists. It is also relevant to get insights for further future inquiry 
(Yin, 2003). 
 
Our survey design uses a cross-sectional approach to get quantitative data and make 
quantitative predictions of factors related to horizontal purchasing collaboration. It 
also enables us to analyse correlations between various constructs.  
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Using two different methodological designs in social studies is widely accepted. This 
is due to the ontological uncertainties that still exist in social sciences (Arndt, 1985; 
Creswell, 1994; Hunt, 1991). 
 
Positivist and anti-positivist approaches 
Research being a human action, is grounded on philosophical perspectives 
(Amaratunga and Baldry, 2001). It is therefore useful to understand the philosophical 
positioning of our research to help us appreciate alternative designs and methods and 
to identify the most relevant methodological design(s) and method(s) for the study on 
hand.    
In the philosophy of science, there is a clear dichotomy between the positivist 
approach and the anti-positivist approach to research. Positivism, among other things, 
is about searching for causal explanations. It reduces the whole into its simplest 
possible elements to facilitate analysis (Easterby-Smith, 1991). Positivists rely mostly 
on quantitative methods. Post-positivists rely on narratives and case studies with 
varying skills of statistical summary as well. Anti-positivists (sometimes referred to as 
realists or interpretivists) are proponents of qualitative research (Schurr, 2007). They 
understand reality as socially constructed rather than objectively determined. 
 
The reality of research involves a lot of compromise between the two approaches. In 
relationship marketing and management, there has been a deliberate policy of using 
and accepting both approaches (Milliken, 2001; Schurr, 2007). According to 
researchers who use and/or accept both approaches, good research adopts a position 
on the continuum between the two approaches (Burell and Morgan, 1979; Gill and 
Johnson, 1991:36; Hunt, 1994). The combination of both approaches in one study is 
recommended by a number of researchers (Denzin, 1970; Hammersley and Atkinson, 
1983; Jick, 1979). They argue that advocates of a given methodological approach 
should incorporate insights from others (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). This implies 
not competing approaches, but a multi-method approach, described by Trow (1977) as 
methodological pluralism. 
 
In our research, among other things, we seek to understand causations between trust, 
commitment, reciprocity, dependence, level of collaboration, and benefits for an 
individual entity. Our study is also based on the premise that Ugandan orientation and 
interpretation toward horizontal purchasing collaboration may be different from how 
it is for developed countries, making the orientation and interpretation socially 
constructed. In addition, we do not only gather facts to measure correlations, but also 
appreciate the different constructions and meanings respondents place upon their 
experiences. As Remenyi et al. (1998) noted, we take both approaches as 
complementary rather than as opposite extremes to avoid an “epistemological crisis” 
(Susman and Evered, 1978).  
 
Descriptive and prescriptive approaches 
Van Aken (1994) provides two alternative approaches of organisational research. The 
first descriptive approach centres on how organisations work in practice. The second 
prescriptive approach centres on how organisations should work. 
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How do organisations work in practice?  
The first approach is about the traditional explanatory sciences of the empirical cycle 
that include observation, induction, deduction, testing, and evaluation. In our study, 
this approach is used at the exploratory study phase. This enables us to understand 
how public purchasing units carry out the horizontal purchasing collaboration. It also 
enables us to suggest how they should work, as suggested by Van Aken (1994). 
How should organisations work? 
The second approach centres on the question how organisations should work. This 
aims at diagnosing a situation, defining the problem, and designing practical methods 
to improve the situation. In the study on hand, we apply both approaches. We do not 
only explain events, but also suggest practical methods for improving the horizontal 
purchasing collaboration situation in developing countries and specifically in Uganda. 
We do this to at least partly resolve the rigour – relevance dilemma.  
 
Resolving the rigour – relevance dilemma 
Many research projects primarily evolve out of the desires of practitioners (Bontis, 
2002) and therefore have a relevant origin. At the same time, researchers have the 
ambition to be in an academic discipline and therefore require rigour. To improve 
rigour, academicians often tend to promote empiricism. However, the quantitative 
approach that relies on empiricism is not free from criticism, as there exists a hole in 
its operationalisation, making its validation and practical relevance questionable 
(Andriessen 2004). Equally, the qualitative approach has its own holes, because apart 
from meeting criticism of insufficient rigour, the tests of the practicability of the 
research results may not exactly be allocated to the research itself, it could be because 
of other factors, such as implementation related factors (Andriessen, 2004).  
 
Due to the rigour – relevance dilemma described above, there is an increasing gap 
between knowledge needed in the practice of business and knowledge produced in the 
academic field (Andriessen, 2005). We deal with this dilemma by taking up both the 
quantitative and qualitative approach. In the next chapters, we explain the current 
horizontal purchasing practices in Uganda (qualitative approach) and then carry out a 
quantitative survey to analyse the relationships between behavioural constructs and 
collaboration (quantitative approach). Finally, we investigate other factors that are 
necessary to have a successful horizontal purchasing collaborative arrangement 
(qualitative approach). This qualitative part may not be deeply rooted in scientific 
rigour, but it enables us to improve the validation of our results from the quantitative 
approach. This compromise is supported by Andriessen (2004) and is a trade-off 
between rigour and relevance. 
Regarding the qualitative research procedures, we note that we do not completely test 
our intervention results. We do not do this as it may be difficult to measure the effects 
of the tested method (Andriessen, 2004). Moreover, there is a logical hole in 
implementation. For instance, the failure of an intervention could be because of a poor 
research methodology or because of poor implementation. The success could be 
because of a change in environmental conditions, which are difficult to control for.  
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2.3 Conclusion 
 
In our study, we aim at understanding, explaining how and why behavioural aspects 
influence horizontal purchasing collaboration and their application in developing 
countries, specifically in Uganda. This kind of research is new in Uganda. Literature 
on our study is not fully adequate to build on. This makes some parts of the study 
explorative, with the aim of getting insights for future academic inquiry. Other parts 
of this thesis build on the explorative results using a quantitative approach.  
 
We argue that it is not enough to simply accumulate knowledge. It is worthwhile to 
know how to apply this knowledge in practice. Whereas rigour is needed in research, 
it should not be compromised for relevance of the research results. Therefore, in the 
final chapters of this thesis, we aim to qualitatively explore the application 
possibilities of our explorative and quantitative findings.  
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Chapter 3 – Literature review 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, we discussed the general methodological choices that we make to help 
us realise our research goals. In Chapter 3, we review the literature to lay a foundation 
for our subsequent discussions. To place our study into the context of existing 
knowledge, we review some of the theories (Section 3.2) and literature (Sections 3.3 
and 3.4) related to collaboration. We justify our choice of the behavioural approach to 
collaboration in more detail than in Chapter 1 (Section 3.5). For each of the 
independent constructs under study, we discuss its meaning, its importance in a 
horizontal purchasing collaboration, and the situational analysis in Uganda. We 
review the models that explain behavioural issues in collaboration and explain how 
they fail to explain what our research aims for. We then formulate hypotheses and a 
conceptual model. 
 
We include Figure 3.1 below to show the position of Chapter 3 in the outline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Research outline 
 
3.2  Theories related to collaboration 
 
As one comprehensive theory of inter-organisational collaboration has not yet 
emerged (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001), we briefly present in this section, the main 
theories that are related to the concept of horizontal purchasing collaboration. Current 
theory hints on networking theory, social exchange theory, resource based 
theory/view, and transaction cost theory/analysis. For improving behavioural factors 
for collaboration, current theory hints on institutional theory and resource dependence 
theory. In the section below, we explain these theories and discuss their relevance for 
our work. 
 
Networking theory 
In recent years, the rise of networking has been dramatic. Even state and public 
organisations and departments have moved into networks. Networking is quickly 
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following the rationale of the global economy, and as a result, we are now witnessing 
the formation of networks on a global scale. Organisations belong to networks to 
enable them to deal with meta-problems. Networks are mostly voluntary (Mitchell 
and Shortell, 2000; Weiner et al., 2000), member controlled, and self-regulatory.  
Networking theory is one of the major theories related to collaboration (Burt, 1982; 
Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Wasserman and Galaskiewicz, 1985). It conceptualises 
autonomous organisations as embedded in networks of linkages, which both facilitate 
and constrain their actions and shape their interests (Nohria and Gulati, 1994). 
Together, the organisations reach goals that none of them can reach separately 
(Chisholm, 1998). The network approach offers a particularly powerful descriptive 
tool for analyzing contemporary inter-organisational exchange.  
Proponents of a network perspective argue that the most significant aspects of an 
organisation are not its individual characteristics, but it is the set of the other 
organisations with which it interacts and the pattern of relationships among them. 
Though these organisations look legally separate, they are in actual sense 
operationally synchronised. As Barley et al. (1992) put it, ‘not only are the 
organisations suspended in multiple, complex, and overlapping webs of relationships, 
the webs are likely to exhibit structural patterns that are invisible from the standpoint 
of a single organisation caught in the tangle’. These structural patterns, and the 
positions of organisations within them, have a significant impact on the degree to 
which organisations are able to control their own actions and influence those of 
others.  
 
Relevance of the network approach to our study 
Clearly, organisations’ participating in one or more horizontal purchasing 
collaborations is a form of networking. Networking theory confirms the importance of 
such collaborations – in case they are successful – as it emphasises the value of these 
relationships. This is especially the case for Ugandan PDEs, as these PDEs are 
relatively small and are often faced with meta-problems. For example, managing the 
procurement of works in a smaller non-technical PDE is very difficult without 
referring to the PDE associated with works. This makes Ugandan PDEs unable to 
individually attain higher goals. They need to network so that they either purchase 
together, and or operationally refer opportunities to each other. 
 
Based on the theory, it can also be stated that it is important that organisations are able 
to network. Note that in Uganda, even PDEs are often not willing to share confidential 
information. There is imperfection of knowledge among the PDEs on, among other 
things, opportunities, availability of experts in the country, availability of more 
efficient and effective suppliers, and better quality products.  
 
Social exchange theory 
Social exchange theory concerns a joint activity with at least two parties and each 
party has something the other values (Lawler, 2001). Both traditional marketing and 
neoclassical exchange theories believe transactions are a one-time exchange of values 
between two parties, who have no prior or subsequent interaction (Webster, 1992). 
However, Lazonick (1990) notes that this definition only works in so far as 
collaborating parties have equal, unrestricted access to each other’s resources. As 
soon as this condition is violated, the conditions for market exchange disappear, and 
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an impersonal relation between the parties is necessary. This is when the behavioural 
factors become more important in the relationship. Factors such as trust, commitment, 
reciprocity, and dependence will keep the relationship on going.   
 
Relevance of social exchange theory to our study 
In horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries and in Uganda, PDEs 
are at the same level, in terms of authority, structure, and operational procedures. 
There is access, though sometimes limited, to each others resources. The social 
exchange theory can therefore be applied. For example, the Ministry of Education and 
Sports offers human skills (in terms of highly skilled personnel to help in bid 
evaluation), while the Ministry of Works and Transport offers specialised expertise in 
deals that concern works. Both PDEs have interests to deal with each other because 
they can gain from each other.  
 
Social exchange theory agrees that inter-organisational relationships depend on the 
social networks built on behavioural factors, such as trust and commitment. This 
theory justifies the choice of behavioural constructs as an important approach to 
understanding collaboration 
 
Resource based theory/view  
The Resource Based View (RBV) looks at resources as being an important source of 
competitive advantage to an organisation. Among other things, such resources include 
assets, capabilities, organisational processes, firm attributes, information, and 
knowledge. Wernerfelt (1994) argued that competitive advantage of a firm is based on 
its resources and ability to exploit them, rather than on exogenous conditions.  
 
We note that in the public sector, entities do not largely compete over business as is 
the case in private sector (perhaps they have started to compete for funding and 
suppliers who have unique and limited goods and skills). However, the core focus is 
not yet about competition (Bakker et al., 2008) but about efficiency and effectiveness 
of running their individual entities. 
 
In an organisation with different units (in our case entities), RBV maintains that a 
capability can sometimes be much more valuable when combined with others 
(Ordanini and Rubera, 2008). This synergistic effect that different capabilities may 
have (Mata et al., 1995) fits into our collaboration study. The central idea of RBV is 
that through collaboration, the parties get access to some resources that they 
themselves lack (Karjalainen, 2008). For example, many PDEs in Uganda do not have 
sufficient manpower (Auditor General Report, 2007); a condition which motivates 
PDEs with low personnel requirements (both in numbers and expertise) to collaborate 
with those who have relatively sufficient personnel requirements. 
 
According to Powell and Dent-Micallef (1997), combination potential is leveraged by 
conditions of co-specialisation; where one capability has less or no value without the  
other one while complementarity arises when the value of a capability is enhanced by 
the presence of another one, due to synergistic effects. 
 
Relevance of RBV to our study 
RBV seems particularly relevant for examining horizontal purchasing collaborations 
in Uganda, because PDEs use these collaborations to gain access to other PDEs’ 
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valuable and rare resources. A few studies have already applied RBV to 
collaborations, but they apply RBV to limited aspects (Tyler and Steensma, 1995; 
Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995). So, using RBV to explain collaboration, 
especially in a developing country like Uganda with notable shortages in resource 
availability to individual PDEs, could be of theoretical and practical contribution. The 
RBV’s rationale is about value maximisation through pooling resources; thus entities 
are viewed as attempting to find optimal resource boundary through which the value 
of their resources is better realised than through other resource combinations (Das and 
Teng, 2000). 
 
We use the VRIO (Value, Rarity, Imitability, and Organisation) framework (Barney, 
1991; Conner, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989) to analyse the applicability of RBV in 
the Ugandan PDEs context. We use the VRIO framework because its elements apply 
to PDEs in Uganda (see Table 3.1). For instance, some PDEs have more value than 
others in different resources than the others. Some of the PDEs have unique resources 
that others need to use, yet they can not easily imitate them.   
 
Table 3.1 Applicability of RBV to the study 
VRIO 
Framework 
Case for Ugandan PDEs 
Value Resources/capabilities in Ugandan PDEs are of value (economic importance). 
For example, some PDEs have skills and accumulated tacit knowledge that can 
improve their positions through saving costs by carrying out their own tasks 
other than hiring private experts.  
Rare Resources/capabilities are rare in some PDEs and not available to other PDEs.  
Inimitable The resources/capabilities in Ugandan PDEs meet the criterion of being 
isolated from imitation or substitution. Resources/capabilities in a PDE are 
specialised and immobile, making it costly to replicate (Peteraf and Bergen, 
2003). Even if replication was possible, it would take a lot of time for entities 
to do so.  
Organisational 
support 
There is organisational support, with management support and processes to 
support collaboration.  
 
Whereas a resource is an observable asset, a capability is not (Makadok, 2001), thus 
making it difficult for the latter to be imitated. Horizontal purchasing collaboration 
may be necessary in bringing up entities together to share some of the capabilities that 
may be difficult to imitate if they operate independently. PDEs have various 
specialisations, similarities, and also differences, but they are complementary. For 
instance, some of the PDEs are more technical in nature (e.g., Ministry of Energy, 
Ministry of Works) whereas others have a service nature (e.g., Ministry of Labour, 
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology). Their resources are only 
available to others when the actors operate together (Kamann, et al, 2004). So, RBV 
helps us to appreciate that shortage of resources stimulates horizontal purchasing 
collaboration (Wernerfelt 1984).  
 
Transaction cost theory  
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory (Williamson, 1981) is a common research 
framework for studying inter-organisational collaboration. TCE suggests that 
collaborating entities will work together as long as the total transaction costs of the 
group members are lower than if each worked separately (Schotanus, 2007).  
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Four key concepts arise out of the TCE. In the next sections, we discuss these 
concepts.  
 
Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality emphasises that although people may intend to make a rational 
decision, their rational capacity is limited since they can not accurately evaluate (or 
even know) all the possible alternatives (Hindess, 1988). In horizontal collaborative 
relationships, benefits are expected in the future. Partners may not know the outcomes 
of collaboration and this may affect the formation and sustainability of collaboration. 
However, bounded rationality can be reversed through mutual forecasts of the parties, 
and taking a long term view of the relationship (Ganesan, 1994). The behavioural 
perspectives of trust and commitment enable the entities to focus on outcomes rather 
than emphasising on the current operations. Trust smoothens out the business 
relationship operations and makes partners view the short run benefits from an 
opportunistic defection as being outweighed by the long run benefits from continued 
cooperation (Montgomery, 1998). 
 
Opportunism 
Opportunism is self interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1985). Collaborating 
partners may seek to exploit situations. In a well functioning collaboration, when 
parties focus on the quality of collaboration outputs, it reduces opportunism. As a 
result, trust and commitment typically increase (Wilding and Humphries, 2006). 
 
Asset specificity 
Asset specificity is about substitutability, complementarity, and redeployment of 
assets owned by parties in a collaborative arrangement. Asset specificity discourages 
collaboration when one partner to an exchange has invested resources specific to that 
exchange which have little or no value in an alternative use. Asset specificity 
dimensions include natural resources, physical assets, human resources, dedicated 
investments which can not be put to other uses (Williamson, 1983), and time 
specificity where value is highly dependent on reaching the user within a specified, 
relatively limited period of time (Malone et al., 1987).  
 
Information asymmetry  
Many business exchanges are characterised by incomplete, imperfect or asymmetrical 
information. It is incomplete to the different parties in the collaboration, even when 
they all face the same situation. For instance, in most cases, Ugandan ministries have 
public information, which is known to all parties, but there is also private information 
which is available to a few. 
 
Relevance of TCE to our study 
From the discussion above, it is clear that TCE views people as calculative. Longer 
runs, larger batches, indirect costs divided by larger volumes, learning curve effects, 
are some of the possible causes for reduced costs (Kamann, et al, 2004). Kamann et 
al., however, note that though cooperation increases internal and external coordination 
costs, such costs are assumed to be off-set by better prices – as a result of leverage 
effects or even oligopolistic or monopolistic market behaviour – and production scale 
effects plus lower purchasing costs.  
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Institutional theory 
Institutional theory suggests that in order to survive, organisations should conform to 
the rules and belief systems prevailing in the environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Scott, 1995). The theory focuses on the deeper aspects of social structure and 
suggests that structures, rules, norms, routines, problem solving mechanisms, 
implementing promises, and involvement of stakeholders are authoritative guidelines 
for social behaviour. 
 
Relevance of institutional theory to our study 
The collaborative initiatives in Uganda are relatively in their initial phases of 
development. They do not yet have a clear working structure. The rules, norms, and 
routines have not yet been fully institutionalised. The necessary actions for improving 
behavioural factors like implementing promises and involving top management can be 
explained by the institutional theory. 
 
Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory is based on the premise that the control over critical 
resources of one focal organisation is the most important determinant of 
organisational behaviour (Werner, 2008). The basic argument is that organisations are 
dependent on resources, which resources originate from the environment. Since the 
environment contains other organisations, each organisation requires other 
organisations since they have part of the resources needed. Each organisation (in our 
case PDE) therefore develops behaviour aspects (trust, commitment, reciprocity, and 
dependence) through developing competences, walking the talk, ensuring that there 
are timely interventions, and developing experiences to improve. 
 
Relevance of resource dependence theory to our study 
The resource dependence theory is based on control of critical resources. PDEs in 
Uganda lack critical resources. This makes them depend on other entities and also 
determines the individual entity behaviour to collaboration. Consequently, the actions 
which are necessary by individual entities to improve behavioural factors for 
collaboration like developing competences, walking the talk, and timely intervention 
can be explained by the resource dependence theory. 
Choice of theories to use in the study  
We note from literature and practice, that all the theories discussed above are used to 
explain collaboration. However, we mainly consider five theories: networking theory, 
RBV, social exchange theory. For developing behavioural factors (Chapter 8), we also 
mainly consider institutional theory and resource dependence theory. These are most 
relevant to our study in the developing countries (note that the choice of these five 
theories does not mean the rest or other theories, cannot be applicable or that we 
cannot infer to them in our study). We use these theories for developing hypotheses. 
We do not mainly use the TCE theory since the transaction costs upon which the 
theory is based, is not a primary consideration in government procurement entities. 
We elaborate more on our choice of theories in the respective sections in which we 
develop our hypotheses.  
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3.3  Literature on horizontal collaboration 
 
In this section, we summarise the general published literature on horizontal 
collaboration. We find it necessary to first review general literature, because 
according to Kamann (2004), theoretical arguments from general collaboration 
literature and the various listings of requirements, also apply to joint purchasing 
activities for a large extent. 
 
We mainly use literature published in key journals. Though literature from textbooks 
mostly overlaps with journal publications (Schotanus, 2007), we selectively consider 
literature from textbooks that is not explicitly replicated in the journals. 
 
Table 3.2 Published literature on horizontal collaboration 
Author(s) Contribution to the field of horizontal collaboration 
Hoffmann and 
Schlosser (2001) 
Although there is an extensive amount of literature dealing with inter-
organisational relationships, a comprehensive theory of inter-organisational 
relationships has not yet emerged. Both content oriented factors and process 
oriented factors play an important role in cooperative (collaborative) purchasing. 
Hoffmann and Schlosser make an important contribution by identifying (critical) 
success factors for horizontal collaboration.  
Fine and Whitney 
(1996); Macdonald 
(1995); Singh and 
Mitchell (1996) 
Although some studies have portrayed collaboration negatively, collaboration is 
generally appreciated to largely reduce the negative aspects, especially if social 
aspects of collaboration exist. 
Ireland et al. (2002) Strategic alliances are an important source of resources, learning, and thereby 
competitive advantage. Few entities have all of the resources needed to operate 
effectively in the current dynamic landscape. Thus, entities seek access to the 
necessary resources through alliances. To maximise cooperation among the 
partners, a trust-based relationship must be developed.  
Das and Teng 
(2001a) 
All entities in collaboration should not perceive they are under rewarded, so that 
they restore equity themselves. Restoring equity themselves would lead to 
reduced levels of commitment to the collaboration 
Naut et al. (2001) Success of horizontal alliances depends crucially on aligning individual alliance-
member incentives with those of the alliance as a whole, therefore it is important 
to find coordination mechanisms that achieve this alignment and are simple-to-
implement. 
Chisholm (1998) Collaboration involves a set of autonomous organisations that come together to 
reach goals that none of them can reach separately. 
Perry et al. (2002) Trust and commitment are the building blocks of alliance effectiveness.  
Oum et al. (2001) Horizontal alliances make a significant contribution to productivity gains. They 
also found out that the level of cooperation in horizontal alliances influences the 
strength of alliance effect on productivity and profitability 
Castells (1996) Inside the collaboration, new possibilities are relentlessly created, while outside 
the collaboration, survival is increasingly difficult.  
Anderson and 
Narus (1990) 
In a well functioning collaborative relationship, the boundary between the 
involved firms becomes blurred so that it is hard to discern where one 
organisation begins and the other ends. The developed collaborative norms like 
role integrity, solidarity, flexibility, and information sharing become an integral 
part of operations, which make the parties aim at similar goals. 
Doukidis (2008) Collaboration has been difficult to implement. This has been because of high 
level of reluctance to implement horizontal collaboration due to the lack of 
strategic decision support framework. Whereas relatively more efforts to 
implement horizontal collaboration have been put in economic, technical, and 
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other perspectives, the behavioural aspects like trust, commitment, reciprocity, 
and dependence have notably been missing. 
Enakrire and 
Onyenania (2007) 
Cooperation and coordination of systems managers and the advocates of 
networking have been less successful in Africa, with notable insufficient 
meetings. 
Enakrie and 
Onyenania (2007) 
Inadequate human resources in Africa results into centralisation of technical 
expertise in an attempt to get the greatest value out of a scarce resource 
Horizontal purchasing collaboration as noted above is important for developing 
countries, since with its adoption, conditions can be realised such as sharing 
resources, the need to seek economies of scale, and other published benefits, which 
are much needed in the developing countries.  
 
The existing literature suggests that to cope with today’s increasing complexity, 
organisations have become more collaborative. The literature also notes that working 
together in collaboration involves behavioural aspects, which need to be well 
explained. Behavioural aspects have a strong influence on collaboration, especially 
where there have been no experiences to motivate collaboration. 
 
3.4  Literature on horizontal purchasing collaboration  
 
After presenting general literature on horizontal collaboration, we now consider 
specific literature on horizontal purchasing collaboration. We note literature is still 
rare, especially literature relating to the developing countries like Uganda. We mainly 
consider literature published in recognised journals.  
 
Table 3.3 Published literature on horizontal purchasing collaboration 
Author(s) Contribution to the field of horizontal purchasing collaboration 
Essig (2000); Rozenmeijer, 
(2000a)  
The authors discussed the horizontal purchasing collaboration practices 
used by local entities to transfer to central entity activities such as 
bidding and contract management. This approach makes it possible for 
the members of the group to acquire additional power vis-à-vis 
suppliers; consequently, they get more favourable conditions than 
those they would have obtained individually. In a similar way, 
consolidation reduces administrative costs, since the negotiation 
process is performed by only one organisation, instead of all local 
entities. 
Essig (2000); Essig and 
Arnold (2001)  
The authors noted that collaboration through vertical relationships has 
been given due recognition, but collaboration through horizontal 
relationships (pooled purchasing) has been largely ignored. The 
authors wonder why despite the known benefits of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration (which seem to be key targets for entities), 
fewer initiatives are recognised. 
Tella and Virolainen (2005) The authors noted that horizontal purchasing collaboration seems to be 
widely applied. However, relatively little research has been undertaken 
and published. The processual dynamics underlying the evolution of 
alliances are still a relatively unexplored phenomenon. 
Galaskiewicz (1985) The motivation of the author is based on the highly fragmented body of 
knowledge in purchasing collaboration, and the uneven scholarship. 
The author notes that few studies have been replicated and that what is 
available remains “tentative findings”. The author reviews three areas 
of inter organisational relations; arenas of resource procurement and 
allocation, political advocacy and organisational legitimation. The 
author notes that analysts have focused on power dependency and the 
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problems of overcoming environmental uncertainty, coalition 
formation, and efforts at collective action and organisational efforts at 
identifying with highly legitimate societal symbols. The author notes 
that organisations have found a wide variety of ways to solve 
collaborative purchasing issues. 
Laing and Cotton (1997) The authors noted that parties in collaboration should have common 
objectives and a coterminosity of interest and should sacrifice for the 
good of the collaboration. They also noted that communication is vital 
in operations of collaboration, because it reduces tensions between 
participants. The study, however, found out that purchasing 
collaborations had failed to manage communication efficiently. The 
authors also noted that in making purchasing decisions, aimed at 
achieving majority support, consortia lead to disaffection for individual 
members and stifled innovation in terms of contracting. 
Stinchcombe (1984) The author notes that the trend towards large scale buying of health 
insurance, life assurance, and pension or annuity plans through 
employers brings up problems of sovereignty, problems of the 
incentives of service providers and problems of availability of services 
which are only available through collaborative purchasing through 
employers. The author suggests the needed social indicators for policy 
assessment. 
Ball and Pye (2000) The authors noted that most purchasing groups ore informally 
organised in their early stages of operations 
Fontenot and Wilson (1997); 
Hakansson and Snehota 
(1995); Lewin and Johnston 
(1997); Vlosky and Wilson 
(1997); Wilson (1995) 
According to the authors, many models have been developed and 
supported, especially on factors that influence the performance of 
collaboration. However, no generally acceptable model of how 
collaborations develop has yet been published. Since several different 
versions have been suggested. Wilson (1995) describes development of 
collaboration as being in infant stage.  
D’Aunno and Zuckerman 
(1987); Fu et al. (2006); 
Johnson (1999); Pett and 
Dibrell (2001); Saz-Carranza 
and Vernis (2006). 
These authors published knowledge about development of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. Apart from Johnson (1999) who developed a 
five stage conceptual model (internal, informal external, developing 
external, formal external, and redevelopment), the rest seem to agree 
on three key phases of development of a horizontal purchasing 
collaboration. Though they use different terminologies; they all seem 
to converge on formation, operation, and outcome stage. 
Cruijssen et al. (2007) The authors suggested that finding a reliable party to lead the 
cooperation and constructing a fair allocation mechanism for the 
benefits are the impediments for horizontal cooperation. 
Das and Teng (2000); 
Johnson (1999); Koza and 
Lewin (2000); Nollet and 
Beaulieu (2005); Schotanus 
(2007); Tella and Virolainen 
(2005);  
The authors published information about advantages (motives) of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration (see also Section 1.2). 
Doucette (1997); Granot and 
Sosic (2005) 
When an entity in a purchasing collaboration perceives that other 
entities are committed, the entity will be committed to the purchasing 
collaboration. 
If all entities in a purchasing collaboration benefit equally, the 
collaboration will be stable 
Bakker et al (2008); Doucette 
(1997); Hendrick (1997) 
Johnson (1999); Koza and 
Lewin, (2000); Nollet and 
Beaulieu (2005); 
Polychronakis and Syntetos 
The authors note disadvantages of horizontal purchasing collaboration; 
high coordination cost; complexity of collaboration activities, 
difficulties in standardisation and compliance, free riding, declining 
cost savings, governance of the collaboration, loss of flexibility and 
control, member commitment problems, disclosure of sensitive 
information, supplier resistance, interference by anti trust legislation 
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(2007); Schotanus et al. 
(2009); Schotanus et al. 
(2008); Schotanus and Telgen 
(2007); Tella and Virolainen 
(2005) 
and losing existing relations with suppliers. 
 
From the table, we note that academic publications that directly explain horizontal 
purchasing collaboration are relatively rare. This was also noted by Schotanus (2007). 
Those references available do not specifically address developing countries’ issues. 
There is a notable lack of solid inquiry on the African and developing world 
perspective.  
The references available do not explain the behavioural differences in between 
developed and developing countries. These differences mainly relate to availability of 
resources and the cultural set ups of the developing countries. We identify gaps in the 
level of existence of the identified behavioural variables, and the extent and direction 
these variables influence each other, given the developing counties’ context.  
Past research seems fragmented, as no single line of argument seems to come out 
clearly. For example, the behavioural aspects have no line of continuous scientific 
inquiry. This situation is more pronounced in developing countries than developed 
countries. We also note that publications that deal with behavioural aspects of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration are rare. We note that most publications that 
consider behavioural aspects are more of collaboration in general terms, not specific 
to horizontal purchasing collaboration. Purchasing being a relatively new function in 
developing countries, the general literature needs to be tailored to suit the developing 
countries/Ugandan context.  
3.5  The need to understand social factors of collaboration 
 
In this section, we justify why we choose the social dimension as a way of 
understanding behaviour and applying this to horizontal purchasing collaboration.  
 
We note that quite some previous research concerns the social dimension of 
collaboration. Researchers who previously studied social factors in the context of 
collaboration state that collaboration operations are bound with contracts embodied by 
technological and social constructions, rather than by contracts that are imposed by 
legal authorities (Hadjikhani and Thilenius, 2005). Economic action is embedded 
within a social structure in which behavioural issues are vital. Reynolds (1996) in 
relation to this noted that there is a mood of change that encourages the extension of 
more human activities into market contexts. The social constructs may be necessary to 
hold the actors in the collaboration together.  
 
As the collaboration relationship goes on, trust substitutes a formal control 
mechanism, which reduces individual behaviours. This is because when partners join 
collaboration, they tend to compromise rather than optimise their individual strategies 
(Brown and Peterson, 1993) thereby progressively developing trust. Partners keep 
changing roles and adapt different ways of interacting with each other, creating a 
circular, not a linear relationship. Formality therefore reduces. Informality then makes 
collaborating parties devote more time together and creates emotional intensity, 
mutual confiding, and reciprocal services (Granovetter 1973). The parties in 
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collaboration become inquisitive in knowing what is going on with the others. Parties 
then see each other as ethical and well intentioned (Malhotra, 2009). The various 
dimensions of a relation interact and self organise into a mutually consistent pattern of 
performance, perceptions and attitudes representing the ‘personality’ of a relationship. 
 
From the sections above, it becomes clear that we already know quite a lot on the 
social dimension of collaboration. However, Cullen et al. (2000) write that most 
previous research focuses on the hard side of collaboration management (e.g., 
financial and operational matters) and that more attention should be paid to the soft 
side of collaborative management. Cullen et al. state that attention should be shifted to 
trust, commitment, and norms of reciprocity). Our literate overview confirms this 
notion of Cullen et al. for the specific field of horizontal collaborative purchasing (see 
Section 3.4). Several scholars have published knowledge about non social factors of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration, but limited research has been done to the social 
dimension of horizontal purchasing collaboration. More than that, there is a 
remarkable lack of literature on the social dimension of (horizontal purchasing) 
collaboration in the context of developing countries. This provides an interesting 
research opportunity for our study as we discuss in the next section.  
3.6  Collaboration in Uganda 
 
Since research on (horizontal purchasing) collaboration has relatively been done more 
in the developed world, we consider the developing countries and Uganda in 
particular. In Table 3.4, we present scholars who support our reasoning. 
Table 3.4 Literature supporting developing countries collaboration 
Author Contribution 
Meyer (1997); 
Rawwas et al. 
(1997); Sommer 
et al. (1996) 
Whereas it is clear that behavioural studies have had a rich research base, they are 
based on western (notably American) research. Models should be made relevant to 
African situations, because situations may be different from developed countries. 
The time to test behavioural constructs in non-western countries has come. 
Gemunden 
(1997) 
Most research on Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) has been theoretical 
and focused on relationships -and networks-based frameworks. Yet, it mostly 
ignored international or cross-cultural dimensions. 
Easton et al. 
(2002) 
Taxonomy of IMP papers concentrated on traditional concepts of IMP research, 
such as relationship characteristics, actors-activities-resources models, and 
internationalisation and identified relatively few cross-cultural contributions. 
Samiee and 
Walters (2003) 
Stressed: “[it is] striking that cultural factors are not taken more explicitly into 
account in most of the IRM studies reviewed”. Moreover, “in an international 
context, cultural diversity is a fact of life that can be expected to have important 
implications for the development and maintenance of relationships”. 
Gronroos (1994); 
Palmer (2000) 
Collaborative relationships are conditioned by unique cultural contexts and by the 
cultural contexts where they take place. 
Atkinson and 
Butcher (2003) 
The conceptual equivalence of behavioural aspects in developing countries is likely 
to be different from developed countries. These constructs are socially constructed.  
 
From the motivation above, we note that few researches to social dimensions have 
been carried out in developing countries. More specifically, even fewer researches 
exist in Uganda. Those research articles that do exist mostly simply refer to Uganda 
on general collaboration issues and not in detail. We show these studies, their 
contributions to collaboration and some opportunities for further research in Table 
3.5. 
 
 
25
Table 3.5 Literature related to collaboration in Uganda 
Author(s) Main contribution What is not covered? 
Kinengyere 
(2007); 
Magara 
(2002); 
Magara and 
Nyumba 
(2004);  
Government in Uganda should set up a 
coordinating mechanism through which it 
should ensure shared library services. There 
should be maximum use of little available 
resources through collaboration. However, 
there is more collaboration in private 
organisations than in public organisations. 
Magara and Nyumba explain this by showing 
that private organisations carry out general 
collaboration through online communication, 
information processing, resource sharing and 
awareness programmes. 
The studies did not consider how to 
collaborate and the dynamics involved 
The behavioural issues were not 
considered. 
Passerini 
(2006) 
In developing countries where diseases are 
worsening, concerned public units can not be 
the only fighters against diseases because they 
lack sufficient resources. Passerini stresses 
that cooperation should be strengthened 
beyond scepticism, with formation of “mega 
communities”. 
Passerini considered public/private 
partnerships, which have different 
rationales of existence, and with 
deferring amounts and sources of 
resources. We also note that Passerini 
studied operational issues on 
collaboration, not behavioural issues.  
Passerini 
(2006) 
Internet would be vital in transforming 
developing economies through collaboration. 
National and international internet 
connectivity is in short supply and limited to a 
few cities. 
The study concentrated on information 
technology, no social dimension was 
considered. For example, in Uganda, 
universities have information 
technology facilities, but staff do not 
use them to collaborate. Social reasons 
have been quoted (Mugisha, 2007) as 
an explanation to this.  
Mitiku and 
Wallace 
(1999) 
While a region such as Eastern Africa can 
choose from the best management knowledge 
the world offers, care is needed in adapting 
new ideas to local conditions. The authors also 
warn that cultural factors or otherwise, the 
disparity between African reality and the 
application of imported theories remains large. 
The study indicates that it is important 
to take cultural factors into account in 
further research.  
From the motivation above, we note that it is new and relevant to consider the social 
dimension of collaboration in the Ugandan context. Thus, in the rest of this thesis, we 
study the social dimension of collaboration in developing countries and specifically in 
Uganda. 
To understand the social factors of horizontal purchasing collaboration in the 
Ugandan context, we use network theory, resource based theory, and social exchange 
theory. These theories stress the need for PDEs to “work together” (Kamann, 2004) 
and create resources none of them can attain by themselves. The behavioural factors 
we choose for the study (trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence) are the 
underlying bases for the PDEs’ “working together” arrangement. We note that 
creating resources through horizontal purchasing collaboration is even more important 
for Ugandan PDEs which largely have no self sustaining capacity. 
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3.7  Existing models that use a behavioural approach  
 
In this section, we present two models, which to the best of our knowledge; have used 
the behavioural approach to explain relationships. We analyse them with a view to 
suggesting our own model, which fits the Ugandan situation. 
 
The relationship satisfaction model 
The relationship satisfaction model focuses on testing the effect of five relational 
constructs on relationship satisfaction (Terawatanavong et al., 2007). According to 
Terawatanavong, relational constructs (total independence, trust, commitment, 
cooperative norms, and conflict) influence the relationship satisfaction. However, the 
magnitude of influence is moderated by the relationship phases (build up, maturity, 
and decline/deterioration phases). The model is shown in Figure 3.2.  
 
Fig. 3.2 The relationship satisfaction model (source: Terawatanavong et al., 2007) 
 
A critical analysis of the relationship satisfaction model  
The model emphasises relationship phases through which one can analytically assess 
the predictability of the relationship constructs on a relationship. The model considers 
how relational constructs lead to relationship satisfaction. However, it emphasises that 
the relationship phases (build up, maturity, and decline/deterioration) moderate how 
they determine this relationship satisfaction. 
 
The model relates behavioural factors to relationship satisfaction. We note that 
relationship satisfaction is an outcome, which comes after another output stage. In 
horizontal purchasing collaboration, we conceptualise relationship satisfaction 
(outcomes of collaboration) as being attained after having achieved some level of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration. We consider the level of collaboration as the 
degree/intensity of common actions. We aim at developing a model that does not have 
a direct relationship between relational constructs and relationship satisfaction. 
 
Whereas the model advocates for assessing the relational constructs on a phase by 
phase basis (Dwyer et al., 1987; Wilson, 1995), we note that respondents at any point 
in time, when asked to evaluate a relational construct such as commitment, are likely 
to be in different phases; some early and some late (Terawatanavong et al., 2007). The 
results may cancel out and assuming respondents are at same relationship phase may 
be misleading. 
 
Relationship phases 
Build up 
Maturity 
Decline/deterioration 
Relationship satisfaction 
Relational constructs 
Total interdependence 
Trust 
Commitment 
Cooperative norms 
Conflict 
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In our study, we consider relationships that have just started or are yet to start. This 
makes the time dimension unsuitable for similar studies that are interested in 
investigating the recently established relationships or want to design rules for starting 
and sustaining collaborations. 
 
The integrated model of the behavioural dimensions  
The integrated model of the behavioural dimensions considers ten behavioural 
parameters concurrently (Leonidou et al., 2006). Leonidou et al. aimed at 
understanding the implications of these parameters in a simultaneous unified model. 
The parameters include distance, trust, understanding, dependence, commitment, 
communication, conflict, adaptation, cooperation, and satisfaction. We show the 
findings of the study in the figure below. 
 
The study uses the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) method to test the proposed 
large scale model. The multiple relationships involved in the study and the need to 
holistically assess the relationships necessitated use of SEM. 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 Integrated model of behavioural dimensions (source; Leonidou et al., 2006) 
 
In their findings, Leonidou et al. (2006) argue that to provide a more realistic 
understanding of the behavioural variables, an integrative approach to examining the 
behavioural aspects of relationships may be more relevant than a partial one which 
may conceal some effects and give misleading results. 
 
The study also found out that it is crucial to ensure familiarity, among other things, 
with the social aspects of the exchange partners’ organisation. Dependence, 
commitment, communication, and cooperation are some of the mentioned social 
factors. The study also found out that trust seems to play a central role in relationships 
and in strengthening commitment. The study findings show that there are several 
associations among the key constructs that characterise relationships. 
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A critical analysis of the integrated model of the behavioural dimensions  
The integrated model considered ten behavioural constructs. To be able to analyse all 
these constructs, this study used SEM which requires a sample ranging between 100 
and 200 (Hair et al., 2002). In our situation in Uganda, there are limited samples of 
purchasing collaboration. It is not possible to obtain a sample ranging between 100 
and 200. We base on the parsimonious principle of research, that plurality should not 
be posited without necessity. Further to this, Vargas et al. (2006) advise that we 
should not admit more causes to phenomena than such are both true and sufficient to 
explain their appearances. We therefore examine the relevance of each of the factors 
to our research. 
 
We consider only four behavioural factors, which seem to be common in literature.  
We note from the literature (Bignoux, 2006; Brennan and Turnbull, 1999;  Gambetta, 
1988; Liden et al., 1997; Mattsson, 1999; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Sherman, 1992; 
Whan and Taewon, 2005) that trust, commitment, dependence, and reciprocity cause 
more variability in horizontal purchasing collaboration than the other factors, such as 
culture, structure, internal support, communication, and technology. We consider 
cooperation, which can also be referred to as collaboration as the dependent variable. 
We do not consider the other factors because of the following reasons: 
· We do not include distance because according to the model, distance is the 
degree of unfamiliarity of one party in a business relationship with the 
characteristics of the other party (Hallen and Sandstrom, 1991). The model also 
defines distance in terms of social distance, cultural distance, and technological 
distance (Hallen and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1979). We recognise that in Uganda, 
horizontal purchasing collaboration is between PDEs that have similar cultural 
and social setups, and are equally affected by similar technology. We do not 
anticipate a lot of variability between the PDEs since they exist in the same 
environment;  
· Conflict is a blocking behaviour by one party in a working relationship to deter 
the other from gaining resources or pursuing an activity for its advancement 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990). It starts from the operations in a horizontal 
purchasing collaboration (Etgar, 1979). Examples are disagreements regarding 
supplier selection, cost sharing, contract management, and supplier evaluation. 
This makes conflict more of an operational nature than behavioural. Besides, 
conflicts may grow with time (Knippen and Green, 1999), so its impact may be 
noticed after some time. We consider PDEs which have just started, which 
makes time dimension factors not very relevant to our study; 
· Adaptation is the degree to which one party in a working relationship makes 
substantial adjustments in structures, processes or strategies in order to 
accommodate the objectives, needs, and capabilities of the other party (Doney 
and Cannon, 1997; Han et al., 1998; Metcalf et al., 1992). Apart from being 
more of an operational than behavioural nature, we note that in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration, PDEs use standard processes. All the processes, 
structures and strategies are largely the same (PPDA Act, 2003) and thus may 
not cause significant variation in our study variables. Therefore, we do not 
include adaptation in our study because individual PDEs in the horizontal 
purchasing collaboration do not have unique structures and processes to adapt 
to; 
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· Understanding is the willingness to appreciate and empathise with the situation, 
conditions, and problems faced by a collaborating partner with regard to issues 
that have a direct or indirect impact on the smooth operation of the relationship 
(Hallen and Sandstrom, 1991). We do note include the understanding variable in 
our study, because the collaborating PDEs in Uganda are in the initial phases 
and have not yet acquired adequate information about structural, procedural, 
strategic, and other aspects to understand each other.  
In the next sections, we explain the behavioural factors we do use in more detail. 
 
3.8  Behavioural factors and a tentative model 
 
In the following sections, we review literature on the behavioural factors trust, 
commitment, reciprocity, and dependence. For each factor, we discuss its meaning as 
per our research, its importance to horizontal purchasing collaboration, and we discuss 
its situational analysis in Uganda.  
 
Trust 
Trust is one’s belief that the other partner will act in a consistent manner and do what 
he or she says he or she will do. We acknowledge different scholars who have 
explained trust using different ways/dimensions. According to Das and Teng (2001b), 
Klein Woolthuis, (1999) and Nooteboom, (1996), the trust variable can be 
operationalised in terms of competency (ability by the other entity to carry out tasks 
as expected) and goodwill (trust in another entity’s loyalty and honesty, with each 
entity treating other(s) with care and concern). According to Swan and Trawick 
(1987), trust is operationalised in terms of:  
· Dependable/reliable; 
· Honest/candid; 
· Competent; 
· Partner orientation; 
· Likeable/friendly. 
 
Swan and Trawick include competency and goodwill in conceptualisation of trust and 
in addition, bring in other aspects like being oriented toward partner norms. In 
Appendix F, we show more detailed dimensions of trust according to literature. 
According to Svensson (2001), these detailed aspects can be reflected in the 
conceptualisation of Swan et al. (1985) and Swan and Trawick (1987).  
 
All the aspects of Swan and Trawick are important to our research, because they play 
an important role during the initial phases of trust building (Swan and Trawick, 1987) 
and most collaborative initiatives in Uganda are in these initial phases. We therefore 
adopt the conceptualisation of Swan and Trawick (1987). We consider trust as one 
variable, and to ensure validity concerns, we exhaust all the five dimensions of its 
conceptualisation as other studies have done (Das and Teng , 2001b; Klein Woolthuis, 
1999; and Nooteboom, 1996) 
 
Trust and horizontal purchasing collaboration 
As Sherman (1992) put it, the biggest stumbling block to success of strategic alliance 
formation is the lack of trust. Trust is therefore an important basis for collaboration. 
This is confirmed by among other things networking theory. According to networking 
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theory, a large and diverse group of people with some minimal level of trust (Huxham 
and Vangen, 2004) will be able to come together and need some level of trust to do 
this. The importance of trust in a collaborative initiative is further emphasised by 
Pesamaa and Hair (2007). They state that the more mutual trust exists, the less likely 
the relationship will result in undesirable actions. Finally, we note that trust is related 
to the assumptions of TCE (Schotanus et al., 2009). Bounded rationality can be 
reversed through trust, since it enables the parties to take a long term view of the 
relationship (Ganesan, 1994; Montgomery, 1998). Trust also reduces opportunism, 
(Chiles and McMackin, 1996), uncertainty (Luhmann, 1995; Monczka et al., 1998), 
and the need for negotiating, drafting, monitoring, and control of contracts, thus 
lowering transaction costs (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Gulbrandsen et al., 2008; 
Park and Ungson, 1997). Trust is an essential “glue” that holds relationships together, 
but it is difficult to develop and maintain.  
 
Importance of trust at various stages of collaboration 
The literature shows that the level of trust may not be the same at various stages of 
collaboration (Kanter, 1994). For example, the formation (sometimes called searching 
or starting) stage, is a pre relationship stage. At this stage, search trust is needed to 
search evidence from indirect sources to give potential partners security to carry on.  
At sustaining (or management) stage, the behaviour patterns have been 
institutionalised; there is consistency in dealings and collaboration continuity. The 
collaborating entities look out for competence trust and goodwill trust (Das and Teng, 
2001b, Klein Woolthuis, 1999; Nooteboom, 1996). A collaborating entity would want 
to perceive an ability of other entities to perform tasks as agreed upon or as expected. 
Each entity is looking out for having its interests being catered for with care by the 
collaborating entities. In the management phase, the collaboration structures seem to 
work out with less suspicion like at the start. Trust may not be a critical success factor 
in the management phase of a horizontal collaboration (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 
2001; Schotanus, 2007), much as trust is greatly required in the early phases of 
collaborative initiatives to sustain the subsequent stages (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 
2001). Based on the sections above, we hypothesize:  
H1a: The existence of trust leads to a higher level of collaboration in the early phases 
of horizontal purchasing collaboratives. 
 
Commitment 
Commitment is the belief that the trading partners are willing to devote energy to 
sustaining the relationship (Dion et al., 1992). Through commitment, partners 
dedicate resources to sustain and further the goals of the collaboration. Commitment 
is the willingness of the partners to adapt. It implies that the partners view the 
relationship as being important enough that it is worth the effort of ensuring that it 
will endure (Zineldin and Jonsson 2000). 
Conceptual literature on commitment continues to evolve towards a three-component 
model (Gundlach et al., 1995). This has been confirmed by a meta-analytical study 
(Meyer et al., 2002). Based on this, we adopt measures of the three dimensions of 
commitment from Gilliland and Bello (2002) and Brown et al., (1995), because these 
measures have been proved to be more conceptually valid in collaboration studies 
(Kelly, 2004): 
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· Instrumental commitment is where an actor is constrained by the costs and 
inconveniences of leaving the current collaboration (Gilliland and Bello, 
2002);  
· Normative commitment is based on the partners’ value in the collaboration 
(Brown et al., 1995); 
· Affective commitment relates to commitment by a partner in relation to the 
identification and involvement with the others (Brown et al., 1995). When the 
commitment level is high, partners in the collaboration want to continue. This 
progressively reduces opportunism.  
 
Commitment in horizontal purchasing collaboration is important, because PDEs that 
come to join the collaboration have to evaluate what to gain and what to invest in the 
collaboration. Partners in collaboration tend to be rational (Cullen, et al., 2000). This 
is why instrumental commitment is the most important measure for our study.  
 
Commitment and horizontal purchasing collaboration 
Based on TCE (Williamson, 1985), commitment reverses bounded rationality since it 
orients parties in collaboration to a long term view of the relationship (Ganesan, 
1994). This is confirmed by Pesamaa and Hair (2007) who found that successful long-
term horizontal purchasing collaboration contains highly committed parties. 
Commitment makes entities make short term sacrifices (e.g., meet operational costs, 
sponsor venues for meetings, use their own resources like computers, printers, paper, 
et cetera to do work for the other entity) for the long term good. Horizontal 
purchasing collaboration should be built on the foundation of commitment and 
sometimes partners have to sacrifice something, especially in emergency situations to 
survive the initial phase (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001). 
 
According to Brennan and Turnbull (1999), commitment leads to increased 
collaboration. We also note that once there is commitment, the partner values the 
relationship (Brown et al., 1995), wants to identify with the collaboration (Allen and 
Meyer, 1990; Brown et al., 1995; Porter et al., 1974), and is constrained to leave 
(Gilliland and Bello, 2002). According to Morgan and Hunt (1994) ‘…when 
commitment and trust – not just one or the other – are present, they produce outcomes 
that promote efficiency, productivity, and effectiveness’. 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that both trust and commitment are needed, 
despite which one precedes the other. It is important to consider both of them, while 
undertaking relationship studies. 
 
Drawing from RBV, the attractiveness of an entity to others is based on its resources 
and its ability to exploit them. We expect that organised resources, called capabilities 
(Stalk et al., 1992), lead to higher levels of collaboration. We therefore hypothesize:  
 
H2a: The existence of commitment leads to a higher level of collaboration. 
 
Trust and commitment  
According to Brennan and Turnbull (1999), high levels of trust lead to adaptations to 
accommodate a partner (commitment). In their research paper, Whan and Taewon 
(2005) state that commitment, which itself is a result of trust, is a key success factor in 
achieving integration. There must be commitment in any collaboration, and it is trust 
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that sustains such commitment. Several researchers have recently supported this view 
that trust leads to commitment. Trust is a key mediator to collaboration and affects 
commitment (Ylimaz and Hunt, 2001). We also note that while trust refers to feelings 
about the relationship, commitment represents a manifestation of actions within the 
relationship (Leonidou, 2006). In Uganda, where collaboration in PDEs is still 
relatively new, whereas feelings about collaboration may be strong, actions are still 
lacking.  
 
In our study, we analyse both trust and commitment as predictors of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. Therefore in our study, we do not go into details of the 
debate on which of trust and commitment determines the other. Whereas we take trust 
to lead to commitment (because collaborative initiatives are new and commitment 
actions are yet to be more noticed), we acknowledge that commitment can also lead to 
trust. However, we take this to be at a later stage in the collaboration when initial 
minimal trust has already led to some commitment (based on Andaleeb, 1996; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994). We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
H2c: The existence of trust leads to higher level of commitment. 
 
Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is a state relationship where an organisation gives something to another 
organisation in return for something else. There is mutual action, giving, and taking 
between the collaborating parties. In an anticipated long-time relationship, there are 
sequences of actions that may continue indefinitely, never balancing out (Bignoux, 
2006). 
 
We conceptualise reciprocity in three dimensions (Sullivan et al., 2003):  
· Equivalence, where parties in a collaboration attach the same value to what 
they get as to what they receive;  
· Immediacy, where partners are interested in knowing how soon the return will 
be for the particular actions carried out now; 
· Interest, which is about self interest as compared to the interests of the 
collaboration.  
 
We note that several scholars other than Sullivan et al. (2003) have contributed to the 
three dimensions of reciprocity (Liden et al., 1997; Uhl-Bien, 2000), but all their 
contributions are incorporated in the conceptualisation of Sullivan et al. (2003). 
 
Reciprocity and horizontal purchasing collaboration 
From the social exchange theory point of view, reciprocity is important to horizontal 
purchasing collaboration because it initiates and stabilises social interaction among 
collaborating entities (Sanders and Schyns, 2006). Equivalence is even more 
important in the beginning of collaboration than in the long run (Uhl-Bien et al., 
2000). For collaborations in the initial stage, immediacy is important because when 
collaboration has not reached high quality, there is a relatively shorter time span of 
reciprocation and reciprocation is very important to sustain the collaborative initiative 
(Sanders and Schyns, 2006). For collaborations in the initial stage, there is relatively 
more selfishness. The focus is not yet on mutual benefits but on self interest (Liden et 
al., 1997). Therefore, the dimension of interest should be given attention in newly 
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established collaborative initiatives, especially those in developing countries and 
particularly in Uganda. 
 
Through a set of reciprocal expectations, partners perceive a low cost of negotiating 
and enforcing contracts and other operations, especially if the immediate benefit is not 
anticipated. For example, a PDE with an expert in evaluation of works and 
construction bids will agree to offer assistance to another PDE which does not have 
such an expert, even when such a PDE with experts knows it may not require 
immediate assistance from the one it is to assist. However, such a PDE knows that 
whenever it requires assistance from the PDE it has assisted, it will get it. Absence of 
direct reciprocity can lead to problems such as free riding and opportunistic behaviour 
(Sanders and Schyns, 2006). Reduced opportunism may be especially important in the 
early stages of a collaborative, when trust and commitment have not yet reached a 
high level, and collaborating partners are on the look out to exploit situations that put 
them to advantages over others, as it is likely to be the case for emerging collaborative 
initiatives in developing countries like Uganda. 
 
A stronger norm of reciprocity will create a sense of willingness to relate with others 
to realise long term benefits. This is likely to increase the level of collaboration 
initiatives. So, we hypothesize:  
 
H3a: The existence of reciprocity leads to a higher level of collaboration. 
 
Dependence 
Dependence is the extent to which a partner provides important and critical resources 
for which there are few alternative sources of supply (Buchanan, 1992; Kale 1986; 
Heide and John, 1988). It is the reliance on actions of another party to achieve certain 
goals or gratification (Emerson, 1962). Collaborative relationships can be the result of 
an organisation’s desire to reduce uncertainty and/or to manage dependence through 
the establishment of semi-formal or formal associations with other companies (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). This is because organisations may not be self sufficient with 
respect to critical resources. 
 
According to Svensson (2004), the research performed by Hammarkvist et al. (1982) 
and Mattsson (1999) provide a sound point of departure for the operationalisation 
process of the dependence construct in collaboration studies. This is because 
Hammarkvist et al. (1982) and Mattsson (1999) identify a set of appropriate 
underlying dimensions of the dependence construct. We therefore adopt their 
measures for our study. We conceptualise dependence according to Hammarkvist et 
al. (1982) and Mattsson (1999), in terms of:  
· Technical dependence, when two organisations technically rely on each other 
because they have to use compatible equipment;  
· Time dependence, when two organisations have a time based need of their 
activities;  
· Knowledge dependence, where knowledge develops between different parties, 
as a result of interaction;  
· Social dependence, where the individuals within the relationship get attracted 
to each other, and enjoy to work together;  
· Economic dependence, the formal dependence, especially in form of written 
contracts;  
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· Market dependence, where an organisation’s image and status may positively 
influence another organisations image and status; 
· Information technology dependence, where organisations may invest in a 
common IT standard. 
We consider dependence as one variable, and for validity concerns, we exhaust all its 
dimensions of conceptualisation as several studies have done (Hammarkvist et al. 
1982; and Mattsson, 1999) 
 
Dependence and horizontal purchasing collaboration 
From the resource based theory point of view, dependence is important in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration, because dependence is a phenomenon which contributes to 
the equilibrium or to the lack of it in a relationship (Svensson, 2002). This equilibrium 
is more necessary in the initial stage of collaborative initiatives (Uhl-Bien et al., 
2000). Dependence applies to horizontal purchasing collaboration because partners 
cannot be perfectly competent in all or most activities. They need each other (Nollet 
and Beaulieu, 2003; Polychronakis and Syntetos, 2007), which requires dependence 
on each other. 
 
Dependence can apply to horizontal purchasing collaboration, where the partners are 
perceived to have equal powers, because of specialisation, partners cannot be 
perfectly competent in the various activities. They still need assistance for example in 
some technical aspects. Partners also need each other to bundle purchasing volumes 
(Ball and Pye, 2000; Hendrick, 1997; Johnson, 1999; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003, 
2005; Polychronakis and Syntetos, 2007; Tella and Virolainen, 2005). This makes the 
partners have better quality purchased products and/or services and enjoy financial 
gains, through reduced prices, et cetera (Schotanus, 2007).  
Drawing from RBV, we argue that collaborations are becoming more important, 
because partners realise that their success is dependent on capabilities and resources 
of others (Carr et al., 2008). According to RBV, organisations take actions to secure 
the resources on which they are dependent (Sambharya and Banerji, 2006) which may 
lead to higher levels of collaboration. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H4a: The existence of dependence leads to a high level of collaboration. 
 
Dependence and commitment      
If an entity seeks to have scarce/unavailable resources from others, it will accept to 
make short term sacrifices, meet costs or restrictions (Leonidou et al., 2006) by other 
collaborating entities. It will adjust its structures, processes, and policies (Leonidou et 
al., 2006) to adapt to those of collaborating entities. In Ugandan PDEs, some 
resources like skilled manpower and equipment cannot easily be found in other PDEs 
or any other alternative sources. For example, PDEs can only get works technical 
personnel in one PDE. PDEs, in an effort to depend on such a works related PDE, will 
likely develop and demonstrate commitment (Leonidou et al., 2006) to collaboration 
initiatives with such a PDE. We therefore hypothesize: 
H4c: The existence of dependence leads to a higher level of commitment.  
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Tentative model 
From the discussion above, we draw a tentative model to show our current theoretical 
model in the figure below. 
 
Fig. 3.4 Tentative conceptual model  
3.9   Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, we aimed at, among other things, reviewing some related theories to 
collaboration. We note that there is an extensive amount of literature about 
collaboration, but a solid theory of inter-organisational relationships is yet to emerge. 
We discussed the theories that are useful in explaining horizontal purchasing 
collaboration. 
We also note that there is a need to give more attention to horizontal purchasing 
collaboration, because research on collaborative purchasing is still in its infancy 
(Eßig, 2000). Compared to vertical collaboration, horizontal collaboration has not 
been a major research area until now (Eßig, 2000; Ellram, 1991; Laing and Cotton, 
1997; Schotanus, 2007; Tella and Virolainen, 2005).  
There is further need to refocus research efforts from the hard side of collaboration 
management like financial and operational dimensions to the soft side of collaboration 
management which is behavioural. This is because we note that though social factors 
(trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence) are important for collaboration, they 
may be low in Uganda. In Uganda, the few researches which have been done have 
simply been about general collaboration issues. This study is specifically focused on 
behavioural aspects of horizontal purchasing collaboration in a developing country. 
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Chapter 4 – Exploratory studies on current horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in Uganda 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Through our literature survey, we know to the best of our knowledge that though there 
are publications on horizontal purchasing collaboration, they are not specific to the 
developing country context. 
 
In this chapter, we present work of two exploratory studies, which we carried out to 
better understand the current level of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda, 
in order to lay a foundation for subsequent work. We develop hypotheses which are 
used in the subsequent chapters. 
 
This approach is consistent with Van Aken (1994), who emphasizes that for research 
to meet both the rigour and relevance tests (Andriessen, 2004; 2005), it is important to 
know “How do organisations work in practice?” before embarking on “How should 
organisations work?”  
We include Figure 4.1 to show the position of Chapter 4 in the outline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Research outline 
 
 
4.2  Objective 
 
Our main research objective of this chapter, which is in line with our first major 
research goal of understanding the behavioural aspects of horizontal purchasing 
collaboration, is to know the state of horizontal purchasing collaboration in PDE’s in 
Uganda. In this chapter, we use two exploratory studies to derive insights that enable 
hypotheses development (Chapter 6). 
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Exploratory study 1 is about understanding the general status of horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in Uganda. It seeks to know the extent to which collaboration issues 
exist, the operations of collaboration and the items involved in collaboration.   
 
Exploratory study 2 supplements the first one, by further understanding the factors for 
initialising horizontal purchasing collaboration, given that developing countries have 
had several relationship failures (Turyatunga, 2008), which could be attributed to lack 
of awareness of developing world contextual factors for starting collaborative 
relationships. The figure below demonstrates how we achieve our first goal. 
 
 
 
4.3  Exploratory study 1 
 
Since our goal is to understand the state of collaborative purchasing in Uganda, we 
posed general research questions which aimed at knowing whether there is 
collaboration, how it is done, in which activities and its forms. We were guided by the 
following specific research questions to find out how PDEs carry out horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. Because there are few publications or secondary data about 
purchasing in Uganda, and specifically on horizontal purchasing collaboration in 
Uganda, we use the exploratory study to lay a foundation for the second phase of our 
study and several other studies in this area. Previous studies (e.g. Cowles et al., 2002) 
encourage practitioners and academicians to approach the development of knowledge 
and understanding in such circumstances in a mode of “discovery” by using 
exploratory studies. We used the following guiding questions: 
· To what extent is there collaboration in various government 
ministries/universities in Uganda? 
· To what extent is there horizontal purchasing collaboration in Ugandan 
ministries/public universities? 
· What priority is attached to purchasing collaboration in ministries/public 
universities? 
· To what extent is there interest by ministries/public universities to collaborate? 
· What are the various activities/processes of purchasing collaboration in 
Uganda ministries? 
· What commodities/services/works are suitable for collaboration in Uganda? 
· What commodities/services/works are unsuitable for collaboration in Uganda? 
· Whom do you collaborate with? 
· What has been the duration of collaboration? 
· What forms of horizontal purchasing collaboration exist in Uganda? 
· To what extent is horizontal purchasing collaboration appreciated in Uganda 
PDE’s? 
Exploratory study 1 
What is the status of: 
· Processes; 
· People/priorities; 
· Products; 
· System? 
Exploratory study 2 
Considering results of 
exploratory study 1 
results, what could be 
the critical success 
factors to emphasise to 
have a sustainable 
collaboration? 
Outcome 
A better 
understanding of 
horizontal 
purchasing 
collaboration  
Fig. 4.2 How we aim to achieve our first goal  
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· What is the future of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda? 
 
Method 
This section explains the methodological choices made. We include population and 
sample of the study, data collection instrument, and the respondents considered. 
Population and sample  
The population of PDEs in central government at the time of study is shown in Table 
4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1 Population of study 
PDE Total  
Commission 14 
Hospital 12 
Ministry  26 
Parastatal 64 
 
Since the aim was to understand the behavioural aspects in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration, we carried out a two case study design, by considering ministries and 
parastatals (universities). This choice considered the largest categories. This enhances 
comparison and validity of findings (Yin, 2003). The cross sectional design was 
chosen, to give us snapshot insights on horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda.  
We considered 21 ministries but received data from 16 of them. We had to leave out 
five ministries because they do not easily release information. For public universities, 
we collected data from two; Makerere University Business School (MUBS) and 
Kyambogo University (KYU). The two universities considered are undertaking a joint 
Netherlands Programme for Institutional Strengthening Post Secondary Education and 
Training Capacity (NPT) procurement project together with the Northern Consortium 
counterparts, University of Twente and Maastricht School of Management in The 
Netherlands. We found the two universities suitable because they are both in the same 
location and there is an already established structure for a purchasing collaborative 
system. 
Data collection  
We used a self administered questionnaire to the sampled PDEs. We used such a 
questionnaire because it would allow face to face interaction and the researcher had 
the chance to discuss with the respondents some of the unclear questions, to further 
improve our understanding of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda. We 
made appointments with the respondents so that the questionnaire is filled instantly 
and with supplementary explanations from the researcher. This also improved our 
response rate to 76%. 
In addition to the questionnaire, we carried out interviews with some staff to obtain a 
deeper understanding of some of the issues. Using more than one method of data 
collection can increase the reliability of the results (Den Hertog and Van Sluijs, 1995; 
Webster, 1991). We selected five interviewees, each from one of the bigger (in terms 
of spend) PDEs, and one interviewee from the universities. These were at the topmost 
rank of principal procurement officer in Uganda. Each interview took about one hour. 
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Response 
We considered all the staff in the respective PDEs who are directly responsible for 
procurement activities. These were employees in the Procurement and Disposal Units 
(PDUs), members of contract committees, and accounting officers. The accounting 
officers are members of top management while members of contract committees and 
PDU employees are middle level officers in the PDEs. All respondents considered had 
worked with PDEs for over a year, with 80% of them having started before the PPDA 
Act 2003 legislation. This means they had enough knowledge to comment on the 
issues under consideration.  
In total, we conducted 18 self administered questionnaires, one from each of the 
considered entities (16 ministries and two universities). Since the unit of analysis was 
an entity, one well filled questionnaire by a competent representative of the entity 
(either procurement officer or accounting officer or a member of the contracts 
committee) for each entity was considered sufficient. After collecting the data, we 
summarized it, edited it and reported the findings. 
 
Findings and discussion 
In this section, we present, interpret and discuss the findings. We consider each 
respective research question. 
 
The extent of collaboration in various government departments in Uganda 
All the responses from the ministries and universities indicated that to a large extent, 
there is collaboration between the organisations. This means in general terms that 
there is horizontal collaboration between the organisations. This collaboration is 
mainly in terms of: 
· Preparation of policy and regulation; 
· Sectoral planning and budgeting; 
· Running joint programmes; 
· Service support like security; 
· Transport (ministries helped ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
during elections); 
· Office space; 
· Making strategic plans; 
· Joint projects like the Commonwealth Heads of Government and Ministers 
(CHOGM) collaboration committees in concerned government departments; 
· Multi sectoral coordination and collaboration national body in disaster risk 
reduction; 
· HIV/AIDS control multi sectoral approach. 
 
This is an indication that collaboration is not entirely new; it already exists. Though 
collaboration in various activities especially those that do not involve monetary 
transactions may be easier to start and sustain compared to horizontal purchasing 
collaboration, we believe that it can be enhanced in the area of purchasing too, since 
the practice is not entirely new. Successes of the existing collaborative initiatives can 
be used as a basis to justify further collaboration in specific functions like purchasing. 
For entities which indicated that they had collaboration dealings with others, we asked 
the respondents why they entered the mentioned collaborative relationships, 
especially when they were not aware of the benefits to realise. They told us that it was 
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mainly out of need to expedite the deals, because of urgency and deadlines. Asked 
whether they realised this urgent need, they said they did. The quotation from one of 
the respondents seems to capture this argument: 
“We decided to collaborate with the other entities because we had to conclude 
the purchase within a month because of urgency. We went into joint meetings 
for most of the time during the first week. At the end of the deal, we did not 
only achieve our target within the set time, but also developed more positive 
feelings towards our counterparts than ever before. We eventually chose to 
expedite other deals that were not originally meant to be done together, and 
since then, we have always welcomed working together”. 
We therefore conclude similar to Schotanus (2007) but contrary to several other 
sources, which list the initial conditions for collaborative purchasing (among others 
Johnson 1999; Laing and Cotton, 1997; Polychronakis and Syntetos, 2007); urgency 
of the deal should be one of the critical factors and/or benefits for horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. This is more relevant in developing countries like Uganda, 
where planning is rarely done or if done, there is less emphasis to implementation 
(Turyatunga, 2008). This causes urgent situations that are a motivator for horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. 
 
Horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda PDEs 
Of the considered Ministry PDEs, about 69% agreed that there is horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. Lack of horizontal purchasing collaboration was indicated 
by 31%. Both University PDEs considered indicated there is horizontal purchasing 
collaboration between them. We noted some insights in the activities where horizontal 
purchasing collaboration takes place. We summarize them below.  
In the ministries, where there is no deliberate effort to collaborate, the following were 
some of the activities where collaboration is noted: 
· Capacity building like training procurement cadres and conferences; 
· Using similar shortlists of prequalified suppliers, especially if one ministry can 
not prequalify or needs a product urgently or does not have a qualifying 
supplier in that particular supply; 
· Services/works providers suitability information; 
· Price comparisons; 
· Other operating and challenging procurement aspects like procurement of 
services and equipment for the newly discovered oil reserves. 
In universities considered, there are deliberate arrangements to collaborate, under the 
NPT programme. We noted the following areas of collaboration: 
· Joint contracts committee; 
· Joint tendering; 
· Using shortlists of another university in case no supplier is short listed; 
· Drawing joint specifications; 
· Bid evaluation; 
· Supplier selection; 
· Award of contracts; 
· Sharing experience on procurement work. 
From above, we note that for Ministry PDEs (where no deliberate effort to collaborate 
have been undertaken) collaboration activities are in the initial stage of the 
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procurement cycle. We mention activities of the procurement cycle in Table 4.3. 
There is less collaboration in the final stages of the procurement cycle. While 
commenting on why the PDEs are not enthusiastic in continuing with collaboration in 
the final phases of the procurement cycle, one respondent said; 
“We have not yet trusted others on contractual issues which involve secrets 
about why some suppliers are not selected. We fear they may reveal some 
important information”. 
We further noted that PDEs have a duty to protect secrets especially costing, bid 
prices; methodology of handling of bided assignment partly because of competition 
between suppliers. However, because of poor business ethics in Uganda, this is not 
done. According to the Government of Uganda Public Service Ethics Report (2002), 
public servants in Uganda lack values and practices. They lack professional values, 
and because they have lived with what is wrong for so long, professional misconduct 
has become normal. As processes in the existing collaborations change from the initial 
processes of the Ugandan procurement cycle where information is general and can be 
shared to final processes where information is specific and can affect competitiveness 
of suppliers, PDEs perceive risk in collaboration. 
On the other hand, for University PDEs (with a deliberate effort to collaborate), 
horizontal purchasing collaboration is in all stages of the procurement cycle. This 
collaboration is a result of the NPT project, with terms among other things, requiring 
a joint purchasing system of the NPT related items and a joint purchasing structure in 
place. We noted that even in the University PDEs, for purchases outside the NPT 
project, the collaboration reverts back to be like the ministry PDEs, only that there is 
more information shared and networks from the NPT collaboration systems are used. 
This existing momentum keeps the collaboration aspects on. 
Though ministry PDEs do not collaborate in all activities, we note that collaboration 
is in the initial stage of the procurement cycle, especially the needs specification 
stage, which makes participating PDEs realize benefits of collaboration as most of the 
decisions that leverage and optimize the benefits of purchasing are at this stage. The 
rest of processes done individually do not leverage benefits optimally to the PDEs.  
We conclude that PDEs may not need deliberate efforts and structures in place to 
collaborate. The voluntary nature of such entities can still make them gain benefits of 
collaboration. This is in agreement with the literature (Ehin, 2000; Anheier and 
Kendall, 2000) which suggests that trust flourishes most under voluntary 
collaboration. 
Attached priority to purchasing collaboration in ministries/public universities 
Of the ministry PDEs that responded, 25% said the priority given is less (medium) 
than what is given to purchasing individually, 38% that it is not given priority, 31% 
that it is minimal (low) and 6% said it has high priority.  
The 6% high priority score is low compared to the other scores. This could be 
attributed to the fact that the procurement officers in the ministries are not in decision 
making positions. We noted that the entire ministry PDEs that scored “no priority” 
had low cadre procurement staff, at the rank of procurement assistant and 
procurement officer, who do not participate in making strategic decisions. The middle 
(sometimes low) level procurement related officers in the organisational hierarchy do 
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not attend top strategic meetings that prioritize activities in their respective ministries. 
So it may be more difficult to give priority to procurement activities. The middle level 
procurement officers are not in position to make strategic decisions that would 
encourage reciprocity. Though they may appreciate the contribution of other PDEs, 
they may not be able to give back to them. 
We, however, noted that those ministry PDEs which said priority for collaboration is 
high, are not among the big five PDES. We attach this insight to the “self sustaining” 
nature of these PDEs in terms of financial, human, and technical resources. Another 
explanation could be that the big PDEs may not have a high need to obtain more 
economies of scale and other related benefits of collaboration like the relatively 
smaller PDEs. 
Both university PDEs said the collaboration is given high priority. They also said that 
this is because of the required conditions on the NPT project. However, because of the 
presence of a structure of collaboration between these universities, there is 
collaboration in even other commodities and services of individual universities not 
connected to the NPT project. Although it seemed obvious that PDEs where structures 
and guidelines about horizontal purchasing collaboration have been put in place 
would agree that they have a high priority, we noted that once such structures and 
guidelines are put in place, like the case of NPT, PDEs will eventually realize the 
need to collaborate even in other areas not required by the working guidelines. We 
argue that structures may not necessarily be the main cause for collaboration, but may 
increase the speed at which collaboration is adopted, especially in developing 
countries where organisational structural set ups are not always emphasised. 
We conclude that having structures and guidelines on how horizontal purchasing 
collaboration should work can be “an eye opener” to the benefits of collaboration. 
This is in agreement with social construction theory, which suggests that the domain 
of knowledge you have, determines the perception (and therefore priority) you attach 
to an activity.  
Extent of interest by ministries/public universities to collaborate 
Fourteen out of sixteen ministries (87.5%) expressed interest in purchasing 
collaboration. Even those that do not have a clear system of collaboration 
acknowledge the need to collaborate. The reasons given for a need to collaborate are: 
· Reducing financial costs; 
· Better prices because of bargaining power; 
· Sharing information; 
· Avoiding repeated tasks which are costly to optimize because of the lack of 
synergy; 
· Getting access to skilled personnel which are still a problem in Uganda; 
· Improving service delivery; 
· Standardizing purchasing activities; 
· Preventing that ministries purchase similar items, from similar sources, at 
similar times but at very different prices.  
 
Both University PDEs expressed interest to further collaborate, in areas that are not 
covered by the NPT project. Apart from a more specific reason (to implement NPT 
guidelines), university PDEs gave similar reasons for collaboration as the Ministry 
 
 
43
PDEs. We therefore argue that the general reasons and perceived benefits of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration are similar, irrespective of the nature and type of 
organisation.  
 
Activities/processes of purchasing collaboration in Ugandan PDEs 
The PDEs which indicated practicing of horizontal purchasing collaboration said it is 
in the following activities: 
· Prequalification; 
· Drawing specifications together; 
· Scope of works; 
· Terms of reference; 
· Contract management; 
· Appraisal; 
· Preparation of standard bid documents; 
· Using the same supplier list (which was jointly compiled by the PPDA); 
· Initiating framework contracts; 
· Evaluation of bids. 
 
We note that these activities are mainly in the initial stage of the purchasing process. 
We also note that horizontal purchasing collaboration exists where there is technical 
competence required. For example, specifications for works and heavy machinery 
may not be easily originated from the Ministry of Education and Sports. Equally 
argued, not any ministry can formulate a framework contract like the Ministry of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs. Drawing from the social exchange theory and the 
resource based view; we conclude that dependencies on competences of others play a 
role in sustaining horizontal purchasing collaboration.  
 
The activities in the procurement cycle where horizontal purchasing collaboration 
does not exist include confirmation of funds, approval of procurement method, 
approval of bid documents, award of contract and signing and communicating the 
contract. We note that these are activities that demand accountability from individual 
PDEs, since each operates a separate budget. We therefore conclude that due to 
accountability requirements not all procurement activities are carried out in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration initiatives. 
 
Commodities/services deemed suitable or unsuitable for collaboration in Uganda 
We present commodities/services deemed suitable or unsuitable for collaboration in 
Table 4.2  
Table 4.2 commodities/services suitable or unsuitable for horizontal purchasing collaboration 
Suitable for horizontal purchasing 
collaboration 
Unsuitable for horizontal purchasing 
collaboration 
Common user items like stationery; 
Fuel; 
Office equipment (like computers), 
communication equipment, and furniture; 
Strategic goods that involve a lot of spend but are 
common to all PDEs; 
Capital buying; which are similar e.g. heavy 
machinery and motor vehicles; 
Items specific to various ministries; 
Classified products like fire arms and other 
weapons; 
Non common user items that are used once in a 
while; 
Customized services; 
Heterogeneous services; 
Services that do not cut across ministries like 
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Internet services like the joint academic and 
professional websites (for university PDEs); 
Cleaning services; 
Security; 
Repair services;  
Insurance services.  
expertise on treatment of Ebola disease; 
Specialized computer software like finance and 
academic records software; 
Specific research (university PDEs). 
 
 
Reasons for commodities/services suitability for horizontal purchasing collaboration 
can be derived: 
· They are in most cases similar and some cases exactly the same. For example, 
all PDEs use the same filing cabinets; 
· They can all be sourced from the same supplier(s).  
 
It is interesting to note that in Uganda, the commodities/services bought under 
collaborative arrangements do not only consist of non strategic, MRO, and standard 
capital equipment as Hendrick (1997) found out. The items identified above range 
from routine, to bottleneck, leverage, and strategic (Kraljic, 1983). We probed further 
from the respondent from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources why the 
entity would buy a unique oil drilling equipment in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Transport and Works. The respondent told us as in the quotation below: 
“We had collaborated with them on several other purchasing deals and had 
done well. We thought we still needed their input since they were themselves 
buying an item they were not used to. We do not regret having worked with 
them”. 
Therefore we derive that where entities have had successful previous dealings with 
each other, they are likely to collaborate in purchasing deals, even when it is not very 
similar to all the participating entities. 
 
From the responses above, we derive reasons for unsuitability for horizontal 
purchasing collaboration of commodities/services (we give more details on this in 
Chapter 5): 
· National security reasons, like the commodities/services in the security related 
PDEs; 
· Specificity and uniqueness makes them unsuitable, because some PDEs may 
not require such, in the next foreseeable future. For example, the Ministry of 
Local Government may never require military consultancy services; 
· Some of them do not have chances of repeated use, so there is no long term 
justification to purchase together; benefits got are one off, which may not be 
perceived as worth the effort involved. 
 
We recommend nationwide efforts to standardise suitable products/works/services, so 
that they can be easily bought together. This is when economies of scale can be 
achieved. Buying in bulk makes negotiation with suppliers strong. Even where 
general products would be the same, over specification by various PDEs makes them 
different. For example Ministry of Education and Sports uses different type of ink 
cartridge compared to Ministry of Public Service, which makes collaboration more 
difficult. However, standardisation requires various meetings by the PDEs to 
appreciate the need to have standardised purchases, especially those different PDEs 
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are not used to. Success stories for those that use most common products can be 
brought up to bring convergence with those that hold on unique purchases to a 
common purchase. 
 
From the above analysis, we conclude that careful analysis of the 
commodities/services involved in PDEs can influence the formation and sustainability 
of horizontal purchasing collaboration. Once collaboration has worked well, it will 
also lead to further standardisation. So standardisation may be both a prerequisite for 
collaboration an outcome of collaboration. 
 
Collaboration partners 
All ministry PDEs decide who to collaborate with in as far as there is a specific need 
to collaborate. The following quotation from the procurement officer Ministry of 
Education and Sports elaborates on the urgency issue; 
“Most procurements that come to our office are already time bad; for 
example, the information and communication technology course curriculum 
and associated packages requisitions were needed in less than two months, 
because the starting of the term for universal secondary school education 
programme was near, so we had to immediately contact the Ministry of 
Information and Communication Technology for technical input, to execute 
the procurement and meet deadlines. There was no time to first consider 
whether the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology was the 
correct long-time partner for us, we left that for the future, though they turned 
out to be good.” 
This is usually because of the specific skills and talents of personnel. Whereas it is 
inevitable for some PDEs like the Ministry of Energy and Minerals to collaborate with 
the Ministry of Lands and Environment and the Ministry of Works (because they are 
the line ministries and experts in environmental and mining affairs) in the exploration 
of oil or all PDEs referring to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs for 
contracting processes. Others simply solicit for expertise from other PDEs without 
any followed guidelines. There is no clear model of how a certain PDE comes to 
collaborate with one PDE, and not the other. We also note that horizontal purchasing 
collaboration can take place between competing companies and between unrelated 
companies (Cruijssen, 2006). 
 
Whereas there is no clear model of how a certain ministry comes to collaborate with 
another ministry, the universities studied have a structure and mechanism of 
collaboration. Each entity has representatives on the procurement structures. There are 
combined committees of: a contracts committee, councils, evaluation committees, 
accounting officers from each university are consulted, and procurement and disposal 
units. All universities consider respective user departments. Chairing of meetings is 
rotational, with each university taking a lead role at different alternating times.  
 
We summarise that starting collaboration is mainly motivated by a need to have a task 
carried out. We also note that once there is no proper procurement planning and 
urgency sets in, then the initial processes of evaluation and analysis of who to 
collaborate with may not be important. Finally, our study shows that in the public 
sector, where gains and profits especially in monitory terms are not key, urgency or 
the situational factors (especially searching for expertise) at the time when the idea of 
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collaboration is introduced can determine whether an entity should join a 
collaborative initiative or not.  
Duration of collaboration 
We note that before the introduction of the PPDA procurement reforms in 2003, there 
was centralisation of purchasing for all supplies/services/works above 1,000,000 Ushs 
(about 417 Euros). This means all government departments would refer purchasing 
decisions to the Central Tender Board (CTB). Therefore, horizontal purchasing 
collaboration as we define it was not an issue. We note that the ministry PDEs 
indicate starting the horizontal purchasing collaboration in 2003, when the PPDA act 
came into force.  
 
Likewise, both university PDEs indicated starting the collaboration in 2004, at the 
time the NPT project started. Despite starting a year later than the ministry PDEs, the 
university PDEs have collaborated more. Perhaps this could be explained by the 
compelling need the university PDEs had to expedite time constrained NPT project 
activities.  
 
We conclude that though trust and commitment develop with time, the initial level of 
trust and commitment among entities coming to collaborate should be enough to start 
off a collaborative arrangement, especially where there is a compelling need that 
motivates the intending collaborating entities. 
 
Forms of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda 
Forms of collaboration can enable and constrain, affect agenda setting, power 
dimensions, resource allocations, and outcomes (Huxham and Vangen, 2000). It is 
therefore important for horizontal purchasing collaboration initiatives in the 
developing countries and specifically Uganda to have an appropriate collaboration 
structure/form for success. In our study, we aimed at answering how collaboration is 
done. There are not yet any fully developed structures of operation. However, the 
PDE with a need to collaborate contacts the one(s) it feels it should work with. It is 
mainly out of the contingent conditions, which states that the conditions prevailing at 
a point in time, determine the next course of action (Batonda and Perry, 2003). 
 
Information is shared at the same level, but from the technical and more 
knowledgeable ministry/university, there is no influence by one over the other, since 
all such ministries/university are (is) relatively at the same level, in terms of authority, 
needs and resources. There is no lead entity with leadership legitimacy, or a steering 
committee with representatives from collaborating entities to make decisions on the 
general direction of collaboration. 
 
According to Bakker et al., (2008), only a few papers in purchasing literature clearly 
mention forms of collaborative purchasing (Aylesworth, 2003; Nollet and Beaulieu, 
2003; Schotanus and Telgen, 2007). Schotanus and Telgen (2007) published a 
highway matrix typology of organisational forms of collaborative purchasing. We 
analyse the Ugandan horizontal purchasing collaboration with a view to allocating the 
various forms on this typology.  
 
According to Schotanus and Telgen, one of the dimensions that distinguish the forms 
of purchasing is related to coordination; coordination by hierarchy and coordination 
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by market (Arnold, 1996b; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Jones and Hill, 1988; Thompson et 
al., 1991). 
 
We note that coordination is mainly by hierarchy since all the PDEs are at the same 
position and with similar mandate. There is no noticeable and official control by any 
of them. According to the dimension of “number of different group activities” in 
Uganda, it is medium. Some activities in the PPDA procurement cycle (see Table 4.3) 
are carried out jointly. 
 
Table 4.3 The Ugandan procurement cycle (PPDA cycle) 
Activities of the Ugandan procurement cycle Existence of purchasing collaboration 
Requisition No 
Confirmation of funds No 
Approval of procurement methods No 
Prepare bid documents Yes 
Approve bid documents No 
Invitation for bids Yes 
Opening of bids Yes 
Evaluation of bids Yes 
Approve evaluation reports No 
Award contracts No 
Sign and communicate contracts No 
Manage/monitor contracts Yes 
Evaluate the procurement Yes 
 
We found out that about six out of thirteen activities are done jointly. Note that 
collaboration is not practiced for all tenders in the PDEs. For example, Ministry of 
Education and Sports collaborated with Ministry of Works and Transport on 20% of 
the purchasing deals, because they were connected to building. This percentage could 
reduce in future when Ministry of Education and Sports has stopped its current 
running universal primary education building project, because the need for technical 
works team will have reduced. PDEs do not have hard rules for the collaboration 
operations; there are no official meeting schedules and structures.  
 
Aylesworth (2003), based on empirical observation, found five types of collaborative 
purchasing:  
· Local networks: consisting of few organisations within a geographical 
proximity, informally joined together, and can piggy back on each other; 
· Voluntary cooperatives: ranging from informal to highly structured 
arrangements, in which work is shared among members who become lead 
agents for the particular assigned tasks; 
· Regional purchasing agency: with a central body, but limited control for 
members; 
· Member owned service bureau: a separate entity, with a board of 
representatives from member organisations; 
 
 
48
· For profit enterprises: enterprises which sell their influence and expertise by 
purchasing goods based on aggregate demand plus a profit margin, or charging 
commission for its services. 
 
Among the five forms discussed above, only the first two (local network and 
voluntary cooperatives) can be noticed in Uganda.  
 
Nollet and Beaulieu (2003) link the different structures to different stages of 
development. The set up (at birth phase) is voluntarily done by members who 
perceive benefits out of collaboration, there are no separate resources to run the 
collaboration, and management of contracts is divided among the members. As the 
purchasing collaboration advances into growth, maturity and concentration phases, the 
structures become more institutionalised, rules put in place, and multidisciplinary 
teams get devoted to the collaboration. We note that in Uganda, horizontal purchasing 
collaboration is still emerging (Mudambi et. al., 2004) and match with the birth phase. 
 
We conclude that horizontal purchasing collaboration initiatives in Uganda do not 
have a deliberate structure to follow. This may cause low outcomes from 
collaboration because collaboration (whether vertical or horizontal) requires 
systematic analysis and configuration, which would support agile implementation of 
procurement plans, and continuous time oriented designs (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 
2001). 
 
Extent of appreciation of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Ugandan PDEs 
Out of the ministry PDEs, 38% said purchasing collaboration is not appreciated (i.e. 
members do not freely welcome it), while 62% said it is appreciated. The 38% score 
on non appreciation matches with the 38% score on the PDEs which indicated they 
have no priority for horizontal purchasing collaboration. Those who said it is not 
appreciated gave the following reasons: 
 
· That they were not yet sensitised about it. One respondent said he hears about 
collaboration in seminars and no efforts have been taken to emphasize it and 
how it should work;      
· Most ministries still do not fully respect the profession of procurement; 
· There is selfishness by individual staff in some of the ministries at the expense 
of national goals; 
· It is not known; 
· Ownership tendencies by individual ministries; 
· Peoples’ minds are still on decentralisation; 
· There is no trust and commitment; 
· Bad experiences with previous relationships.  
 
The following quotation from one of our respondents seems to explain this point 
clearly: 
 “I do not trust the other ministries, especially one ministry. We have bad 
relations already”. 
We note that sensitisation is important for horizontal purchasing collaboration to be 
appreciated. This may be important especially in Uganda where officers in the PDEs 
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may not have sufficient knowledge and experience on collaboration. This is worsened 
by lack of published literature on horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda.  
 
Since we had concluded that one possible reason why there is no priority given to 
horizontal purchasing collaboration is because procurement related staff are not yet in 
top levels of the management hierarchy in the PDEs, we argue that once there is more 
qualified and experienced staff in procurement, and therefore in top levels of the 
hierarchy, “able to sit in the boardrooms” and have a “helicopter view” and direction 
of the whole PDE, horizontal purchasing collaboration may have a higher priority and 
be more appreciated. Absence of hierarchical authority in collaborative projects being 
common was also noted by Williams (2008). Dissemination of successes on 
horizontal purchasing collaboration to other entities that have not yet appreciated it 
may improve the situation. We further note that absence of published literature on 
horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries may be mainly because of 
lack of proper dissemination of experiences of the already existing collaborative 
initiatives. 
 
Both university PDEs gave the following reasons for appreciating horizontal 
purchasing collaboration: 
· Increasing more bargaining power and obtaining savings, like the textbooks 
and computers that have been internationally and relatively cheaply purchased; 
· More purchasing knowledge; 
· More supplier information.  
 
We note that these universities have had structures and time to get exposed to the 
benefits of horizontal purchasing collaboration. Their experiences are fresh in their 
minds. Most of the ministries which said collaboration is appreciated are the big ones. 
We further asked the smaller PDEs why they did not appreciate collaboration, given 
the potential benefits involved. They said they have not yet been convinced of the 
potential benefits. A respondent from the Law Reform Commission, one of the 
smallest PDEs in terms of budget, said that they buy in smaller quantities and these 
quantities are enough for them, so they do not value the potential benefit of reduced 
costs of operation. Also the technical ministries said it is appreciated. These have had 
more exposure to collaborative purchasing than the rest. The technical/service 
ministries for example are meant to be informed of what happens in all the other 
ministries, which makes them, collaborate with others in their day to day activities. 
This may be the reason why they tend to evaluate horizontal purchasing collaboration 
more positively than the other ministries. 
 
We conclude from this analysis that more exposure opportunities can encourage 
horizontal purchasing collaboration. From our research, we suggest that in addition to 
the existing critical factors of horizontal purchasing collaboration (among others 
Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005); exposure should be recognised by scholars. This is in line 
with the findings of Schotanus (2007) who also found that promoting successes and 
quick wins is an important perceived success factor. 
 
The future of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda 
Eighty seven percent of the ministry PDEs and both university PDEs said the future of 
horizontal collaborative purchasing in Uganda is bright. To appreciate responses to 
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this research question, we include Table 4.4 to show the most common verbatim 
statements from respondents and whether they are positive and or negative. 
 
Table 4.4 Statements on future of collaboration 
Statement Positive Negative 
If government comes in to put an enabling law, purchasing collaboration will work √  
There is nothing to loose, because sharing information in public bodies is not wrong √  
The future is bright, but more sensitisation by the PPDA is required. √  
I do not think purchasing collaboration will be good for us, because we can manage 
on our own. 
 √ 
It has worked well for us in the Justice law and order sector √  
I do not trust the other ministries, we have bad relations already.  √ 
It is too early to conclude, lets wait and see. √ √ 
We can not avoid it because we can not do without the experts from other entities, 
until when we develop capacity ourselves 
√  
The process should be free from politics, let it be brought by professionals. √  
I do not think collaboration would answer our individual wishes, we can purchase 
separately 
 √ 
This is a policy of the developed countries, we can not share the budget  √ 
It has been practiced by the entities through sharing information about suppliers on 
the PPDA website, it can be strengthened 
√  
In our opinion, there is a great future for horizontal collaborative purchasing because 
all entities get finances at the same time and needs arise at the same time, so buying 
at the same time is viable 
√  
We have been wasting a lot of resources buying similar day to day items like others, 
this strategy is long overdue 
√  
I imagine it would rather be applied in private enterprises where there is a threat of 
competition, in government; we do not mainly aim at saving money. 
 √ 
If research is well done and finds that collaborative purchasing is good, then it will 
be supported 
√  
I believe it is a good idea, though because of selfishness, it may fail. We should 
encourage it. 
√  
 
Most of the respondents believe, based on experiences and perceptions, that horizontal 
purchasing collaboration will work and has a future (71 % of the respondents). 
However, some respondents are negative, especially those that hint on selfishness and 
bad previous experiences with the entities they have collaborated with in the past. One 
respondent is not sure that his entity would work well with another entity. On further 
discussion with the respondent, he said their orientations are different.  
 
We therefore conclude that past experiences can determine the willingness of entities 
to collaborate with others they have had such experiences with. However, the general 
analysis shows that there is a promising future in horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
 
4.4  Exploratory study 2 
 
As in exploratory study 1, we carried out exploratory study 2 in line with our first 
major research goal of understanding the behavioural aspects of horizontal purchasing 
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collaboration. We specifically set out to understand the initial factors for horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in Uganda. Understanding the critical factors further 
enlightens us on the status of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda. 
Whereas we largely use qualitative design to understand general issues on the status 
of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Exploratory study 1, we use a quantitative 
design to gain a deeper understanding of critical factors that lead to success of 
collaborative initiatives. This is important for developing countries that are largely 
starting up collaborative initiatives. 
 
Motivation for the study 
Our motivation for this exploratory study was mainly from the fact that horizontal 
purchasing collaborative initiatives being new in Uganda, and further basing on the 
fact that no literature specific to Uganda exists, there was need to understand the 
initial factors for horizontal purchasing collaboration. Determining success factors is 
an established method of organisational analysis. Essential elements that need to be 
addressed for PDEs to collaborate should be known and administrators need to keep 
an eye on them (Koutsikouri et al., 2008). As Koutsikouri et al. noted, failure to do 
this leads to problems which may act as barriers to success. We noted that having 
knowledge in initial factors is relevant for collaborative initiatives that are emerging, 
especially in the developing countries.  
 
We note that there is sufficient literature to justify horizontal purchasing collaboration 
because of associated benefits (Johnson, 1999; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005; Schotanus, 
2007; Tella and Virolainen, 2005). However, in practice purchasing groups do not 
always flourish and premature endings of such groups occur (Schotanus, 2007). We 
therefore try to better understand the critical factors that may make the purchasing 
collaborative initiatives to start and operate, so that management of such collaborative 
initiatives may take note of them since current research (apart from some few 
researches done by Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001 and Schotanus et al., 2009) offers 
little guidance in this area (Essig, 2000). 
 
Points of departure from previous research 
We reviewed the literature to identify the factors that are necessary for a successful 
horizontal collaboration. These include; trust (Bakker et al., 2008; Butler, 1991; Lee 
and Billington, 1992; McAllister, 1995;   Nollet and Buleaulieu, 2005; Schotanus, 
2007; Swan and Trawick, 1987; Svensson, 2004; commitment (Allen and Meyer, 
1996; Bakker et al., 2006b; Brown et al.,1995; Dion et al., 1992;  Gilliland and Bello, 
2002; Kanter, 1994; Zineldin and Jonsson, 2000;) reciprocity (Anderson and Narus, 
1990; Graen and Scandura, 1987; Stern and Reeve, 1980; Sullivan et al., 2003); 
dependence (Buchanan, 1992; Emerson, 1962; Hammarkvist et al., 1982; Mattsson, 
1999) government intervention, internal support, collaboration structure (Fryxell et 
al., 2002), communication (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Laing and Cotton, 1997; 
Schotanus, 2007) size (Mudambi et al., 2004), governance (Enthoven, 1994), sharing 
mechanism and allocation of sharing benefits and risks (Heijboer, 2003; Schotanus, 
2007), and uniformity of the members (Klein Woolthuis, 1999; Laing and Cotton, 
1997; Polychronakis and Syntetos, 2007; Schotanus, 2007). 
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Note that some of these factors are not behavioural in nature, which is the main focus 
of our study. Nonetheless, we consider all these factors with a view to see the relative 
importance of behavioural factors to the other factors. 
 
Whereas many studies have focused on the performance effects of collaboration 
(Bagchi et al., 2005; Johnson and Kristal, 2008), very few have focused on the factors 
influencing collaboration (Oh and Rhee, 2008). As Schotanus (2007) noted, there still 
exists minimal academic debate on critical factors of purchasing collaborations. We 
also note that Schotanus aimed at factors for managing a purchasing group. Whereas 
this was very relevant with studies in Netherlands where group purchasing initiatives 
have had a relatively longer time under such arrangements, and therefore management 
can be a challenge to the survival of these collaborations, in Uganda the concept is 
still new. In this research, we therefore direct the focus on the critical factors for start 
up collaborations. We also note that Schotanus (2007) and Hoffmann and Schlosser 
(2001) studied differences between successful and unsuccessful purchasing groups. 
Since in Uganda collaborations are still relatively new, these differences may be 
difficult to study, as respondents would find difficulties in evaluating their 
collaborations. We do not specifically consider factors for the management phase of a 
successful group. We mention this in our limitations of the study and suggest that 
future research projects could consider it. 
 
We also note differences between developed countries and developing countries. 
Previous studies (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001; Schotanus, 2007, Schotanus et al., 
2009), studied small and medium sized entities. Whereas these are defined as small 
and medium in the developed countries, they can be perceived as large from the 
context of developing countries.  
 
We also note that Hendrick (1997) studied the perceived importance of critical 
success factors. However, we note that most of the factors were not behavioural. We 
argue that behavioural factors rather than economic, legal or technical dimensions are 
less understood in the literature and experience more problems in collaboration 
(Boddy et al., 2000; Lambert et al., 1998). Of the critical components to starting and 
sustaining collaborative initiatives, behavioural issues “perhaps are the most fragile 
and tenuous” (Nicholas, 1999). We therefore focus on behavioural factors. 
 
We do not test hypotheses, but we test the significance of success factors which we 
derive from theory for practical applicability in existing horizontal purchasing 
collaboration initiatives; an approach similarly used by Schotanus et al (2009). There 
are two methods of identifying success factors (Schotanus et al., 2009). One method is 
by directly asking respondents about the perceived importance of several factors used 
by Hendrick (1997) and Schotanus (2007). The second method is about measuring 
differences and similarities between successful and unsuccessful purchasing groups 
from several potential success factors (Schotanus et al., 2009). Then the factors that 
best predict success are identified as success factors. 
We prefer the first method because for starting collaborative initiatives, it is more 
difficult and sometimes not realistic for respondents to evaluate success. Hoffmann 
and Schlosser also note this hindrance. 
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Theoretical foundation of factors for initialising horizontal purchasing 
collaboration 
In this section, we include a theoretical analysis of factors for initialising horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. We consider factors that have not been covered before in 
Chapter 3.  
 
Communication 
We define communication as the formal and informal exchange of information and 
meaning between the parties of a working relationship, concerning day to day tactical 
or strategic issues of the relationship (Anderson and Narus, 1984; Leonidou et al., 
2006; Kim and Frazier, 1997; Mohr and Nevin, 1990). In a collaborative initiative, 
communication builds trust and reduces concerns of perceived disadvantages by 
collaborating entities. Efficient communication leads to regular contact, which 
ultimately facilitates the sharing of information and the lowering of barriers regarding 
confidentiality (Mudambi et al., 2004). This regular contact between collaborating 
entities is likely to reduce uncertainty in the collaboration (Hoegl and Wagner, 2005). 
We note that whereas studies in the developed world suggest that trust plays a key 
role in online purchasing decisions (Pavlou, 2003), we still note that issues of trust 
have been found to inhibit the adoption of information technology in the developing 
countries like Nigeria, Mexico and Thailand (Ezeoha, 2005; Sukkar and Hassan, 
2005). So a breakthrough of trust barriers is necessary to achieve benefits of 
collaboration. Communication gives assurances to all entities that the collaboration is 
going on. Basing on the transaction cost theory, a common information and 
communication platform supports standardisation (Bakker at el., 2008) and reduces 
opportunism. Basing on the resource based view; communication enables 
collaborating entities to share information or rare resources (Tyler and Steensma, 
1995). 
 
For starting collaborative initiatives, there are more communication problems (Laing 
and Cotton, 1997). Therefore for starting collaborative initiatives, communication 
should be efficient and effective (Schotanus et al., 2009), to ensure minimal 
transaction costs that justify continued collaboration. 
 
Internal support 
Though the collaborating partners have a great role to play in the success of a 
purchasing collaboration, the context, tone and tenor of the relationship are 
established by the respective top managers (Michael et al., 1995). Top managers of a 
collaborating partner will give it the confidence to go on. Some of the strategies in 
collaboration require constant approval from the individual partners themselves. This 
is even more relevant in newly established collaborative initiatives with no strong 
operating structures. 
 
Sincere efforts by top management go beyond slogans and provide vision and broad 
goals that direct quality efforts, provide realistic assessments of resource requirements 
and plan for these resources (Ahire and O’shaughnessy, 1997). 
 
Uniformity of members 
Whereas using the resource based view of the firm, we note that entities go to 
collaborate to realise resources they do not possess (Kamann et al., 2004; Wernerfelt, 
1994). Several scholars (e.g. Polychronakis and Syntetos, 2007) suggest that some 
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aspects of the collaborating entities should be more or less uniform. This is even more 
relevant for PDEs which operate under similar public service work culture and 
operating PPDA guidelines.  
 
From the transaction cost theory, uniformity is crucial in reversing the bounded 
rationality concept, because it ensures mutual forecasts of the parties and for all 
parties to take a uniform long-term view of the relationship (Ganesan, 1994). 
Uniformity also reduces room for opportunism (Wilding and Humphries, 2006).  
 
Collaborating structures 
We define structure as a permanent set of social relations with a certain pattern 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The structure of a collaborative initiative is important 
if benefits from collaborative purchasing are to be gained (Bakker et al., 2008). Many 
scholars have argued that collaboration structure at formation is the key to 
collaboration success; hence success is predetermined by the initial combination of 
ingredients (Das and Teng, 1996; Doz, 1996; Shane, 1998). Based on Bakker et al., 
(2008), we note that there are few studies about collaboration structures (Aylesworth, 
2003; D’Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003; Schotanus and 
Telgen, 2007). 
 
Based on the transaction costs theory, we note that in the initial phases of 
collaboration, the structure is aimed at having potential for savings through 
consolidating volumes (D’Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003). 
Also based on the resource based view, we note that the growth phase has an 
autonomous structure, a separate organisation that manages the contracts, involves top 
management and separate resources are devoted to the collaboration (Bakker et al., 
2008). 
 
Sharing mechanism 
Collaborating entities need a systematic and fair way of allocating gains and costs that 
result from operations. Sharing should be fair (Dyer, 2000; Heijboer, 2003). Based on 
the transaction cost theory, collaborating entities look forward to incurring lesser total 
costs than what they would have incurred without collaboration. We note that in 
practice, fair allocation of savings is difficult (Schotanus, 2007), however, this has to 
be done because the quality of the relationship between collaborating entities is based 
on this (Wagner and Lindemann, 2008). 
 
Governance 
From the transaction costs theory, we note that some entities to collaborative 
initiatives may be potential opportunists who look out for chances to gain more than 
the others (de Man and Roijakkers, 2009). This could be even worse for starting 
collaborative initiatives which have not yet developed sufficient trust, which need 
iterative transactions to create trust (Granovetter, 1973; Brown and Peterson, 1993; 
Powell, 1996). 
 
Governance therefore becomes important, in ensuring that there is careful control. 
Control can occur through detailed contracts and working guidelines between the 
collaborating entities. However, we note that governance of collaborative initiatives 
should be a balance between having controls and relying on trust, since literature 
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(Ehin, 2000; Anheier and Kendall, 2000) suggests that trust flourishes under voluntary 
collaboration. 
 
Collaborating knowledge 
Knowledge is expertise and skills acquired through experience or education; the 
theoretical or practical understanding of a subject. Basing on the resource based view, 
we note that in collaborative initiatives, partners seek to learn and acquire from each 
other, knowledge that is not available to individual partners (Lei et al., 1997). Based 
from the resource based view, we also note that relatedness is composed of closeness 
to the competences of collaborating entities and tacit knowledge (Gulbrandsen et al., 
2008). The building up and maintaining of specific knowledge (Wynstra et al., 2001), 
could be one way of developing tacit knowledge. Collaboration closeness captures 
similarities between an entity’s present knowledge and skills with the knowledge and 
skills of other entities, which sustains collaboration. We also note that new 
collaborative initiatives may have less tacit knowledge because of less time and 
experience in collaboration. However, it is argued that the weak ties between the new 
collaborative initiatives characterised by distant and infrequent interaction are more 
likely to be the source of novel diversified information which is interesting for 
relationships (Granovetter, 1973; Hansen, 1999; Cai et al., 2010). Low level of tacit 
knowledge means the collaborating entities “can tell more of what they know” 
(Polanyi, 1966). We note that new collaborative initiatives have more explicit 
knowledge than tacit knowledge. Therefore, based on the transaction cost theory, 
there are less costs of knowledge sharing and transfer (Wagner and Buko, 2005). 
Related to this argument, low levels of tacit knowledge in new collaborative 
initiatives lead to low threats of opportunism (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Schilling and 
Steensma, 2002). 
 
Based on transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1981), knowledge enables 
collaborative entities to reduce information asymmetry through having complete and 
perfect information. Knowledge on collaboration is important, because there is a 
growing array of research which shows that many partners enter collaborations with 
limited understanding of collaboration dynamics, which could affect the relationship 
(Hamel, 1991; Osborn and Baughn, 1990). If there is little, you can bring in little 
knowledge. 
 
Government intervention 
Government intervenes in the operations of collaboration to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness of operation (Rai et al., 1996). Favourable government policies are 
required for formation and operation of collaborative initiatives (Taylor, 2006). 
However, government intervention can often have a restricted role in formation and 
operation of collaboration, especially where its tedious approval processes are 
involved (Cusumano, 1991; Rai et al., 1996). According to the transaction cost theory, 
the long processes may increase costs of operations and this may affect operations of 
collaboration. 
 
Based on the transaction cost theory, we argue that entities in initial phases of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration seek to maximise benefits while reducing risks 
(Williamson, 1985). The entities therefore look up to efficient institutional 
governance systems as a cushion to protect them against future risks. 
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Size 
We consider size as the number of entities in collaboration. Whereas we note that one 
of the first objectives of collaboration is to acquire more power in order to realise the 
associated benefits (Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005), basing on the transaction cost theory, 
we note that if collaboration involves many entities, it will lead to higher transaction 
costs and if entities are few, there will be less economies of scale (Schotanus, 2007). 
 
We also note that the larger the collaboration size, the less the attraction a member 
feels towards the collaboration (Stoel, 2002). Therefore, there should be an optimal 
size of a collaborative initiative. In the study by Chan et al., (1999), once the group 
became too large, the outcomes decreased with additional increases in the group size. 
Based on the transaction cost theory, we note that it is cohesion among collaboration 
members that would provide more leverage for better prices (Cleverly and Nutt, 1984; 
Comptroller-General, 1980; Henderson, 1988). Basing on this, then size and bundled 
volumes argument for lowered prices may be less relevant (Scanlon, 2002). 
 
Method 
Population and sample 
The population of study was 116 central government PDEs in Uganda. Out of these, 
we collected data from 89 procurement officers who attended the workshop, about 
general procurement policies in Ugandan PDEs at which we gave a presentation of the 
factors that determine horizontal purchasing. All these officers were both theoretically 
and practically knowledgeable in horizontal purchasing collaboration. We noted that 
previous studies (e.g., Koutsikouri et al., 2008) have also used facilitated workshops 
and group discussions to identify critical factors. 
   
Data collection and procedure 
We used a questionnaire to get responses from 89 procurement officers representing 
77% of the central government PDEs in Uganda. 
In order to refine the questionnaire, and ensure validity and reliability of the research 
instruments, we carried out a pilot test mainly to ensure content validity (Mitchell, 
1996) of the questionnaire. 
 
Prior to the workshop, we pre-tested the questionnaire using ten respondents (who 
were practicing procurement officers in the PDEs and at the same time had research 
skills since they were studying for Master of Science in Purchasing and Supply Chain 
Management at Makerere University), and made the necessary adjustments, before the 
final questionnaire was used. This focus group was much similar to the final 
population those who were to attend a workshop. The ten respondents were chosen 
basing on Saunders et al., (2003) guidelines on the number of respondents for a pilot 
study (size of study, time, and money resources available, and having largely used a 
previously used standardised questionnaire). We thought that since all the respondents 
are mainly professionals, doing similar work, there would be no major variations in 
the populations. This number met the ten respondents recommended by Fink (1995b) 
for pilots of such student questionnaire designs. After the pilot testing, we made 
adjustments and prepared the final questionnaire.   
 
We adjusted the question on the factor collaboration hierarchy to read collaboration 
structure because in Uganda government civil service, they use the term structure. We 
also noted that literature uses this term (Enthoven, 1994; Galaskiewicz, 1985; 
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Mintzberg, 1983; Nollet and Beauleu, 2003). We asked the respondents the extent to 
which they scored the level of importance of the individual critical factors. Responses 
ranged from 1 = Not at all important to 5 = Very important. 
Response 
We received response from all the 89 sampled procurement officers. All the responses 
got were complete; we did not remove any questionnaire for incompleteness. Since 
the workshop was not specifically about the importance of behavioural factors, it 
minimised the chances of having biased responses.  
 
We used the Kolmogorov – Smirnov Lilliefors Significance Correction (Table 4.7) to 
test for normality (Field, 2005). The data was found to be normal. 
 
Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
In Table 4.5, we show the results of the descriptive tests.  
 
Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Discussion of findings 
From the descriptive tests, considering the minimum scores, none of the respondents 
rated trust as not at all important or as unimportant. All the scores are 3 and above. 
This may show the importance of the trust factor to collaboration in the Ugandan case. 
On the other hand considering the maximum scores, government intervention was the 
only factor not rated among the respondents as very important. None of the scores of 
government intervention is 5 and its mean score is the lowest (mean = 2.9545). This 
may show how the respondents perceive the factor as less important to collaboration. 
Descriptive Statistics 
89 3.00 5.00 4.7303 .4946
89  1.00 5.00 4.3596 .6784
88 1.00 5.00 4.1477 .8379
89 2.00 5.00 4.0899 .7634
89 2.00 5.00 3.6854 .9120
88 1.00 5.00 3.3523 .9102
88 1.00 5.00 3.3295 1.1009
89 2.00 5.00 3.2584 .8986
89 1.00 5.00 3.1461 1.0824
89 1.00 5.00 3.0337 .8588
88 1.00 5.00 2.9545 .9815
88 1.00 4.00 2.9545 .8292
89 1.00 5.00 2.8764 1.1263
84
Trust 
Commitment 
Reciprocity 
Dependence
Communication 
Internal Support
Uniformity of the
members 
Collaborating Structures 
Collaborating Knowledge
Governance 
Sharing Mechanism 
Government Intervention
Size
Valid N (listwise) 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
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Table 4.6 Tests of normality  
Tests of Normality
.250 84 .000
.291 84 .000
.264 84 .000
.289 84 .000
.296 84 .000
.210 84 .000
.204 84 .000
.266 84 .000
.297 84 .000
.223 84 .000
.214 84 .000
.452 84 .000
.275 84 .000
collaborating Knowledge
collaborating Sructures
Committment
Communication
Dependence
Governance
Governence Intervention
Internal Support
Reciprocity
Sharing Mechanism
Size
Trust
Uniformity of the
members
Statistic df Sig.
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Lilliefors Significance Correctiona. 
 
 
Our results show that trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence (mean score of 
4.7, 4.4, 4.1 and 4.1 respectively; Sig .000) are considered to be the most critical 
factors for horizontal purchasing collaboration according to the respondents. On the 
other hand, governance, sharing mechanism, government intervention and size (means 
scores 3.0, 3.0, 3.0 and 2.9; Sig .000) are less important factors for horizontal 
purchasing collaboration according to the respondents. 
 
Our findings seem to be related to other existing literature, for example Hendrick 
(1997) ranked 20 critical factors for successful purchasing consortiums. The 
behavioural related factor “there is a high degree of trust among all participants” was 
ranked second. However, we note that most of the factors (19 out of 20) Hendrick 
considered were not behavioural as literature advances them. He included more 
operational factors. The outcome of behavioural factors being important seems to 
match with our findings. We therefore conclude that perhaps behavioural factors, 
more than other factors are necessary for successful horizontal purchasing 
collaboration, especially in the initial stage of collaboration, which may currently be 
the dominating stage of collaborative initiatives in developing countries. This is in 
agreement with findings (e.g. Schotanus, 2007; Browning et al., 1995) that when 
starting collaboration, behavioural factors are key, but once established, other 
previously less important factors become increasingly important to ensure proper 
management of the collaboration.  
We however, note that Schotanus did not study reciprocity and dependence directly, 
and that commitment is a critical success factor in the management phase of 
collaboration. Please note that we did not study the factors during management phase 
of collaboration. The behavioural factor trust may no longer be a distinguishing factor 
between successful and unsuccessful purchasing groups since the initial adoption of 
this factor keeps the collaborating partners going. Other factors may then become 
more important. 
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Our results also show that government intervention (mean score 3.0, Sig .000) which 
is the enforced approach to collaboration is not appropriate for horizontal purchasing 
collaboration. This is in agreement with Schotanus (2007). This may be because PDEs 
in Uganda are autonomous and may perceive government intervention negatively and 
oppose it. This is in agreement with Rai et al. (1996) that government should 
intervene in the operations of collaboration to the extent to which it ensures efficiency 
and effectiveness of operations.                                                                   
We note that uniformity is a less important factor in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration because many PDEs in Uganda operate at almost same level in terms of 
authority, resources, working environment, and guidelines. One would not expect a lot 
of diversity, thus respondents perceived it as less important compared to the 
behavioural factors. This is consistent with Schotanus et al. (2009), who found out 
suggest that uniformity may not be an important success factor because purchasing 
groups are already operating at the same horizontal level of a supply chain. 
We, however, note some differences with the existing literature. Basing on Schotanus 
(2007), the organisation and similarity of the collaborative initiative scores relatively 
high (mean score 3.9) compared to ours (collaboration structures and governance). 
This may be because when a purchasing group has been existing for a longer time (as 
is the case in the Netherlands where the study was done), the relatively large size may 
require proper organisational arrangements. Sharing mechanisms then become 
increasingly important as and when there are resources to share. In situations where 
the collaboration is new, and perhaps little to share (costs or gains), then organisation 
may be a less important factor to collaboration.  
In addition to the insights got from this chapter, we further analyse the situational 
analysis of the variables we consider in our study; trust, commitment, reciprocity and 
dependence.  
 
We note that some horizontal purchasing collaborative initiatives started in 2003 and 
others 2004. These collaborative initiatives are relatively new. Developing high levels 
of trust and commitment requires longer time than these collaborative initiatives have 
existed. According to Hendrick (1997), time is a key dimension for horizontal 
purchasing collaboration to be an effective tool. Based on this reasoning, trust and 
commitment are still at low levels, compared to developing countries where it has 
existed longer.  
 
Situational analysis of trust, commitment, reciprocity and dependence  
We include the situational analysis of dimensions of these variables to further 
contextualise the above findings, and strengthen our hypotheses. 
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Situational analysis of trust and collaboration in Uganda 
Although the meaning of trust is intuitively understood, researchers from different 
backgrounds ascribe divergent meanings to it (Tschannen-Moran and Hoy, 2000). We 
therefore include a brief analysis of the Ugandan context of trust below: 
Trust in developing countries like China is difficult to earn (Fukuyama, 1995). If a 
question for example is asked, the typical response is “why do you want to know 
that?” In Uganda, a question like “what is the price of this shirt?” is met with “how 
much money do you have?” instead of mentioning the price such as Ushs 10,000 or 
Ushs 20,000. If the user department informs the procurement department that there is 
no ink cartridge for use, the reply is “why not?”, or “where did it go?”. This is a 
response that possibly reflects a lack of trust among the various parties. This analysis 
can be extended for public PDE’s. 
Trust arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based 
on commonly shared norms. Such norms could be about professional standards and 
codes of behaviour. For example, we trust a doctor, because by his profession, we do 
not expect any deviation from those standards expected of medical personnel. In 
finance, accounting, and purchasing, officers are more often suspected not to do what 
they are expected of (Public Accounts Report, Uganda 2004). This is mistrust in the 
finance related disciplines, amongst which is procurement. 
Trust manifests itself in terms of the form of concrete deeds and actions. Individuals 
are no better than their word. For example, in New York city, the Hasidic Jewish 
diamond traders complete million dollar business transactions strictly on verbal 
agreements – in such cultures, a person’s word and reputation are highly valued 
(Scarnati, 1997). In Uganda on the other hand, even low value agreements are written 
with the assistance of expensive legal experts and several witnesses. 
In Table 4.7 below, we further show the situational analysis of trust in Uganda. 
Table 4.7 The situational analysis of trust in Uganda 
Author/dimension Contribution Ugandan Situational Analysis 
Dependability/Reliab
ility (Swan and 
Trawick, 1987; 
Svensson, 2004) 
This is about confidence, or 
consistency or 
predictability, or faith in the 
collaborating parties 
In Uganda, the collaborative initiatives are 
relatively new. This may make consistency 
and predictability difficult to realise.  
Honesty This is about fairness, less 
motivation to lie and 
openness of management.  
Though most information in public 
procurement practice is open for the public 
to access, there are cases of information 
asymmetry. For example some PDEs have 
knowledge of non performing suppliers, 
whom they can not disclose to other PDEs.  
Some of the information may not be 
correct, or some may be hidden. For 
example PDEs under collaborative 
initiatives have different price lists. 
Competence This is about ability, 
character, expertise and 
integrity of the collaborating 
parties 
Most collaborating initiatives have 
expertise that is largely similar. Staff have 
all been introduced to public procurement 
procedures, apart from those of major 
PDEs. Again, collaborative initiatives being 
relatively new, character and integrity are 
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Author/dimension Contribution Ugandan Situational Analysis 
 still on a low side, till such a time when 
they have developed closer relationships. 
Partner orientation This is about altruism, 
business sense of 
judgement, or congruence 
with collaborating parties 
Altruism, the concept that emphasises 
pursuit of the public interest and not selfish 
interest is in line with the rationale of 
public procurement in Uganda, which aims 
at fairness and service to all. All the PDEs 
follow similar guidelines and getting 
oriented towards each other is relatively 
easy, than private procurement sector 
where collaborating entities follow 
divergent guidelines.  
Friendliness This is about acceptance, 
benevolence and liking 
towards collaborating 
entities. 
Friendliness may be real after a reasonable 
time of relationship. People in Uganda are 
friendly. However being new relationships, 
friendliness has not yet reached the high 
levels. Benevolence, the disposition made 
up of a choice and desire for happiness of 
others, may range from medium to high in 
Ugandan PDEs. 
 
From the discussions above, we note that though we appreciate that trust would 
strongly influence the level of collaboration, it has probably not yet been able to fully 
mature amongst the concerned public units for the case of developing countries 
Drawing from the networking theory, the entities in Ugandan collaborative initiatives 
do not have adequate information and communication systems. Apart from the 
Integrated Information Management System (IFMS) which connects entities with 
financial information, there are no other information and communication systems to 
the best of our knowledge, which link entities together. According to Michelle and 
Kenneth (2008), the low levels of trust in the developing countries are thought to 
especially pose threats to emerging institutions. Drawing from the transaction cost 
theory, these entities are limited in their ability to receive, store, retrieve, and 
communicate information without error (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). Some high 
level of information asymmetry is existent. This limits the extent to which rational 
behaviour and behavioural aspects like trust can be conducted, since there are 
conditions of uncertainty. We therefore hypothesize: 
H1b: The level of trust between Ugandan PDE’s in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
In the study, respondents said they were not yet sensitised about horizontal purchasing 
collaboration; and that little is known about it. Lack of complete knowledge and 
clarity of future operations and direction lead to low level of commitment to the 
collaboration. Respondents said that nationalism is sacrificed for individualism. In 
addition to this, they indicated there is less patriotism to national interests. Some 
PDEs still tend to “own” up whatever belongs to them. This keeps the levels of trust 
and commitment low. A situational analysis of the dimensions of commitment further 
enables us to make a hypothesis on commitment.  
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Situational analysis of commitment and collaboration in developing countries and 
Uganda 
According to Choppin (1994), commitment will be best achieved when people 
involved in the collaboration believe in its mission and objectives, and when they are 
aware of their potential to contribute to them. They will then be willing to take 
considerable effort for the collaboration to achieve its objectives. This does not only 
make them act, but also feel the commitment.  
 
In the table below, we further show the situational analysis of trust in Ugandan  
 
Table 4.8 The situational analysis of commitment in Uganda 
Author/dimension Contribution Ugandan situational analysis 
Instrumental 
commitment 
(Allen and Meyer.,      
1996; Brown et 
al.,1995; Dion et 
al.,1992; Gilliland 
and Bello., 2002; 
Zineldin and 
Jonsson., 2000) 
This is where an actor is 
constrained by the costs and 
inconveniences of leaving the 
current collaboration. In our 
case, the collaborating entity 
will keep going on, because 
leaving will be 
inconveniencing and will 
involve financial and non 
financial costs.  
 
In Uganda, PDEs are legally autonomous. 
This means they have an option to operate 
alone. They collaborate mainly on 
voluntary bases. Since collaborative 
initiatives have not gone deep into 
collaboration, then the costs to incur after 
leaving collaboration may not be high. 
This makes the dimension of instrumental 
commitment to horizontal purchasing 
collaboration low. 
Normative 
commitment 
(Allen and Meyer.,      
1996; Brown et 
al.,1995; Dion et 
al.,1992; Gilliland 
and Bello., 2002; 
Zineldin and 
Jonsson., 2000) 
Normative commitment is 
based on the collaborating 
entity’s value in the 
collaboration. A value is a 
preference of one mode of 
behaviour over another. It is 
about obligations that 
members feel to remain with 
an organisation and build on 
generalised expectations. 
Whereas in Uganda, PDEs are largely 
similar in terms of size, authority, 
stakeholders etcetera, the similarities in 
values PDEs stand for are rated low 
(Tumwine, 2006). This may be because 
of differing mission statements of each 
PDE, since they are not derived from a 
similar national mission. PDEs have not 
yet had enough time to learn the “ins and 
outs” of  each other. 
 
Affective 
commitment 
(Allen and Meyer.,      
1996; Brown et 
al.,1995; Dion et 
al.,1992; Gilliland 
and Bello., 2002; 
Zineldin and 
Jonsson., 2000) 
This relates to commitment by 
a collaborating entity in 
relation to the identification 
and involvement with the 
others. It is a feeling of 
belonging, and a sense of 
attachment to the 
collaboration. 
PDEs would wish to be associated with 
the big ones, but this may not be the case 
with the many same size PDEs. Since 
most PDEs at horizontal collaboration 
have same authority and almost same 
level of resources, the feeling of 
belonging and sense of attachment to the 
other collaborating PDEs may be low. 
 
In public service like public procurement, those involved are working towards 
achieving benefits, which will be shared by all members of the public. Much as each 
member benefits, the particular outcomes can not be easily traced and therefore 
appreciated by the individual procurement units. In Uganda, this worsens the situation 
where most of the financial benefits from public activities are taken by some 
individuals through corruption (NPPIS Report, 2007).   
 
Collaborating entities, especially those that have just emerged, tend to practice 
adversarial engagement instead of cooperation (Mudambi et al., 2004). While they 
have a philosophical commitment to horizontal purchasing collaboration, they had not 
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consciously designed or implemented systems to support this strategy, so they get 
committed to a low level.  
 
Compared to developed countries, flexibility, adaptability, and consistency in 
developing countries can be challenging (Surana et al., 2005). Voordijk (1999) further 
notes that in developing countries, few links exist between collaborating partners. 
Partners are seen as less cooperative and less reliable (Callahan, 2000; Babbar et al., 
2008). 
 
Drawing from the resource based view, for new horizontal purchasing collaborative 
initiatives, capabilities are still of low value and low rareness, creating low conditions 
of heterogeneity. Some of the capabilities for instance human resource competence 
can be imitated with time which may create instability in the collaboration (Barney, 
1991). Besides, basing on the resource based view criteria of what constitutes 
advantage-generating resource (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991, Grant, 
1991), public procurement uses the same guidelines, which leads to duplication of 
processes and therefore capabilities. 
 
Drawing from the transaction cost theory, because of opportunism, entities in the new 
collaborative initiatives have not yet overcome self interest with guile; like cheating 
and lying. This raises transaction costs of monitoring the behaviour and making sure 
that other entities do not engage in opportunistic behaviour. Entities may not be 
committed to the collaboration. Further, drawing from the transaction cost theory, 
new collaborative initiatives in Uganda have less desire to continue and further 
develop the collaboration. This is partly because the transaction costs are still high. 
The transaction costs will reduce as commitment increases (Kim, 2007). In the initial 
phases of collaboration, entities may not readily accept other collaborating entities’ 
specific requests and processes (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  
 
The developing countries and particularly Ugandan collaborative initiatives being 
new, they have not yet got clear understanding of specific needs of each other, to 
accommodate similarities in issues like product quality, delivery schedules and 
specifications. The transaction costs therefore remain relatively high and may lead to 
low levels of commitment. 
 
We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H2b: The level of commitment of PDE’s in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
 
We also note that there is no lead PDE with leadership legitimacy or steering 
committee with representatives from collaborating PDEs to make decisions on the 
general direction. PDEs being almost at the same level, means they do not perceive 
others as having unique and critical resources for which there are a few alternatives to 
justify holding on. This implies low levels of dependence.  
 
Situational analysis of dependence and collaboration in developing countries and 
Uganda 
We present the Ugandan situational analysis of dependence in Table 4.9 below.  
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Table 4.9 Ugandan situational analysis of dependence 
Author/ 
dimension 
Contribution Ugandan situation 
Technical 
dependence 
This is when two organisations 
technically rely on each other 
because they have to use compatible 
equipment. 
This enables the participating 
members to mutually use the assets 
in a technical sense. 
In Uganda, the equipment may not easily be 
compatible since each PDE has its own 
specifications. For example IT equipment 
differs in make and model, for different 
PDEs. This reduces compatibility of the  
equipment, and reduces dependence on other 
PDEs. Since collaborative initiatives are 
relatively new, PDEs have not largely 
adapted their mutual business operations. 
This makes technical dependence is low. 
Time 
dependence 
Here, two organisations have a time 
based need of their activities.  Based 
on the networking theory, time 
dependence is more important in 
supply chain networks where 
leanness (Lambert et al., 1998) is 
key. 
 
To PDE’s, the Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development has a great 
implication to the timing it releases respective 
funds. 
Horizontal purchasing collaboration requires 
funds for the participating PDE’s at similar 
times, if the activities are to be jointly carried 
out at the same time. This makes the time 
dimension important. Some PDEs require 
services of other PDEs in predetermined 
sequence, for instance, MOJCA PDE has to 
first advise on the suitability of the contract 
before another PDE executes the contract 
Knowledge 
dependence 
This is where knowledge develops 
between different parties, as a result 
of interaction. Such is tacit 
knowledge and is unique to the very 
partners in the collaborative 
arrangement. This is applicable in 
horizontal collaboration because tacit 
knowledge is unique to a particular 
partner, and can not be copied.  
Therefore, a partner may need to rely 
on the other for such knowledge. 
In Uganda, even where there are lawyers in 
every public unit, still the Ministry of Justice 
and Constitutional Affairs is referred to 
whenever there is a need to draft a contract.  
Various units have to refer to staff of other 
ministries for knowledge on how to handle a 
certain purchase. For example, most of the 
ministries considered in our explorative study 
always referred to a Principal Procurement 
Officer in the Ministry of Education and 
Sports, including those officers at the same 
rank.  Based on the resource based view, 
knowledge especially tacit knowledge which 
can not easily be copied, is an important asset 
(Gingold and Johnson, 1998) for a PDE, 
which motivates other PDEs to collaborate 
with it.  
Social 
dependence 
This is where the individuals within 
the relationship get attracted to each 
other, they like to work together.  
The interaction creates bonds that are 
hard to break, and members feel 
more obliged to collaborate.  
 
Though there is interaction, it is generally for 
formal processes, and sometimes technical. 
Interaction has been on for a short time, 
because these procurement and disposal 
entities started in 2003 (PPDA Act, 2003).  
We therefore do not expect social dependence 
to be a major influence to horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in Uganda. The 
social atmosphere and personal chemistry 
(Svensson, 2004) between the top managers 
of the PDEs have not yet reached high levels. 
Social dependence is still low. 
Economic 
/juridical  
This is the formal dependence, 
especially in the form of written 
contracts 
With relatively new collaborations and low 
level of trust, PDE’s tend to depend on others 
because of formal contracts.  
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Author/ 
dimension 
Contribution Ugandan situation 
Market 
dependence 
It refers to an organisation’s image 
and status that may positively 
influence another organisation’s 
image and status. 
Apart from five key ministries that are 
classified as large, the issue of dependence as 
a result of image and status does not seem to 
be strong in Uganda. This may be because 
PDEs are largely similar, in terms of size 
(apart from five key ones) and authority, 
which reduces possibilities of some PDEs 
positively influencing others’ image and 
status. 
Information 
technology 
dependence 
It refers to two organisations that 
may invest in a common IT standard, 
such as electronic data interchange. 
Currently, all Ministry PDE’s depend on the 
Integrated Financial Management System; 
with the Ministry of Finance Planning and 
Economic Development. Various PDEs can 
network with others for example MOFPED 
can monitor financial information relating to 
other PDEs using the software. 
  
From the literature (Ball and Pye, 2000; Buchanan, 1992; Emerson, 1962; Hendrick, 
1997; Hammarkvist et al., 1982; Johnson, 1999; Mattsson, 1999; Nollet and Beaulieu, 
2003, 2005; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Polychronakis and Syntetos, 2007; Tella and 
Virolainen, 2005), we find that in a horizontal purchasing collaboration arrangement, 
each PDE has a relatively high level of independence and can start and complete a 
purchasing transaction on its own (PPDA Act, 2003). This reduces the strength of the 
dependence concept.  
 
In Uganda, PDEs have duplicated resources. For example, the Ministry of Education 
and Sports has building equipment, which should ideally be a specialisation of the 
Ministry of Works and Transport. Each PDE employs specialists in different fields of 
specialisation. This makes PDEs relatively self sustaining and therefore reducing the 
need for dependence. For knowledge dependence, this would be very motivating if the 
collaborations have existed for a relatively long time to create specific tacit 
knowledge for specific entities, from where other entities would wish to benefit from. 
We note that the PPDA Act (2003) is relatively new, and the horizontal purchasing 
collaboration itself is a new concept. Tacit knowledge has not fully evolved. All 
employees seem to be relatively new (Ministry of Public Service 2007 records). This 
reduces the contribution of the knowledge dependence dimension to dependence.  
Drawing from the resource based view; we note that horizontal purchasing 
collaboration entities may not depend on each other for a high level of operations 
since they operate at relatively same level of authority. In their initial years of 
collaboration, entities may not make changes to their processes and specifications to 
meet each other’s needs (Hailen et al., 1991). 
We therefore hypothesize: 
H4b: The level of dependence among PDEs in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
 
Another lesson we note from the study is that procurement officers in Ugandan PDEs 
are in the middle or low levels of the organisational hierarchy. This means they do not 
sit in the top level meetings that take strategic decisions, yet we also note procurement 
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involves strategic decisions. For example, even if they appreciate the contributions of 
other PDEs to their operations, such officers can not authoritatively reciprocate to the 
corresponding PDEs, which may likely keep the level of reciprocity low. 
 
Situational analysis of reciprocity and collaboration in developing countries and 
Uganda 
We look at reciprocity in three ways; equivalence, immediacy, and interest (Sullivan 
et al., 2003). Similar studies on collaboration (Graen and Scandura, 1987; Liden et al., 
1997) have used this three way approach. In Table 4.10, we present the Ugandan 
situational analysis of reciprocity. 
 
Table 4.10 Ugandan situational analysis of reciprocity  
Author/dimension Contribution Ugandan situational analysis 
Equivalence 
(Graen and 
Scandura, 1987) 
This is where parties in a relationship 
attach the same value to what they 
get as to what they receive.  
When there is commitment, even if a 
difference existed, it would be 
ignored. This kind is common during 
the starting phase of collaboration. 
PDE’s sometimes perceive the input of 
others and compare them with theirs, and 
accordingly adjust their own input (GOU 
Report, 2007). But in practice, there may 
be no equivalence.  
 
Immediacy  
(Sullivan et al., 
2003) 
This recognizes the time dimension 
in reciprocity.  
Partners are interested in knowing 
how soon the return will be for the 
particular actions carried out now. 
According to Sullivan et al. (2003), 
as long as trust is built among the 
collaborating parties, the time span 
of reciprocation lengthens, and if the 
relationship reaches high quality, 
concern about when reciprocation 
occurs becomes less important. 
Most collaboration initiatives are new. 
Organized and regulated procurement in 
Uganda is new; the PPDA Act (2003) 
itself is only a few years back. Trust has 
probably not yet fully evolved. 
Therefore, reciprocation time remains an 
important factor. 
Interest 
(Liden et al., 1997) 
This is about self interest as 
compared to the interests of the 
collaboration.  
As relationship quality increases, 
interest will move from a focus of 
self interest to a focus on mutual 
interest. Individual interests will be 
offset for group interests. There will 
be unselfish devotion and deep 
concern for the other partners in the 
collaboration. 
Because of relatively a short time of 
existence of purchasing collaboration 
and the PPDA Act (2003), relationship 
quality has not been achieved in Uganda. 
Selfishness is still common. There have 
been conflicts amongst ministries for 
resources. For example, public bodies 
like Post Uganda Ltd and National Water 
and Sewerage Corporation deny each 
other services, instead of reciprocating 
behaviour (New Vision, September 10, 
2006). Group interest is still at low level.  
 
Since horizontal purchasing collaboration is new in Uganda, trust has not reached the 
sufficient level for collaborating entities to ignore the imbalances between their 
operations with each other. This may lead to calculative actions, and for some entities 
to withhold actions, once they have “weighed” the returns from the other party. This 
can lower down the impact of reciprocity to horizontal purchasing collaboration. Thus 
the factors of equivalence and interest may not be strong. On the other hand, because 
of the relatively short time collaboration initiatives have been going on in developing 
countries, immediacy becomes crucial as noted above.  
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Drawing from the transaction cost theory, we argue that in Ugandan collaborative 
initiatives, there are no contracts upon which collaborative initiatives operate. This 
means entities can not put in place contractual provisions for potential future 
contingencies (Oum et al., 2004). This creates incentives to exploit each other 
(Parkhe, 1993) and to reduce the level of reciprocity among collaborating entities. 
We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H3b: The level of reciprocity among PDEs in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
 
4.5  Practical implications 
 
From the two exploratory studies, we derive insightful suggestions for the practicing 
managers, which may improve horizontal purchasing collaboration in the developing 
countries and particularly in Uganda. 
 
There is less collaboration in Ugandan PDEs in the final stages of procurement, 
compared to the initial stage of procurement. We note that the final stages of 
procurement where there is collaboration are about contract management. The reason 
for minimal collaboration in the contract management phase may be because the 
processes involved do not fall under the procurement function according to the 
Ugandan law. We also note that the first steps in the purchasing cycle as per Van 
Weele (2000) contribute more to the final outcomes of the process. Therefore the last 
processes may not yield much benefit, and this could equally explain why there is 
minimal collaboration in the last phases of the Ugandan purchasing cycle.  For 
example after the contract has been signed, the stores personnel receives the supplies, 
the internal auditor verifies receipt and checks whether the supplies matches the 
sample, the quality control function checks the quality and the accounts function 
prepares payment to the supplier. The procurement function is only partly informed of 
what has taken place and is no longer in full control of the process it initiated. 
Therefore, there is need to consider cross functional processes and stakeholders other 
than those in the procurement function if one wants to cooperate on contract 
management. We extensively present this in Chapter 7. 
 
Hard urgent tasks are a great motivation for horizontal purchasing collaboration. This 
motivation is more of short term, to solve a current problem than the future benefits. 
Nevertheless, managers could use this opportunity to build purchasing relationships. 
We deal with this in Chapter 7. 
 
With fewer and not properly structured collaborating PDEs, the factor of “structure of 
collaboration” may not be so crucial to sustenance of a collaborative initiative. In the 
initial phases, structures and strict rules may not motivate. Putting proper structures 
and strict rules of the game could be more applicable when collaboration has become 
large. Sharing mechanisms equally may not play a major influencing role. There is 
need to have priorities of factors to concentrate on during the starting and growth 
phases of collaboration. We expand on this in section 7.3. 
 
Whereas the majority of the respondents appreciate that collaboration has a future and 
will become more prevalent, 29% point out selfishness and bad experiences from the 
past dealings (even those not related to procurement) they have previously had. 
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Managers of collaborations need to reduce on “ownership” of individual entities and 
to sensitise collaborating PDEs about the expected benefits in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration and not use the previous general experiences to discredit collaboration. 
 
We note from our exploratory study 2 results, that whereas the behavioural factors 
like trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence are most critical factors for 
horizontal purchasing collaboration, management should also consider the other non 
behavioural factors. We agree with research based on the developed countries like the 
findings of Schotanus et al. (2010) and Browning et al., (1995), that while starting 
collaboration, behavioural factors are key, but once the collaborative initiative is 
established, other factors become increasingly important for proper management of 
the collaborative initiative. This implies developing countries should put emphasis on 
behavioural factors at this time. 
 
Since government intervention is among the least scored factor, relative to the others 
(mean = 2.9545 out of a maximum of 5), we argue that in Uganda, government 
intervention should cautiously be applied on collaborative initiative.  This is relevant 
where there is anecdotal evidence that developing countries tend to intervene in most 
activities of the economy, not based on rational but political reasons. 
 
4.6 Limitations  
 
We carried out a two case study in Exploratory study 1, which may limit the strengths 
of comparison and validity of findings. However, though some literature suggests four 
cases (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989), other literature sources (e.g. Yin, 2003) support our 
approach. Note that our deeper understanding of the issues under the cases makes our 
findings valid. We therefore need to be cautious about statistically generalising the 
results 
 
Whereas previous research (e.g. Hoffman and Schlosser, 2001; Schotanus, 2007) have 
studied factors for initialising collaboration by considering differences between 
successful and unsuccessful purchasing groups, our study does not consider these 
differences. Note that collaborative initiatives being new in developing countries and 
specifically in Uganda, respondents may not easily evaluate the differences, since 
being successful or not successful has not yet become a major concern. 
 
4.7  Conclusion 
 
We note that there is low level of behavioural factors. Since trust is mainly about 
feelings about the relationship (Leonidou et al., 2006), it is likely to be more achieved 
than commitment which is a manifestation of actions to the collaboration. These 
actions do take a relatively long time to be done and explicitly appreciated. As our 
confirmation of the literature, trust should be built more in the initial phases of the 
collaboration than other. Once trust is built, commitment will follow. As a 
contribution to the ongoing debate about what leads to the other: trust or commitment; 
we add to the scholarly work that trust will lead to commitment (Andaleeb, 1996;  
Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Whan and Taewon, 2005; Yilmaz and Hunt, 2001). 
However, unlike these scholars who do not consider the time dimension in making to 
trust – commitment analysis, we argue that in the initial periods of collaboration, trust 
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will be needed first to lead to commitment. After sometime, the commitment 
developed may eventually lead to more trust, at a higher level. 
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Chapter 5 – An in-depth case study of horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in Uganda 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we considered two exploratory studies to know the state of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration in PDEs in Uganda. In both studies, we explored 
the general practice of horizontal purchasing collaboration, thereby laying a 
foundation for further chapters and developing some hypotheses. In this chapter, we 
carry out a specific in-depth case analysis of a relatively more established and 
organised collaborative initiative, the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS). We then 
develop further hypotheses to be tested in Chapter 6 and to be used for application of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). 
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss the method we use in analysing the in-
depth case, the general and procurement related background of the JLOS horizontal 
purchasing collaboration, and the motivation to collaborate under the Sector Wide 
Approach (SWAp) framework.  
 
We include Figure 5.1 to show the position of Chapter 5 in the outline: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1 Research outline 
 
5.2  Objective 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to derive lessons from a more formal and 
structured collaborative initiative in the developing countries like Uganda, to enable 
us develop hypotheses for application of horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
 
5.3  Method 
 
Study design 
Case based research methodology, was selected for use. The purpose was to obtain a 
depth of understanding of the horizontal purchasing collaboration issues under the 
case. We did not want to be limited by the rigid limits of questionnaires and models 
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(Voss et al., 2002). Whereas other methodologies like survey could have been used, 
we noted they would provide a breadth of understanding, without first deeply 
understanding issues that seemed novel at our beginning (Mukherjee et al., 2000; Yin, 
1994). As Johnson and Lewin (1996) found out from their meta analytical study, 
research should penetrate below the surface of the usual large surveys. Much of the 
research in collaborative behaviour has remained at the prescriptive and survey based 
level (Emberson and Storey, 2006). We consider context-specific research (Gadde and 
Hakansson, 2001), to explore the apparent truths (Christopher and Juttner, 2000). 
 
Data source  
We selected the JLOS case because it has ten collaborating PDEs, which is a sizeable 
number. We found JLOS interesting to pick because unlike any other collaborating 
PDEs, this collaboration was more formal and structured. It was also possible to get 
literature about the sector, unlike others. 
 
Data collection 
We used JLOS reports, research papers, and procurement records to carry out 
document analysis and deduce meanings. To improve validity of the findings we got 
by use of document analysis method, we supplemented this method with the interview 
method (Den Hertog and Van Sluijs, 1995; Webster, 1991).  
 
We interviewed two key informants, one from the JLOS secretariat and another one 
from the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs policy and planning 
department. These were key in establishment and operationalisation of JLOS 
collaborative initiative. The key informant technique of data collection has been 
recommended by previous scholars (e.g. Cowles, 2002). Key informants were 
selected carefully, based on possession of special knowledge, willingness to share 
their knowledge and skills with us and accessibility to perspectives or observations we 
could not have accessed (Goetz and Lecompte, 1984). 
 
We include the figure below to show the position of the key informants we considered 
as our respondents. The JLOS secretariat and Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs coordinator receive information from all the committees at various levels. 
They are knowledgeable in affairs of the collaboration. 
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Fig. 5.2 Position of key informants   
 
According to Johnson (1990); Kumar et al. (1993) and Sanjek (1990), the questions 
we asked key informants were data driven and according to the direction and 
relevancy of the discussions with them. These included questions on: frequency and 
formality of meeting of the collaborative initiative; increased efficiency and 
effectiveness in the purchasing process; improved collaboration among JLOS 
institutions; improved lead-time; specifications of goods, services and works and the 
philosophy before and after collaboration. 
 
We made prior appointments with each of the key informants. We had to reschedule 
our appointments to meet their convenient schedules. Each interview took between 
one to two hours. We used an interview guide to avoid digressing to unrelated issues. 
We recorded the responses in notebooks. On three occasions, we did not clearly 
understand what we had written and had to call back to confirm original views of 
respondents. 
   
We used the notice-collect-think process model (Agar, 1991). We wrote notes during 
our interview sessions with key informants. We also picked relevant information from 
the documents. We then critically read through our notes several times to notice 
trends of insightful themes. We would keep building up new insights to respective 
themes.  We then looked for patterns across all interviews and relevant information 
got from the documents to make conclusions.  
 
5.4 The general and procurement background 
 
The general problem 
From 1966 to 1986, there was political, civil, and economic regression in Uganda 
resulting into the breakdown of the functions of the state including the maintenance of 
law and order. There was lack of civil authority. This made it impossible for the 
justice system to function (Edroma, 2005). Institutions did not have adequate 
financing to operate and members of staff were demoralised. This resulted into acts of 
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corruption. Consequently, there was loss of public confidence in the justice system. 
This can be illustrated by the high incidence of mob justice (MOJCA Report, 2005). 
People were unable to meet the high costs of justice. In the MOJCA Report (1995) 
report, the court fees were too high and therefore were limiting the poor from 
accessing justice. 
 
Lawyers were concentrated in Kampala city, making it further difficult for the 
majority of the people who live upcountry to access legal representation. About 24 
million out of 26 million people lived upcountry in this time period (NHPC Report 
2000). 
 
The police force services were not available in half of the districts in the country 
(MOIA Report, 2006). No communication equipment was available to the few 
districts that had police services. Even where the equipment was purchased, it was a 
problem to deliver such to the rural districts because there were not enough vehicles. 
 
The procurement related problem 
In all the ten institutions, procurement related problems were high. For example 
according to the interview with the senior planning officer Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs, in 1998/99, there was malfunctioning in all the justice system 
related institutions.  
 
All the institutions had shared responsibility in the inmates. So, no institution would 
procure fuel, expecting the other to procure. As a result, inmates could not be 
produced in court within the 48 hours required by the law. This resulted into legal 
suits by some inmates which made government loose 1.3 billion Uganda shillings in 
payment of damages (MOFPED National Budget, 2005/2006). Only 21% inmates 
would be taken to court at any point (Court records, 2006). Judicial officers could not 
be hired or contracted. At some extreme point, there were no handcuffs. All these had 
implications on delivery of justice.  
 
The ten institutions are crosscutting. They were all procuring similar supplies, 
services, and/or works at the same time, since they had similar goals, strategies, and 
targets. This increased costs of operation in several meetings and allowances. This 
further reduced the available funds for the direct delivery of justice (OAG Report, 
2006). 
There were no sufficient procurement staffs to handle procurement work in the ten 
institutions. Only the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs had a qualified 
procurement officer. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social welfare and Uganda 
Prisons Service had no qualified staff in procurement or even storekeeping (Ministry 
of Public Service Report, 2006). 
 
In some of the supplies that were being used jointly, there was a problem of 
harmonizing specifications. According to our interview with one of the officers in the 
Judicial Service Commission, there was a disagreement on the purchase specifications 
of the type of pickup trucks between prisons and the police departments. Disagreeing 
on specifications put the whole process on a standstill which further added to the 
transport problem. Lack of dependability on other collaborating PDEs, competence 
and honesty issues were suggested as the reason for this. The Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs for example was not comfortable with the expertise of the 
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Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Welfare staff, and thus not trusting the 
specifications developed by them. All these are issues of among other things trust, 
commitment reciprocity and dependence.  
 
Each of the ten institutions had a relatively small spend budget compared to the spend 
budget estimate for the whole sector. Buying individually was expensive for all the 
institutions. For example, some of the big suppliers could not accept to supply smaller 
quantities. The entities would therefore resort to buying to low scale operating 
suppliers with associated high costs. 
 
5.5 The motivation to collaborate under the SWAp - JLOS framework 
 
In 1999, the public outcry was heard by all stakeholders, including the international 
community. Various studies were carried out to investigate the situation and 
recommend a way of solving the problem: These were the Criminal Justice Review 
(1997), Uganda Integrity Survey (1998), The Commercial Justice Study (1999), 
Crown Agents Legal Sector Programme (1999), and the Policy Shift Mamba Point 
Meeting, (November 1999). At the policy shift Mamba Point meeting, all the ten 
institutions held a joint meeting, to find ways of reversing the situation. Each 
institution identified prime problems that hinder the delivery of justice in Uganda. 
It was agreed, among other things, that these problems were accelerated by the 
absence of a clear policy framework and unifying strategic plan for the institutions in 
the sector. 
 
The participants identified 40 problems. These were ranked and reduced to ten. 
Procurement problems came up. Other related problems to procurement include 
corrupt practices in tendering and a lack of effective planning and budgeting. The 
SWAp approach below was adopted. 
 
5.6  Features of the Sector Wide Approach  
 
The Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) is a new way of tackling development related 
issues. The key features of SWAp include: 
· An analysis of key constraints through examination of all contributing factors; 
· Bringing together all stakeholders to develop a sector wide, prioritized, costed 
strategic plan for reform; 
· Collection of baseline data and setting of performance indicators for 
monitoring and evaluation of reform; 
· Donor budget support to aid reform to ensure national ownership and; 
· Improving procurement and accessibility of supplies to the members.  
 
The SWAp strategy in Uganda has best formally been adopted by the Justice Law and 
Order Sector (JLOS). All ten institutions (PDEs) are members of JLOS. The JLOS 
addresses crosscutting issues that include the health, education and water sanitation 
sectors. The JLOS thus seeks to increase inter-sectoral linkages to ensure that sector 
objectives are included in the objectives of other sectors, where relevant. To carry out 
the functions of JLOS, facilitation is very important, in terms of having an efficient 
and effective joint purchasing system. 
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5.7  Structure of the JLOS 
 
The JLOS is managed according to a well established and deliberate structure. The 
structure includes: the Leadership committee, which is chaired by the Chief Justice. 
This committee mainly gives political support and policy guidance across the sector. 
Below this, there is the Steering committee, which is chaired by the Solicitor General. 
It consists of the top officers (Including Accounting Officers who are in charge of 
procurement decisions) of each JLOS institution. The Technical committee is 
responsible for implementation of decisions and strategies. It consists of senior and 
middle level management from the JLOS institutions. Under the Technical committee, 
there are Working groups, which make follow up of work done by the Technical 
committee. The JLOS Secretariat builds consensus among the JLOS stakeholders and 
ensures that there is a shared vision by all the stakeholders. To provide accountability 
to the stakeholders and the community, a National Justice Forum provides a platform 
at which all issues are discussed. 
 
Important properties of JLOS structure 
We note the following properties of JLOS structures, which may also contribute to the 
success of collaboration through the enhancement of behavioural factors. 
· All committees in the JLOS structure have representatives form all the 
member institutions;  
· Top management is involved in the JLOS structures. This makes decision 
making faster, as the members in the meetings can take decisions without 
further seeking authorisation; 
· Committees meet regularly. This avoids backlogs of work. Meeting regularly 
also results into a mutually consistent pattern of performance perceptions and 
attitudes (Powell, 1996; Wilkinson and Young, 1999); 
· There is constant follow up and reminders to ensure agreed positions are 
implemented; 
· In the JLOS meetings, though there are established structures, there is no 
protocol of authority; all members regard themselves as equal contributors to 
the debate being considered. This is necessary in building trust and 
commitment; 
·  While in the group, each member does not represent and defend positions of 
the JLOS institution, but acts on behalf of the whole JLOS; 
· In meetings, consensus is aimed at rather than the majority. This ensures 
positive perceptions of the shared vision. 
 
5.8  Outcomes of JLOS horizontal collaboration 
 
General outcomes 
The JLOS collaboration has several general outcomes that exceed the procurement 
level. Some examples of general outcomes are; identification and withdrawal of 600 
cases which had no evidence, reduced back log cases and established measures not to 
accumulate such cases again, increased efficiency and effectiveness in handling cases 
and greater bargaining power than individual institutions had. Other general outcomes 
are; reductions in the number of persons staying on remand beyond constitutional 
period from 39% to 1% and 23% to 10% for serious offences and petty offences 
respectively and improved processes like coordination, communication and 
cooperation among JLOS institutions.   
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Procurement related outcomes 
· There was development and distribution of agreed performance standards for 
purchasing and other administrative activities; 
· A coordinated approach for planning purchasing, budgeting and other 
financial activities was put in place, throughout the JLOS structures; 
· The purchasing process was expedited, materials bought to procure works. 
Construction of regional offices of Directorate of Public Prosecution, Ministry 
of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and courts were build and completed in a 
short time (e.g. it took one year to complete the regional court in the western 
region under the joint JLOS framework, compared to three years the Ministry 
of Justice and Constitutional Affairs had planned to take before the JLOS 
collaboration (interview with the Senior Planner, Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs); 
· The institutions were able to jointly purchase heavy duty vehicles from a low-
price-high volume supplier, who otherwise had not accepted to supply 
individual institutions because of low spend value. The institutions in the 
JLOS collaboration were able to jointly save 1.16 billion Uganda shillings 
because of buying from a low price supplier with discounts (MOJCA records). 
· Training of purchasing staff has been possible with all the institutions in JLOS 
(JLOS Secretariat Report, 2007); 
· The lead time of supplies has greatly improved. This is because of the 
structures of JLOS. Meetings comprise of various members with differing 
powers. In one meeting, all the necessary actions can be executed and 
expertise is readily available from the “pool” of diverse membership. A 
meeting can be a “one stop centre” unlike several sessions in an individual 
entity (Interview with Procurement officer, MOJCA). For example stationery 
purchased by Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs entity separately 
has a lead time of 60 days, while under the JLOS framework, the lead time 
reduces to 30 days (MOJCA Records, 2005). 
· Bulk purchases are done, for all the JLOS institutions. According to the JLOS 
Secretariat, some of the purchases are now bought in bulk for three months 
use. The information technology match well as the same specifications of 
equipment are emphasised, contrary to when the individual institutions had 
different hardware software packages that were slowing down processes 
because of incompatibility. 
 
There has been efficiency in generation of reports under the JLOS initiative. In the 
table below, we indicate how efficient it is to generate procurement reports in the 
JLOS (fourteen days) compared to generating reports from individual members of the 
JLOS collaboration. They all double the time if they work independently, compared to 
when they work jointly. We interviewed the respondent from Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs on why reports take long while the PDE is operating alone for 
relatively comparable purchases. The respondent attributed this to lack of enough 
competent procurement officers, and lack of drive and interest to do work in a more 
interesting joint operational style. 
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Table 5.1 Days taken to generate reports  
PDE/Sector Average days to generate report 
after purchasing activity 
Justice Law and Order Sector (collaboration) 14 days 
Ministry of Justice, and Constitutional Affairs (alone) 29 days 
Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Welfare (alone) 37 days 
Uganda Prison Service (alone) 39 days 
 
We notice that all JLOS PDEs had one common goal, to dispense justice. They all 
faced similar problems to collaborative initiative. We conclude that entities to 
collaborate should belong to same sector. This, we argue shortens the time to 
appreciate collaboration, have common long term orientation and have shared goals. 
 
We note that PDEs in JLOS collaborative initiative had a common problem of 
consistent judicial crises, which acted as a “catalyst” for change in favour of 
collaboration. Most of PDEs are passive to collaboration; they need a critical 
minimum effort to “push” them into realising the urgent need to collaborate. 
 
5.9  Lessons learned from the Justice Law and Order Sector collaboration 
 
We were able to derive some general lessons about collaboration of government 
sectors and specific about horizontal purchasing collaboration. We use some of these 
lessons to support the discussions in further chapters. 
 
General lessons 
We noted that even if relatively sufficient resources are allocated to individual PDEs, 
there will be minimal improvements in the individual PDEs compared to 
improvements that would accrue to all PDEs working collaboratively. For example, in 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s development partners (donors) invested in institutions 
(PDEs) carrying out functions relating to law enforcement or the administration of 
justice (which included procurement of supplies, works, and services to the PDEs). 
The development partners with the respective aided PDEs are: DFID, Uganda Police 
Force; Danida – Judiciary; Netherlands - Directorate Public Prosecutions; Germany - 
Uganda Prison Service; Norway - Uganda Law Society; Austria - Uganda Law 
Reform Commission. However, support was provided to individual agencies with 
minimal cooperation between the agencies. The traditional institutional approach with 
different development partners working with different agencies was DFID, Uganda 
Police Force; Danida – Judiciary; Netherlands - Directorate Public Prosecutions; 
Germany - Uganda Prison Service; Norway - Uganda Law Society; Austria - Uganda 
Law Reform Commission (Edroma, 2005). The results were not encouraging. While 
investment and effort was extensive to individual PDEs, the impact was limited. 
 
From our interviews with the respondents, we derive that for the success of 
collaborative initiatives, the philosophy of the organisation should be directed to 
collaboration. It is important that each entity in the collaboration has similar 
philosophies. If the members have substantially different philosophies about the role 
of the collaboration, such diversity will give rise to a complex and potentially 
conflicting value set within the collaboration that will limit its effectiveness. Whereas 
it is logical that each entity will come to collaboration with a set of motives, values, 
and needs; efforts should be made to progressively make these entities shift their 
individual philosophies to the general one, shared largely by all. According to the 
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JLOS reports, the JLOS was conceived with the overall objective of improving the 
administration of justice through a philosophy of coordinated programme planning, 
budgeting, purchasing, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all sector 
institutions, along a strategic investment plan of 2001-2006.  
 
Peer reviews and wide consultations across all institutions in the collaboration for the 
member institutions assist to create a sense of ownership of the decisions. Reports in 
collaboration go both vertical and horizontal. From our discussion with the JLOS 
secretariat, we noted that while each JLOS institution remains independent, it keeps 
interested in knowing what goes on in the other institutions to be able to collaborate 
with them well. This has been possible because public horizontal institutions have less 
information to hide from the others. Perhaps in the horizontal collaboration, flat 
organisational structures might fit better and provide more additional impetus than the 
hierarchical ones. We note that even in government where the operations mainly 
follow the hierarchical structure, still the nature of collaboration can adopt flat 
structure systems. For example, in JLOS, even with top steering committee structure, 
there are representatives from low level positions, especially the technical personnel. 
By the same analysis, low structure committee, the technical committee has senior 
staff. Having a diverse range of positions of staff on collaboration committee reduces 
bureaucracy since in a meeting; there are almost all the necessary personnel to take a 
decision.  
 
The frequency with which the inter-institutional meetings take place is important. 
This makes institutions develop positive feelings towards each other and trust is 
learned and reinforced over successive iterations of transactions (Powell, 1996). From 
our discussion with the respondent from Uganda Police Force, we noted that whereas 
the Steering committee, Technical committee and Working group were to meet once 
every two months, once in two weeks and once a week respectively, the meetings 
were more frequent than this at the start of the collaboration, and informality would 
characterize most of the meetings. We note that frequency of meetings and therefore 
communication could have partly been responsible for the registered successes of 
JLOS. This is supported by findings of Hoegl and Wagner (2005) who found that 
communication frequency and intensity have significant relationship with the 
performance of interorganisational relationships. 
 
We also derive from our study that for, members in a working group or any meeting 
of collaboration, it is important to share the goals of the whole collaboration in order 
to obtain optimal outcomes.  
 
Purchasing related lessons 
The success story of the JLOS horizontal purchasing collaboration shows that it is 
possible for PDEs to start with working together in general tasks and then roll out the 
strategy to purchasing functions, once the phenomenon has been widely appreciated 
by all the parties. This is because when it starts in general terms, it is able to involve 
management for political and strategic support. For example, JLOS attracted the 
ministers and Chief Justice. 
 
The complex nature of horizontal purchasing collaboration and networking (Barley et 
al., 1992) requires a shift of focus from institutional interests to sector wide interests, 
with the shift in applicable resources. This is supported by the case. Individual PDE 
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priorities and plans should not guide operations of the collaboration. What is needed 
is a participatory process that originates collaborative priorities and plans. 
Contributions to support collaborative tasks could be proportional to resources of the 
individual institutions to ensure fairness. This avoids complaints and feelings of being 
cheated in the early days of the collaboration. This is when the operations will not 
reflect individual interests in the process of collaboration.  
 
Increasing awareness of the stakeholders and particularly users of supplies, works, 
and/or services strengthens checks and balances in the procurement system. 
Awareness can be improved through media like radios, television, publication of 
manuals, newsletters, and brochures. This makes stakeholders believe in the 
collaboration and in turn increase commitment to horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
 
We note that committees of the JLOS are constituted and chaired by top officials of 
collaborating institutions. This gives the political support and policy guidance. 
According to the JLOS Report (2006), the high ranking officials in JLOS have made 
the collaboration politically acceptable to all parties that would query its operations, 
and has made it to sometimes operate informally especially where urgency has been 
required. For example, some big procurements can be divided into small lots to meet 
the authority requirements and their speedy execution, contrary to what the 
regulations would ordinarily require. 
 
There should be a forum for all the stakeholders of the collaborating entities. This is 
because some of the stakeholders like end users may not appreciate some of the 
purchase specifications or other issues. At such a forum, all the stakeholders have an 
opportunity to debate what they think is not going right. In JLOS, the National Justice 
Forum resolves all stakeholder issues and links the JLOS to government, which is a 
major stakeholder in public procurement. 
 
The success stories from the case of JLOS, indicate that horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in developing countries and in specifically Uganda can work.  
 
Whereas all public procurement entities are presumed to be working towards similar 
national goals; to achieve fairness, transparency, accountability, and value for money 
(PPDA Act, 2003), some still want to be seen individually to achieve them. Each unit 
is accountable to its own stakeholders. From our exploratory study findings (see 
Chapter 4), there is evidence to show that some PDEs of the considered sample) want 
to work alone, and achieve the goals individually.  
Related to the above, even when all ministry PDEs are expected to be at the same 
levels in terms of resources and authority, they still differ. They have different 
budgets and authorities. For example, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development gets more than twice the resources of the Ministry of Gender, 
Labour and Social Welfare. The Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic 
Development also gives permission to other Ministries on how to spend certain levels 
of their budgets. Horizontal collaborative collaboration may be hampered by such 
differences. 
It is also important to note that PDEs have incongruent strategic options. For example, 
the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry would want to spend more in order to 
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achieve its ministerial objective of “selling” Uganda (GOU Report, 2006) whereas the 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development would want to minimize 
the expenditure, to save funds for other activities (New vision, May 4, 2006), which is 
the ministry’s strategic orientation. This lack of shared vision by all the government 
departments can cause problems in the strategic direction of the collaborating PDEs, 
and affects collaboration in making procurement plans. 
Decision making in some cases is not synchronized, which means misrepresenting the 
interested parties that are affected by the decision. According to the report on 
performance of Members of Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, few members 
consult their electorate on suggestions they have towards a certain bill. Likewise 
according to an interview with the Procurement Officer, Ministry of Lands, Water and 
Environment, the PPDA does not always consult the various entities on the various 
directives issued out. The practice of lack of consultation in various other activities in 
government, other than purchasing, could make PDEs and their staff not attach a lot 
of value to consultations. 
The issue of information asymmetry also applies to Uganda, because some of the 
PDEs have access to more information than others because of their large size, priority 
position they occupy in the government or because of having more competent 
personnel. For example there are major Ministries with the biggest spend. These are 
the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 
Ministry of Education and Sports, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and 
Fisheries, and Ministry of Lands and Environment. These have access to more 
training opportunities; their staffs are more experienced and at the rank of Principal 
Procurement Officers, while all the other entities stop at Senior Procurement Officer 
or simply Procurement Officer Rank. This brings question marks when it comes to 
procurement, as such big ones can perceive less benefits from the collaboration 
(Eliashberg and Michie, 1984). 
 
We agree with Schotanus (2007) that partners may not be motivated to join 
collaboration because they fear loosing control over the purchasing process; decreased 
flexibility; expect costs to be high; partners lack support of own agency; lack 
resources, commitment, and no management support. We also agree that lack of trust 
in other’s competencies and because of legal issues. We also find differences in some 
of the reasons Schotanus advances. We note that disclosure of sensitive information 
may not be an important reason for fear of horizontal purchasing collaboration in 
Uganda. This is because the PPDA Act (2003) requires all information to be released 
at certain times. Though some PDEs have more information than others at different 
times, after some time all the information becomes known.  
We also note that free riding may not be an important motivator for PDEs not to 
collaborate. We note that horizontal purchasing collaboration initiatives in Uganda are 
still new. According to the highway matrix analogy by Schotanus and Telgen (2007), 
free riding typically appears when the level of complexity, control, intensiveness, 
joint decision making, joint meetings, equal roles, self management, decentrarity and 
adaptation to specific needs is high (on the influence by all members on group 
activities dimension) and when the level of specifying, selecting, contracting, 
evaluating, sharing information, sharing personnel or other resources, shared policy 
and procedures, benchmarking et cetera (on the number of group activities dimension) 
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is low. We also note that free riding often occurs when collaborating entities do not 
know each other well and do not have to continue cooperating in the future. In regard 
to this, we note that though collaboration in Uganda is still relatively new, the 
collaborating entities know each other fairly well, and since they are all public 
entities, they are sure of continued future collaboration. Whereas we also note that 
number of group activities in Ugandan (and perhaps developing countries) is low, we 
note that the main indicators on the influence by all members on group activities are 
low or even lacking. Therefore for starting or newly established horizontal purchasing 
collaboration initiatives in developing countries and specifically in Uganda, the fear 
of free riding may not be important. Note that we do not further study the free riding 
aspect, as new collaborative initiatives have not experienced free riding to derive 
meaningful responses.  
Whereas we agree with Fine and Whitney (1996) that PDEs may not find horizontal 
purchasing collaboration interesting because of fear of dependence of knowledge, on 
collaborating PDEs, and therefore reducing capacity for own future challenges, we 
note that this may not be important for Ugandan PDEs where no single PDE 
monopolises knowledge, since all procurement officers are relatively new. The fear of 
dependence on knowledge of other PDEs and reducing opportunities for future 
challenges may not be an important factor. 
A procurement officer from the Ministry of Local Government made this comment: 
“We collaborate with the other entities, not because they are total experts or 
consultants, but because they know more than us at the moment. That is why 
we crosscheck their advice; we do not take it wholesome, because they are 
only a little better than us” 
From the case, we note that procurement officers in the PDEs are relatively new. This 
implies that they have not yet got tacit knowledge and monopoly knowledge, 
sufficient enough for other collaborating PDEs to entirely rely on. According to 
Walsh and Ungson (1991), the entities knowledge repositories or knowledge stock are 
found in individual members. This means that PDEs do not entirely trust advice got 
from others. They have sometimes to crosscheck it, an indication of low levels of trust 
and dependence. 
Whereas we agree with Eliashberg and Michie’s (1984) reason of perception of 
differences in the anticipated horizontal purchasing collaboration, we do not find 
Bowersox’s (1990) reason to be applicable to the developing countries particularly the 
Ugandan context. Bowersox gives the difference in emphases by different PDEs on 
different strategies as the reason for organisations not getting interested in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. This may not be very relevant for Ugandan PDEs because 
all PDEs derive their strategies from the main country strategy.  
We note that in JLOS PDEs, there are problems of harmonising specifications of 
items to be purchased. According to the respondents, the disagreements on 
specifications and other decisions were as a result of some PDEs lack of dependability 
on other PDEs, competence, and honesty issues. For example MOJCA was not 
comfortable with specifications originated by MGLSD. MOJCA was also disagreed 
with the specification of purchase of heavy duty printing machinery done by the 
ULRC PDE citing incompetence as the reason for the disagreement. We note that the 
JLOS collaboration is relatively more developed than others.  
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The JLOS case shows that when the PDEs collaborated, efficiency in procurement 
processes improved. There is an improvement in coordination, communication and 
cooperation among JLOS institutions. Consensus has been built in the PDEs, which 
originally had independent interests and priorities, to now working together to realise 
common goals. Each PDE eventually has eventually realised more than it could, had it 
operated separately. This indicates positive correlation between the level of 
collaboration and benefits for the PDEs involved under the JLOS circumstances. 
From the JLOS case, we note that if resources are available to individual PDEs, 
working individually will result into minimal outcomes. This is demonstrated in the 
example where donors invested in JLOS members individually. The results did not 
exceed 50% of the expected targets (SWAP Secretariat, 2007). Subsequently, joined 
similar donor support to JLOS resulted into significant benefits. We note that under 
the JLOS circumstances there is a positive relationship between collaboration and 
benefits for PDEs. 
5.10  Level of collaboration 
 
By examining issues with JLOS and considering the results of our exploratory studies, 
we get insights to consider the level of collaboration and the benefits of collaboration.  
 
We rely on the literature to measure the level of horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
Collaboration implies an attitude characterized by joint effort, team spirit, and mutual 
cooperation, which is expressed in the form of common actions (Childers and 
Ruekert, 1982; Frazier, 1983). Anderson and Narus (1990) also agree with the 
position that collaboration can be defined and operationalised as activities or actions 
taken by one or both exchange partners that promote individual and mutual benefits.  
We measure the level of collaboration in a similar way as Rozenmeijer (2000) did in 
his study; by examining its degree/intensity. Rozenmeijer also studied horizontal 
purchasing collaboration through how intra-company cooperation between two or 
more business units can cause purchasing synergy.  
 
We measure level of horizontal purchasing collaboration instead of the success, 
because horizontal purchasing collaboration initiatives in developing countries and in 
Uganda are relatively new; there has been no sufficient time to create notable 
successes. Whereas we can measure some of the benefits of collaboration, which have 
an important influence on the perceived success, all the possible benefits may not be 
fully measured, given the fact that collaboration in developing countries is still 
relatively new to realise all the benefits of collaboration.  
 
While we acknowledge the collaboration measurement options may include 
operational collaboration which is geared towards transaction efficiency 
improvements for example bundling volumes to reduce operational costs (Vereecke 
and Muylle, 2006), we note that collaboration in Ugandan PDEs has started and is 
mainly at the medium and strategic level with more emphasis on shared or matched 
objectives. Through the current joint actions; mainly sharing information and decision 
synchronisation, PDEs have not yet gone beyond passive information exchange to 
engage in proactive collaboration (Holweg et al., 2005; Jagdev and Thoben, 2001) 
like bundling volumes rather than mere sharing of information. 
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We also note that measurement of the level of collaboration is a subject of debate. 
Some studies have used quantified and objective measures like profitability (e.g. 
Taylor, 2006), bundling of volumes (e.g. Schotanus, 2007). However these measures 
are often difficult to obtain due to their commercial sensitivity (Taylor, 2006) or due 
to non availability. In the developing countries like the Ugandan case, the PDEs have 
not yet reached an extent of evaluating such measures, since the collaborations are 
still in the initial stage. Consequently, the method which can relevantly measure the 
level of collaboration is to employ managerial perceptions of intensity to which 
related activities of collaboration have been met (Cullen et al., 2000, Geringer and 
Herbert, 1991; Saxton, 1997). 
 
We examine the degree of interaction among the collaborating PDEs in the various 
purchasing activities. We also apply Simatupang and Sridharan (2005)’s list of 
collaboration activities to exhaust the activities upon which we test the level of 
collaboration. Table 5.2 presents this. 
 
Table 5.2 Level of collaboration  
Author Contribution 
Rozenmeijer 
(2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simatupang and 
Sridharan (2005) 
 
 
 
Information sharing - This is disseminating timely and relevant information to 
other partners, for informed decision making. Joint initiatives rely on clear 
expectations, with all parties being fully informed of what is expected of them. 
Sharing of information is important even from the cost perspective because it 
replaces unnecessary costs (Lee and Whang, 2001). The shared information if 
available to all parties will increase knowledge about each others plans, which 
harmonises operations (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002; Stefansson, 2002). In 
purchasing, such information includes: procurement plans, prequalification lists, 
evaluation criteria, information on suppliers, needs specifications, prices, 
inventory levels, ordering and after care information. 
Decision synchronisation - This is where decisions are taken jointly. These could 
be in operational and strategic contexts. Areas of collaboration include, 
specification, contracting plans, level of purchases, order levels, monitoring 
systems, and after delivery. 
Level of incentive alignment – where the benefits or risks that accrue from 
collaboration are shared by participating members, and if there are joint 
investments 
 
Relationship between the level of collaboration and benefits of collaboration 
As literature supports (Johnson, 1999; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005; Schotanus, 2007; 
Tella and Virolainen, 2005), collaboration provides concrete benefits and results. 
When people come together in a horizontal purchasing collaboration, they get used to 
each other and get willing to assist each other. Horizontal purchasing collaboration 
makes use of expertise across the collaborating PDEs to leverage volumes and secure 
benefits from economies of scale through harnessing combined purchasing power. In 
public purchasing in Uganda, with PDEs at similar levels in authority and mandate, 
there is a lot of duplication of same processes/tasks. Therefore combining them in 
horizontal purchasing collaboration would reduce costs of operation, time spent in 
individual processes and maximise use of systems that would otherwise remain idle 
because of individual sub optimal use. Horizontal purchasing collaboration removes 
boundaries between PDEs (Naylor et al, 1999; Romano, 2003), which makes all 
purchasing procedures standardised and less costly. Information sharing by PDEs is 
crucial because most PDEs do not have adequate information, especially on prices, 
reliable suppliers, availability of alternative products/services et cetera. Information 
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sharing will benefit PDEs in the collaboration because they will be able to get better 
deals. 
 
Horizontal purchasing collaboration ensures reduction of transaction costs through 
sharing of information on purchasing operations. Once entities collaborate, one common 
way of working can be established, uniform purchasing procedures are put in process, 
sharing best practices across all entities, common training, ensures economies of process. 
Moreover, the standardisation of requirements, synchronising specification and sharing 
supplies create economies of scale to collaborating entities (Arnold, 1997; McCarthey and 
Golicic, 2002; Rozenmeijer, 2000). 
We therefore hypothesise: 
 
H5a: The higher the level of collaboration, the higher the benefits of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration for an individual entity. 
 
We note that the level of collaboration in Uganda is not yet high. This mainly results from 
their relative new existence time they have been operating. For example, expertise is not 
an important factor, since most procurement officers are new and do not have sufficient 
experience and qualifications (CIPS Uganda 2008). This reduces the level of benefits. We 
also note that not all the processes and tasks of the procurement cycle are carried out 
jointly. Activities like purchase requisitions, choice of procurement method (e.g., whether 
to use domestic bidding or international bidding), award of contract, and communication 
between the entities and suppliers are carried out by individual PDEs. This reduces the 
benefits of horizontal purchasing collaboration. From the discussion above, we 
hypothesize: 
 
H5b: The level of horizontal collaboration for individual Ugandan PDEs is low. 
 
5.11 Benefits for individual entities 
 
According to Aylesworth (2003), the level of horizontal collaboration influences the 
benefits realised from collaborative initiatives. Based on this, we note that the 
Ugandan collaborative initiatives are largely local networks and voluntary 
cooperatives, which are informally organised. We also note that collaborative 
initiatives are relatively new, thus reducing the tacit knowledge and experience 
required to raise the benefits of collaboration. We also note that the level of 
information sharing, is low, and decisions are not largely synchronised. This further 
leads to low level of standardisation and low level of common practices. We 
hypothesise: 
 
H6b: The level of benefits for individual entities in Ugandan PDEs is low. 
 
5.12  Limitations 
 
We acknowledge the weaknesses inherent with the case study design. Whereas the 
case study design is an acceptable qualitative study design (Eisenhardt, 1989), we 
note that our conclusions may be limited to analytical rather than statistical 
dimensions (Yin, 1994). This reduces the ability to generalise the findings to other 
collaborative initiatives. 
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5.13  Conclusions 
 
 
From Chapters 3, 4 and 5, and the tentative model (Figure 3.4), we derive 
relationships which we indicate in our conceptual model below.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.3 Conceptual model 
 
 
 
Level of 
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Chapter 6 – The survey 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3, we reviewed the existing literature to set the theoretical base of the 
research. We reviewed constructs and various relationships. We also found some 
theoretical gaps and posed hypotheses in later chapters. In this chapter, we extend the 
knowledge gathered over the previous chapters (especially the literature review and 
the exploratory studies) and carry out a survey to test the hypotheses posed. 
 
In this chapter, we first discuss the specific objective of the survey: understanding 
behavioural aspects in horizontal purchasing collaboration. Next, we include the 
methodology used to achieve our survey goal. In this, we include the justification for 
the choice of a survey design and how it fits into our goal. We show how we analysed 
the data and how we ensured credibility of our findings. In order to discover simple 
patterns of the items used, we subsequently carry out a factor analysis. We then 
present the results of the hypotheses testing, by use of descriptive and correlational 
statistics. We next conduct a hierarchical regression analysis and present a model with 
results. We give limitations of the survey and end with a discussion of the practical 
implications. 
 
We include Figure 6.1 to show the position of Chapter 6 in the outline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.1 Research outline 
 
 
6.2  Objective  
 
The main objective of the survey is to test the hypotheses posed from knowledge gaps 
identified in the previous chapters. This is derived from our main focus of the study: 
understanding why and how the behavioural aspects influence horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in the developing countries and specifically Uganda. It is important to 
make it clear that for simplicity and parsimony purposes, we aimed at trust, 
commitment, reciprocity, and dependence variables, since most research done in the 
relationship area identify them as important aspects.  
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From the previous chapters, we came up with a model (see section 5.13). We 
appreciate that such a model exists and works in the developed world. However, we 
want to find out whether the conceptual model also works in the developing world, 
because outcomes of behavioural factors in developing countries seem to be different 
from outcomes in the developed world (Atkinson and Butcher, 2003; Gemunden, 
1997; Meyer, 1997; Sommer et al., 1996). We aimed at finding out the relationships 
between these factors. 
We summarise the hypotheses from the previous chapters below. 
 
H1a: The existence of trust leads to a higher level of collaboration in the early phases 
of horizontal purchasing collaboratives. 
H2a: The existence of commitment leads to a higher level of collaboration. 
H2c: The existence of trust leads to higher level of commitment. 
H3a: The existence of reciprocity leads to a higher level of collaboration. 
H4a: The existence of dependence leads to a high level of collaboration. 
H4c: The existence of dependence leads to higher level of commitment 
H5a: The higher the level of collaboration, the higher the benefits of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration for an individual entity. 
 
We also aimed at knowing the level of behavioural dimensions in horizontal 
purchasing collaboratives in PDEs. From previous chapters, we developed and used 
the following hypotheses, which are based on the major assumption that if the 
conceptual model works for developing countries, then it works to a lesser extent than 
in the developed world, because the levels of trust, commitment, reciprocity, and 
dependence are lower in developing countries.  
 
H1b: The level of trust between Ugandan PDE’s in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
H2b: The level of commitment of PDE’s in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
H3b: The level of reciprocity among PDEs in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
H4b: The level of dependency among PDEs in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
H5b: The level of horizontal collaboration for individual Ugandan PDEs is low. 
H6b: The level of benefits for individual Ugandan PDEs is low. 
 
6.3 Method 
 
Relevance of the survey 
In the previous chapters, we formulated hypotheses. To test these hypotheses, we use 
a survey. We used the survey design because of several reasons. A survey is best 
suited when we want to get a snapshot of the current state of affairs (Janes, 2001). We 
first of all acknowledge the fact that purchasing research is limited in developing 
countries and specifically in Uganda. To the best of our knowledge, apart from MBA 
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and M.A theses works of Kalinzi (2005) and Tumwine (2006) respectively, there is no 
published work done in the area of collaborative purchasing in Uganda. Because of 
the nature of the current state of purchasing activities in Uganda (which came into 
existence in 2003), we aimed at getting knowledge on the current state of purchasing 
activities in the country. 
 
Surveys are also good for describing a large population. This matches with our design 
in our research, of considering all the central government PDEs. The survey reduces 
the observer effect: asking questions makes people think about a subject in a new way 
and can provoke a different answer than a friend or colleague might get (Collins and 
Cordon, 1997). To this extent, we aimed at getting new insights into the seemingly 
new horizontal purchasing collaboration strategy. 
 
Population and sample 
The study population includes all the PDEs in the Ugandan public sector. A PDE, 
which we refer to as “entity”, is our unit of analysis. Central government PDEs came 
into operation in the year 2003, compared to the recently (2007) operationalised local 
government PDEs, and have had some time to carry out horizontal purchasing 
collaboration activities. We therefore left out the local government entities in our 
sample.  
 
In the survey, the population of study is similar to the one used in Chapter 4 
(exploratory study), since these are the same entities that exist in Uganda. However, 
the studies were carried out at different times. In Table 6.1, we show the population 
entities, the sample selected, and the sampling method.  
Table 6.1 Study population and sample 
Category Number of 
entities 
Sample Sampling method 
Central 
Government 
   
Commission 14 14 Census 
Hospital 12 12 Census  
Ministry 26 26 Census 
Parastatal 64 64 Census 
Local 
Government 
   
Districts 76 0 Left out, as they were relatively new 
Urban areas 79 0 Left out, as they were relatively new 
TOTAL 271 116  
 
Most of the PDEs are located around Kampala, which enhanced the data collection 
process. Note that since we did not have complete information at the beginning of our 
field work on which specific PDEs have experiences in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration, we set out to consider all the PDEs, but we subsequently dropped nine 
PDEs which we found lacking such experience during fieldwork phase. 
 
Response 
Our respondents were officers in PDEs, who deal with purchasing activities. We 
considered all the purchasing related employees to increase the validity of our 
statistical analyses. These include procurement officers, members of contracts 
committees, finance officers that deal with purchasing activities, and accounting 
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officers. In Appendix G, we show the involvement of the considered categories of 
respondents in purchasing tasks and thus justify their choice.  
 
Operationalisation and measurement of variables 
In the previous chapters, we presented various foundations of the variables we are 
examining. In this section, we show how these variables were operationalised. 
 
Independent variables  
In the table below, we show how we measured the behavioural variables (trust, 
commitment, dependence, and reciprocity). We used different literature sources to 
ensure construct validity in our measurement. We present the measurement of the 
independent variables in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Measurement of independent variables 
Variable Key literature bases Items in measurement scale/issues to examine 
Trust Swan and Trawick (1987) We examine dependability/reliability, honesty, 
competence, orientation, and friendliness among PDEs 
Commitment Brown et al. (1995); 
Gilliland and Bello (2002) 
We examine instrumental, normative, and affective 
commitment about horizontal purchasing collaboration 
amongst PDEs 
Dependence Hammarkvist et al. 
(1982); Mattsson (1999) 
We examine time, knowledge, social, economic, 
technical, market, and IT dependence of PDEs  
Reciprocity Sullivan et al. (2003) We examine equivalence, immediacy, and self interest 
 
Horizontal purchasing collaboration 
We measured horizontal purchasing collaboration as a process, in terms of its 
activities. We considered the level of collaboration by testing the frequency at which 
activities of collaboration are done (based on Arnold, 1997; Rozenmeijer, 2000; Ryan 
and Walsh, 2004; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2004a). Various publications converge 
on two main measurement dimensions, as shown in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3 Measurement of horizontal purchasing collaboration 
Key literature bases Items in measurement scale/issues to examine 
Arnold (1997); Rozenmeijer (2000); 
Ryan and Walsh (2004); 
Simatupang and Sridharan (2004a) 
Information sharing/economies of information: 
We examine information on suppliers, needs specifications, 
prices, inventory levels, ordering, and after care information. 
We also consider information on new technologies, market 
developments, internal users, and spending behaviour 
Arnold (1997); Rozenmeijer (2000); 
Simatupang and Sridharan (2004a) 
Decision synchronisation/economies of process: 
We examine joint decision taking in issues of specification, 
contracting plans, level of purchases, order levels, monitoring 
systems, and after delivery. We examine the existence of state 
of the art purchasing process knowledge across all steps of 
purchasing, by common way of working, uniform purchasing 
procedures, sharing best practices, common training and 
education, and sharing suppliers. We also consider the level of 
incentive alignment – where the benefits or risks that accrue 
from collaboration are shared by participating members, and if 
there are joint investments. 
 
Benefits of collaboration 
Collaboration benefits have been classified by several scholars (Essig, 1999b; 
Kauffman, 1993; Rozenmeijer, 2000; Sheperd, 1985; Van Weele, 2000). We use a 
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combination of relevant measurement items from these measures in our work. Based 
on Van Weele (2000), purchasing benefits centre on the extent to which by choosing a 
certain action, a previously established goal or standard is being met. Applied to 
collaborative purchasing, this means among other things that effectiveness and/or 
efficiency can be achieved as a result of better use of resources, knowledge and scale 
(Essig, 1999b; Kauffman, 1983; Sheperd, 1985), sharing information and more 
accurate information (Nollet and Beaulieu, 2005; Schotanus, 2007; Tella and 
Virolainen, 2005), sharing resources (Schotanus, 2007), standardisation of 
requirements, and sharing suppliers across participating entities (Johnson, 1999).  
 
The main point from these references is that horizontal purchasing collaboration 
process or activities may lead to collaborative outcomes. We therefore examine the 
existence of these outcomes, which is empirical evidence of the existence of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration (other factors are held constant) to have a much 
deeper understanding of these outcomes. We present the outcomes (benefits) of an 
individual entity in Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 Outcomes (benefits) of individual entity 
Key literature bases Items in measurement scale / issues to examine 
McCarthy and Golicic 
(2002); Quinn (1999); 
Sheperd (1985); Sin et 
al. (2005); Van Weele 
(2000) 
We examine sharing of information and resources, 
existence of state of art purchasing process, standardisation 
of requirements and sharing of suppliers, sharing human 
resources and improved procedures.  
 
Data collection and procedure 
We used a researcher-administered questionnaire to collect data. This enabled face to 
face interaction between researcher personnel and respondents, which further 
improved the quality and response rate of the survey. Out of 107 PDEs in our sample, 
(we removed nine PDEs) we received responses from 63, a response rate of about 
59%. We assured the respondents of confidentiality and feedback of the survey 
results. 
 
We used a five point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 
(not sure), 4 (agree) to 5 (strongly agree). All odd Likert point scales have a neutral or 
not sure choice. As opposed to the even number response scale, where the respondent 
must decide whether to chose the agree side or disagree side (which may be against 
his/her will), we used an odd scale because it allows free expression of choice. 
Behavioural variables have questions which may be perceived neutral by respondents, 
so they need to be given all possible alternatives. We selected a five point scale 
because in our view, with a three point scale, the respondent has limited options and 
you risk loosing nuances. On the other hand, with a seven point scale (or even more) 
the difference between the choices is difficult to understand. The seven point scales 
are also used when very small differences are expected. We do not expect this, so we 
do not use a seven point scale.  
 
In order to refine the questionnaire and ensure validity and reliability of the research 
instruments, we carried out a pilot test mainly to ensure content validity (Mitchell, 
1996; Polit et al., 2001; Teijlingen et al., 2001). We pre-tested the questionnaire on a 
focus group (who were practicing procurement officers in the PDEs and at the same 
time had research skills since they were students of Master of Science in Purchasing 
 
 
91
and Supply Chain Management at Makerere University) and made some adjustments 
before the final questionnaire was used. This focus group was similar to the final 
population of our sample. Based on Saunders et al. (2003) guidelines on the number 
of respondents for a pilot study (size of study, time and money resources available, 
and having largely used a previously used standardised questionnaire), we used 13 
respondents. We thought that since all the respondents are mainly professionals, doing 
similar work, there would be no major variations in the populations. This number was 
above ten, which is recommended for pilots of such questionnaire designs (Fink, 
1995).  
 
Data analysis 
Completeness and inconsistencies 
We checked the data for completeness and inconsistencies, and removed incomplete 
answers list wise. Where there were some questions that were not filled by the 
respondent, we referred back to the entity for an answer.  
 
Credibility of research findings 
As expressed by Raimond (1993), we need to subject our work to the “how do I 
know?” test: “…..will the evidence and my conclusions stand up to the closest 
scrutiny?” Rogers (1961, cited by Raimond 1993) captured it as: 
 
“Scientific methodology needs to be seen for what it truly is, a way of 
preventing me from deceiving myself in regard to my creatively formed 
subjective hunches which have developed out of the relationship between me 
and my material" 
 
In regard to the above argument, we pay attention to reliability and validity.  
 
Reliability of the test 
A reliable test is one that yields stable results, whatever it measures, it is consistent. A 
reliable test accrues from the use of reliable variable scales. In Table 6.5, we use 
reliability considerations developed by Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) and show how we 
take care of these considerations in our research. 
 
Table 6.5 Reliability considerations (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) 
Consideration Our design 
Will the measures yield the same 
results on other occasions? 
We carefully used a representative sample.  
Will similar observations be 
reached by other observers? 
Though we made adjustments to suit our study, we largely adopted 
research instruments that have generally been applied. We also 
consulted practitioners and other experts in the testing stage.  
Is there transparency in how 
sense was made from the data? 
The same researcher(s) who collected data interpreted it. Experts 
were also consulted on this. 
 
Reliability of the instruments 
In addition to the considerations mentioned in Table 6.5, it is important to ensure that 
our measuring instruments are consistent. The reliability of instruments can be 
obtained by using any of the following tests: test-retest method, the alternative form 
method, and the internal consistency method (Nunnaly, 1978; Peter, 1979). Since 
literature offers options of any of the tests, we used the test-retest and the internal 
consistency test. Below, we justify their relevance: 
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Test-retest reliability 
With our pilot study, we carried out the test-retest reliability (based on Field, 2005) by 
giving the same instrument to each sampled procurement officer, two weeks after 
filling it, and the scores were 98% similar. This confirmed that there was no influence 
of anxiety and emotions while filling the questionnaire at both points in time. 
 
The internal consistency test 
There are several tests for internal consistency: Guttman, parallel, strict parallel, split 
half, and Cronbach alpha (1970). The Chronbach’s alpha, which we adopted, is one of 
the most commonly used measures of reliability. It is a useful test because it is based 
on the average correlation of all items in the test. Scholars in collaboration have 
commonly used this test. Besides, it provides a direct estimate of the mean of all 
possible split-half tests. It allowed us to identify two items (the variance within the 
item, and the covariance between a particular item and any other item on the scale), 
that negatively affect the overall reliability of the dependence scale. We present the 
results of the internal consistency test of our pilot study in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6 Cronbach Alpha values 
Variable/construct No. of items Cronbach Alpha 
Instrumental commitment 
Normative commitment 
Affective commitment 
2 
5* 
3 
.8193 
.8162 
.9138 
Trust 10 .8629 
Dependence 8 .8487 
Reciprocity 6 .8447 
Information sharing 
Decision synchronization 
Incentive alignment 
7 
6 
3 
.8471 
.7824 
.7340 
Benefits for individual entity 6 .8374 
Note: n = 13 
*The item our attachment to PDEs we collaborate with is mainly based on the similarity of our values 
had a low correlation with the others, and affected reliability. On further discussions with the focus 
group, we changed it to read our relationship with PDEs we collaborate with is mainly based on the 
similarity of our values. 
After the above mentioned adjustment all the Cronbach alpha coefficients were above 
.7340, which is above the .70 accept/reject standard (Afifi and Elashoff, 1966; 
Cronbach, 1951; Nunnaly, 1978). This is strengthened by the fact that the instrument 
was tested in a new environment, in which even a coefficient of 0.6 would be 
acceptable (Churchill and Peter, 1984; Nunnally, 1967). 
 
Validity 
In this section, we aim at checking whether our constructs measure what they purport 
to measure. We use the construct validity test. Construct validity refers to the extent to 
which the measurement questions actually measure the presence of those constructs 
the questions intended to measure (Saunders et al., 2007). Saunders et al. recommend 
the use of construct validity when referring to constructs such as attitude scales. We 
find it very relevant because our scale seeks attitudes of respondents. 
 
We wanted to know the pattern of inter-correlations among item measures. 
Correlations between theoretically similar measures are expected to be high. We took 
a correlation of above .5 (based on Stevens, 1992) as the cut off point. Note that based 
on Field (2005), there are two approaches to locating underlying dimensions of a data 
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set: factor analysis and principal component analysis. We used the principal 
component analysis, by the varimax rotation method to extract the most important 
factors. The principal component analysis method is preferred to factor analysis, since 
according to Field (2005), the principal component analysis is concerned only with 
establishing which linear components exist within the data and how a particular 
variable might contribute to that component. Field also argues that the principal 
component analysis is a psychometrically sound procedure. Moreover, it is a better 
measure than others in our research where variables are less than twenty (Stevens, 
1992). We preferred the varimax method to quartimax and equamax because it 
maximizes the dispersion of loadings within factors and therefore it loads a smaller 
number of variables highly onto each factor resulting in more interpretable clusters of 
factors. Field (2005) further suggests use of the varimax method for a first analysis, 
because it is a good general approach that simplifies the interpretation of factors.  
 
From our pilot study findings, all the constructs under study explained the variables 
they represent by well above the .5 cut off point. We therefore got scientific base that 
the items were measuring what they are meant to measure.  
 
6.4  Results and discussion 
 
Testing assumptions 
In this section, we aim at checking whether certain assumptions for parametric tests 
are met, before applying these tests. We carry out the following necessary tests based 
on Field (2005): normality test, linearity test, multicollinearity, homogeneity, 
heterosdasciticity, and auto correlation. 
 
Normality test 
We test for normality using frequency distributions and plots. We first use the 
descriptive statistics to establish the skewness and kurtosis. The skewness and 
kurtosis were used to establish normality based on the range of -2 to +2 as a normal 
distribution. According to the results in Table 6.7 below, skewness and kurtosis are in 
the range of -2 and +2. This implies that the data is normally distributed. 
 
Table 6.7 Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Min.  Max.  Mean  
Std.  
dev.  
Skewness Kurtosis 
Stat. Std. error Stat. Std. error 
Instrumental commitment 1.00 5.00 3.01 1.262 .062 .302 -1.335 .595 
Normative commitment 2.00 5.00 3.57 .802 -.119 .302 -1.161 .595 
Affective commitment .00 5.00 3.07 1.184 -.135 .302 -.920 .595 
Commitment 1.69 5.00 3.22 .878 .259 .302 -.996 .595 
Trust 1.56 4.89 3.44 .812 -.484 .302 -.243 .595 
Dependence 1.38 4.63 2.91 .930 .237 .302 -1.078 .595 
Reciprocity 1.50 4.83 3.14 .858 .084 .302 -.481 .595 
Information sharing 1.00 4.71 3.19 .927 -.191 .302 -.330 .595 
Decision synchronization 1.50 4.33 3.06 .808 -.329 .302 -.990 .595 
Incentive alignment 1.00 3.67 1.79 .729 .676 .302 -.399 .595 
Collaboration 1.31 3.98 2.68 .606 -.227 .302 .143 .595 
Benefit 1.83 4.67 3.50 .620 -.899 .302 .983 .595 
Note: n = 63 for all variables 
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Normal probability plots 
We also used normal probability plots to test for normality. Normality distribution for 
all study variables indicate that most of the data points are along a straight line, an 
indication of normal distribution. 
 
Linearity test 
According to the zero order correlation matrix (Table 6.17) and F statistic and Sig F in 
the regression model (Table 6.19), trust, commitment, dependence, reciprocity, and 
collaboration are linearly related to benefits of individual entity. 
 
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity exists when there is a strong correlation between predictors in a 
regression model (Field, 2005). Multicollinearity increases the probability that a good 
predictor of the outcome will be found non significant and rejected from the model, 
limits the size of R (a measure of the multiple correlation between the predictors and 
the outcome), makes it difficult to access the individual importance of a predictor, and 
increases the variances of the regression coefficients, resulting in unstable predictor 
equations. 
 
We used the Durbin-Watson test to check the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) as a 
collinearity diagnostic, to show whether each of the predictors; trust, commitment, 
reciprocity, and dependence, has a strong linear relationship with the other predictors. 
Based on Myers (1990) cut off rule of a VIF value of 10 at which to worry, we 
conclude that there is no multicollinearity in our data since all VIF figures are below 3 
(see Table 6.19). We also used the tolerance statistic. Based on Menard (1995) cut of 
rule of existence of multicollinearity with figures below .2, we still do not find 
multicollinearity since all our values are .387 and above. 
 
Homogeneity 
Homogeneity of variance is another assumption we tested to ensure suitability of our 
further hierarchical tests. Homogeneity assumes that the variance of one variable 
should be stable at all levels of other variables (Field, 2005). In studies that use 
correlation analysis and regression models, the Levene’s test is mostly used. We used 
Levene’s test to test if the differences between the variances were zero. As shown in 
Table 6.8, Levene’s statistics for each of the variables is non significant (i.e., p >.05) 
meaning that the difference between the variances is (almost) zero.  
 
Table 6.8 Test of homogeneity of variables 
Variable Levene statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Benefits 1.345 9 37 .213 
Collaboration 1.718 9 37 .120 
Dependence .721 9 37 .687 
Reciprocity 2.696 9 37 .076 
Trust 5.633 9 37 .077 
Commitment 1.488 9 37 .189 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
Heterosdasticity occurs when the residues at each level of a predictor variable have 
unequal variances. If the plot of regression standardized predicted value against 
regression standardized residual looks like a random array of dots evenly dispersed 
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around zero, and the graph does not funnel out, then there is no heterosdasticity (there 
is homodasticity). From our analysis, the regression standardized residual and 
regression standardized predicted value plot indicated a distribution funning in wards, 
which is an indication of homoscedasticity as opposed to heteroscedasticity.  
 
Auto correlation 
Auto correlation is a situation when for two observations, the residual terms are 
independent (Field, 2005). According to Durbin and Watson (1951), there is no auto 
correlation when two adjacent residuals have a test statistic between 0 and 4 and if the 
Durbin-Watson value is greater than the adjusted value. Our results (see also Table 
6.19) show s Durbin-Watson value of 1.463 (i.e. between 0 and 4). This is greater 
than the adjusted value of .498 implying no serial correlation. 
 
Factor analysis 
Factor analysis seeks to discover simple patterns of relationships among the variables. 
Since we operationalised our variables into several dimensions and used several 
questions that exhaust these dimensions, we carried out a factor analysis to identify 
groups of variables and see how they are related to each other. According to Field 
(2005) and Feisel (2009), behavioural and exploratory studies such as ours should use 
the explanatory factor analysis to understand the structure of the variables and know 
which of the questions cause more variability in the variables they measure. This 
method has been supported by recent scholars in collaboration (Brown, 2008; 
Meunier-FitzHugh and Piercy, 2007; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005).  
 
Social variables like trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence are likely to have 
unobservable characteristics. These are internal attributes and have effects that are 
reflected when one obtains measures of surface attributes (Tucker and MacCallum, 
1997). Tucker and MacCallum in support of factor analysis, argue that these internal 
attributes need to be analysed because they account for observed variation and 
covariation across a wide range of surface attributes. 
 
For the factor analysis, we use the Kaiser (1960) criterion, which requires only those 
factors with Eigen values above 1 to be picked. This is because according to Kaiser, 
these are the ones with substantial amount of variation. However, we note that other 
scholars like Jolliffe (1972, 1986) lower the cut off to .7. But since research has 
shown that Kaiser’s criterion is accurate when the number of variables is less than 30 
(Field, 2005) like in our research, we use the same criterion. 
 
For each variable, we used the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy (Kaiser, 1970) which tests whether factor analysis will yield distinct and 
reliable factors. The test varies between 0 and 1. Bartlett’s tests were also done, to 
check for sphericity, i.e. whether a variance-covariance matrix is proportional to an 
identity matrix. The Bartllet’s test has been recommended in factor analysis (Field, 
2005) since it checks similarity of group variances and that the dependent variables 
are not correlated. According to Field (2005), for suitability of factor analysis, the 
results of the Bartllet’s test should be significant i.e. sig. should be less than .5. In 
Table 6.9 below, we give the interpretation of the test based on Hutcheson and 
Sofroniou (1999).  
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Table 6.9 Interpretation of correlation 
Range Interpretation 
0 There is diffusion in the pattern of correlations, so factor analysis not appropriate 
Close to 1 Patterns of correlations are relatively compact, so factor analysis will yield distinct 
and reliable factors 
.5 – .7 Mediocre results 
.7 – .8 Good results 
.8 – .9 Great results 
Above .9 Superb results 
 
For all variables discussed in the next sections, the KMO test indicates values that will 
give good to great results (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). The Bartlett’s test for 
sphericity is significant for all variables (sig. 000). Therefore there are some 
relationships between the variables. 
 
Trust 
The trust factor was extracted from ten items explaining 61% of the total variance of 
trust. Five items with factor loadings of more than .70 were finally extracted (see 
Table 6.10). This implies that the five items strongly measured the trust variable. 
 
Table 6.10 Trust component matrix 
Measure Value 
The PDEs we collaborate with always keep their promises. .852 
We always receive a good response from the PDEs we collaborate with. .843 
The PDEs we collaborate with are always obliging. .843 
The PDEs we collaborate with are always polite. .815 
The PDEs we collaborate with always inform us immediately if problems occur in 
their purchasing operations that may have an impact on the collaboration 
.723 
Eigen value 3.721 
% of variance 61.344 
 
Commitment 
Three constructs of commitment were extracted from ten items explaining 75% of the 
total variance of commitment. Affective commitment (pride in the collaboration) 
explained more of commitment followed by normative commitment (based on strong 
values and beliefs) and instrumental commitment (fear of costs of switching off from 
current collaboration). Our results show that affective commitment, more than 
instrumental commitment and normative commitment cause variability in 
commitment. This could be because pride is more important in the initial phases of 
collaboration (which applies to our sample) compared to the fear of switching costs; 
which would be minimal at the initial stage and the not yet evolved values and beliefs, 
as we find relevant for developing countries.  
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Table 6.11 Commitment rotated component matrixa 
Measure Component 
 1 2 3 
Affective commitment    
We feel that the PDEs we collaborate with, view us as being an important 
team member rather than just being another PDE. 
.917   
We are proud to tell others that we are associated with the other PDEs. .895   
We take up our collaboration with other PDEs, to friends and acquaintances, 
as a great relationship to be connected with. 
.847   
Normative commitment    
Our relationship with PDES we collaborate with is mainly based on the 
similarity of our values. 
 .861  
The reason we work with other PDEs is because of what they stand for, their 
values. 
 .807  
If the values for PDEs we collaborate with were different, we would not be 
as attached to them. 
 .684  
Our procurement values, and those of the PDEs we collaborate with are 
becoming more similar. 
 .512  
Instrumental commitment    
We need to keep working with the other PDEs since leaving would create 
hardship for our organisation. 
  .911 
Changing the horizontal collaborative purchasing with other PDEs now 
would be too disruptive for our activities, so we continue to work with them. 
  .764 
Eigen Values 3.403 2.318 1.743 
% of variance 34.034 23.175 17.431 
a Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
Dependence 
The dependence factor was extracted from eight items explaining 51% of the total 
variance of dependence. Final extraction showed six items with factor loadings of 
over .50 on the dependence. This implies that six items significantly measured the 
dependency variable (see also Table 6.12). 
 
The item Our PDE has a close relationship with the PDEs we collaborate with, has 
the highest coefficient (.899). This means that it causes more variability in the 
variable dependence more than other items that measure dependence. We argue that 
developing a close relationship may cause more collaborating entities to be dependent 
on each other. On the other hand, the item Our PDE’s relationship with the 
collaborating PDEs is regulated in a written contract has the lowest coefficient 
(.598). This means that it causes lesser variability in the variable dependence than the 
other considered items. We argue that contracts do not have a major impact in causing 
dependence between entities in collaborative initiatives. This matches with Anheier 
and Kendall (2000) finding that voluntary participation in collaboration is more 
necessary than contractual obligations. 
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Table 6.12 Dependence component matrix 
Measure Value 
Our PDE has a close relationship with the PDEs we collaborate with. .899 
Our PDE’s activities are developed through the knowledge that is interchanged with the 
collaborating PDEs. 
.879 
Our PDE’s activities have a strong time based synchronisation with the other collaborating 
PDEs’ activities. 
.867 
Our PDE strives to maintain a common information technology standard of hard and soft ware 
with the collaborating PDEs. 
.824 
Collaborating PDEs influence our PDE’s reputation .779 
Our PDE’s relationship with the collaborating PDEs is regulated in a written contract. .598 
Eigen value 4.074 
% of variance 50.929 
 
Reciprocity 
The reciprocity variable was extracted from six items explaining 61% of the total 
variance. Five items with factor loadings of over .30 significantly measured the 
reciprocity variable. The item Our PDE regards ‘never forget a good turn’ as our 
motto has a coefficient of .900, an indication that it causes more variability in the 
variable reciprocity. The item Even if we don’t anticipate immediate benefit, we offer 
our service to the collaborating PDEs has the lowest coefficient of .442. We argue 
that for new horizontal purchasing collaboration initiatives, recalling good acts causes 
more reciprocity than anticipating future benefits. This may be true because for 
starting initiatives, there are no immediate benefits to evaluate.  
 
Table 6.13 Reciprocity component matrix 
Measure Value 
Our PDE regards ‘never forget a good turn’ as our motto. .900 
If the PDEs we collaborate with give assistance when my PDE had difficulties, then I would 
be responsible for returning its kindness. 
.838 
We keep our promises to each other in any situation. .829 
Even if we don’t anticipate immediate benefit, we offer our service to the collaborating PDEs. .442 
We don’t investigate discrepancies in performance of activities we are involved in with the 
collaborating PDEs. 
.454 
Eigen value 2.446 
% of variance 60.767 
 
Level of collaboration 
Three factors with Eigen values greater than 1 were extracted from 16 items 
explaining 68% of total variance of the level of collaboration. Eleven items with 
factor loadings of over .40 remained in the final rotated matrix. This implies that the 
three factors or dimensions extracted are the significant measures of the level of 
collaboration. Level of information sharing measured more of the level of 
collaboration (31.4%), followed by level of decision synchronization (19.1%), and the 
level of incentive alignment (17.4%). 
 
From the results, we note that sharing information has high loadings and has the 
highest percentage of variance (31.403%) compared to decision synchronisation and 
incentives alignment dimensions (19.083% and 17.839 respectively) and therefore 
causes more variability in the level of collaboration than all the other dimensions. 
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This is not a surprise, because in the public sector, there may be less motivation to 
keep purchasing data confidential, since public policy requires transparency of all 
processes (PPDA Act, 2003). Therefore public purchasing information will be shared 
with relative ease. We also note that incentives alignment and decision 
synchronisation have low loadings and therefore have a relatively lower importance in 
influencing the level of collaboration. 
 
Table 6.14 Level of collaboration rotated component matrixa 
Measure Component 
 1 2 3 
Level of information sharing     
In our PDE, we very frequently share information on product/service 
specification with other PDEs  
.933   
In our PDE, we very frequently share information regarding on hand 
inventory levels with other PDEs. 
.910   
In our PDE, we very frequently share information regarding supplier 
performance with other PDEs. 
.852   
In our PDE, we very frequently share information regarding price changes 
with the PDEs we collaborate with. 
.752   
Level of decision synchronization    
In our PDE, we very frequently use supplier list with other PDEs  .834  
In our PDE, we very frequently share best practices with other PDEs.  .772  
In our PDE, we very frequently carry out joint training programmes across 
all collaborating PDEs. 
 .745  
In our PDE, we very frequently have common purchasing goals with the 
other PDEs. 
 .650  
In our PDE, we very frequently jointly carry out plans on needs 
specification with other PDEs. 
 .509  
Level of incentive alignment    
In our PDE, we very frequently share the savings made on reduced costs 
with other PDEs. 
  .535 
In our PDE, we very frequently have made some investments with PDEs. 
 
  .501 
Eigen value 3.424 3.053 2.782 
% of variance 31.403 19.083 17.389 
a Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Benefits for an individual entity 
Six items explaining 34.2% of the benefits of an individual entity were extracted. The 
final component matrix below indicates four items with factor loadings of over .30 as 
the significant measures of benefits of individual entity. We note that reduction in 
transaction costs through sharing of information is the item that most causes variation 
in benefits for horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda than the other items 
used in the study. 
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Table 6.15 Benefits of individual entity rotated component matrix 
Measure Value 
Sharing of information reduces transaction costs. .829 
Better purchasing procedures are carried out  and at minimal costs .817 
There are proper quantities of supplies .654 
There is existence of state of the art purchasing process (e.g. through . uniform 
purchasing procedures and common training) 
 
.425 
Eigen Value 2.051 
% of variance 34.176 
 
Findings and discussion of hypotheses testing 
Using the descriptive statistics and the mean score2, we show the level of existence of 
each variable we hypothesized on. We interpret values between 4.2 and 5.0 as very 
high; between 3.4 and 4.2 as high; between 2.6 and 3.4 as medium; between 1.8 and 
2.6 as low and between 1.0 and 1.8 as very low. The hypotheses are shown below. 
 
H1b: The level of trust between Ugandan PDE’s in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
H2b: The level of commitment of PDE’s in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
H3b: The level of reciprocity among PDEs in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
H4b: The level of dependence among PDEs in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
H5b: The level of horizontal collaboration for individual Ugandan PDEs is low. 
H6b: The level of benefits for individual Ugandan PDEs is low. 
 
The findings on the levels of existence of hypothesized variables are shown in the 
table below.  
 
Table 6.16 Descriptive statistics for hypotheses on level of existence of independent variables 
 
Variable 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Magnitude of 
hypothesised 
variable 
H1b: Trust 3.3889 .83929 Medium 
H2b: Commitment 3.3079 .89478 Medium 
H3b: Reciprocity  3.1429 .87463 Medium 
H4b: Dependence 2.9068 1.00791 Medium 
H5b: Level of collaboration 2.8810 .69487 Medium 
H6b: Benefits of individual entity 3.5026 .62036 High 
Note: n=63 
                                                
2 Note that responses to all item scales in this study were anchored on a five point Likert scale, 
reflecting the degree to which they strongly disagreed (1) or strongly agreed (5) to the questions about 
horizontal purchasing collaboratives in Uganda. 
 
 
101
Discussions of the hypotheses that seek to find the level of existence of variables 
 
H1b: The level of trust between Ugandan PDE’s in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
Based of the findings in Table 6.16, the level of trust in Ugandan PDEs in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration is medium (mean = 3.3889). The results show that PDEs 
have not yet adjusted to orient themselves to practices of others and that friendliness 
is still medium. Literature suggests that for trust to develop, there should be honesty 
and competences amongst partners (Svensson, 2004; Swan and Trawick, 1987). The 
medium level of trust could be attributed to lack of honesty. Based on TCE and 
arguments by Grover and Malhotra (2003), the Ugandan PDEs may not be able to 
receive, retrieve and communicate information without error, causing information 
asymmetry, which in turn reduces the level of trust. We also note that in Uganda, 
PDEs have employees that are largely of the same academic and professional 
qualifications, with similar experiences and competences, which make staff in a PDE, 
not trust that the technical expertise got from others is worth taking up. 
 
H2b: The level of commitment of PDE’s in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
Based on the findings, the level of commitment in Ugandan PDEs in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration is medium (mean = 3.3079). This may be because in the 
developed countries and specifically in Ugandan public sector, also being relatively 
new, collaborating entities which are legally autonomous have an option to operate 
alone. They do not have high costs to incur if they left the collaborative, since they 
have just started the relationships. This is in agreement with the arguments of 
Gilliland and Bello (2002) and Zineldin and Jonsson (2000) that the level of 
commitment will not be high as long as partners are not constrained to leave or have 
an incentive to stay. We also note that the PDEs have differing values and targets. As 
long as they do not all prefer one mode of behaviour against the others (Allen and 
Meyer, 1996; Brown et al., 2005; Dion et al., 1992), the level of commitment will be 
more likely to be medium. 
 
H3b: The level of reciprocity among PDEs in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
Based on the findings, the level of reciprocity in Ugandan PDEs in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration is medium (mean = 3.1429). This could be because in the 
initial phases of collaboration, PDEs in Uganda still perceive the input of others and 
compare them with their own input. This is contrary to Graen and Scandura’s (1997) 
argument that for reciprocity to be high, parties in collaboration should attach the 
same value to what they get from other collaborating parties to what the receive.  
 
Based on Liden et al. (1997), reciprocity will flourish if with time, the collaborating 
partners shift from self interest orientation to one based mutual interest. We note that 
in Uganda, selfishness is still common (see section 4.5), and conflicts between PDEs 
still exist, all reducing group interest and leading to medium reciprocating behaviour.  
 
H4b: The level of dependence among PDEs in Uganda in horizontal purchasing 
collaboratives is low. 
Based on the findings, the level of dependence in Ugandan PDEs in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration is medium (mean =2.9068,). We note that in Uganda, PDEs 
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have duplicated resources. This reduces the need for dependence, since each PDE can 
to some extent access some resources. We further note that because of a short time of 
existence, individual PDEs have not yet developed enough tacit knowledge to be 
regarded as a scarce resource by other PDEs. This means there is medium level of 
knowledge dependence since individual PDEs do not see a lot to gain from others in 
the collaboration. This matches with literature, which converges on the notion that the 
level of dependence will not be high when there are no unique resources to gain from 
collaboration (Kale, 1996; Leonidou et al., 2006). Based on the resource based view 
(Draft, 1983; Ordanini and Rubera, 2008; Wernerfelt, 1994), the level of dependence 
will be more likely to be medium until unique resources like knowledge, information, 
individual PDE status and image and technical competences develop. This also 
applies to other countries because their competences are still below the required level 
for development. 
 
H5b: The level of horizontal collaboration for individual Ugandan PDEs is low 
Based on the findings, the level of horizontal collaboration for individual Ugandan 
PDEs is medium (mean = 2.8810). We note that whereas there is a relatively high 
level of information sharing amongst the PDEs, this is moderated by relatively low 
levels of decision synchronisation and incentives alignment. We also note that 
because Ugandan collaborative initiatives are relatively new, it may be easy for the 
entities to share information since implementation of the actions is done individually, 
compared to decision synchronisation and incentives alignment, where 
implementation has to be done jointly. As had been noted (Holweg et al., 2005; 
Jagdev and Thoben, 2001), entities in developed countries and specifically in Uganda 
have not yet gone beyond passive information exchange to engage in proactive 
collaboration. This is also in agreement with Liden et al. (1997) that with time, 
collaborating partners shift from a position of selfishness to mutuality, and therefore 
are able to increase on the level of decision synchronisation and incentives alignment. 
 
H6b: The level of benefits for individual Ugandan PDEs is low 
Based on the findings, the level of benefits for individual Ugandan PDEs is high 
(mean = 3.5026). We note that sharing human resources amongst PDEs and joint 
training are the most evaluated benefits of collaboration. We further note that benefits 
realised from reduced operational costs and proper quantities of supplies are still 
medium rated. We note that whereas we had hypothesised that the level of benefits for 
individual entity is low, the results show it is high, though close to the medium rating. 
This may mean that the PDEs perceive high benefits in the initial phases of 
collaboration, even when they have not yet actually realised much benefits. This may 
be a signal of willingness to collaborate. This matches the findings of Kuada (2002) 
about collaboration in developed countries, that “people perceive more than they see”. 
 
Hypotheses that deal with correlation between variables 
We tested for correlation using the Pearson’s correlation coefficient method. We used 
this method since our data were mainly interval data and normally distributed (Field, 
2005). Note that from literature review and exploratory studies (Chapters, 3, 4 and 5), 
we get sufficient evidence regarding the direction of our hypotheses. Thus we use 
one-tailed tests in our analysis. Based on Cohen (1992) and Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001), we interpret correlation coefficients as: .8 – 1.0 (strong); .5 – .8 (moderate); .2 
– .5 (weak) and .1 – .2 (negligible).  
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In the next sections, we show and discuss results that deal with correlation between 
variables. The hypotheses tested for correlation are given below: 
 
H1a: The existence of trust leads to a higher level of collaboration in the early phases 
of horizontal purchasing collaboratives. 
H2a: The existence of commitment leads to a higher level of collaboration. 
H2c: The existence of trust leads to a higher level of commitment. 
H3a: The existence of reciprocity leads to a higher level of collaboration. 
H4a: The existence of dependence leads to a higher level of collaboration. 
H4c: The existence of dependence leads to a higher level of commitment. 
H5a: The higher the level of collaboration, the higher the benefits of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration for an individual entity. 
 
The zero order correlation matrix in Table 6.17 below shows the results. 
 
Table 6.17 Zero order correlation matrix 
Variable Com. Trust Dep. Rec. Coll. Benefits  
Commitment 1      
Trust .586** 1     
Dependence .584** .624** 1    
Reciprocity .561** .652** .547** 1   
Level of collaboration .252* .467** .529** .287* 1  
Benefits of individual entity .194 .618** .504** .400** .675** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1 – tailed) 
  * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1 – tailed) 
 
Discussion of the hypotheses that deal with correlation between variables 
In this section, we discuss the results of each hypothesis and relate our findings to 
existing literature. 
 
H1a: The existence of trust leads to a higher level of collaboration in the early phases 
of horizontal purchasing collaboratives. 
There was a significant positive relationship between trust and collaboration (r = .467, 
p < .01). This shows that presence of trust increases the level of collaboration. The 
almost moderate relationship indicates the importance of building trust in the 
relatively newly established collaborative initiatives. From literature, we note that 
trust takes time to develop. According to Leonidou et al. (2006), building trust is a 
continuous process. Pesamaa and Hair Jr (2007) also noted that in early phases of 
collaboration, loyalty of partners to each other is largely missing, and this inhibits the 
growth of trust, since it causes opportunism and selfishness as we found out in 
Chapter 4.  
 
H2a: The existence of commitment leads to a higher level of collaboration 
There was significant positive relationship between commitment and the level of 
collaboration (r = .252, p < .05). This indicates that once there is commitment, the 
level of collaboration will also increase. The weak relationship could be attributed to 
the PDEs which are government owned, and could be less motivated to gain benefits 
since most benefits are public and less perceived as personal (Tumwine, 2006). Even 
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when individual PDEs get committed to the horizontal purchasing collaborative 
initiative, other PDEs may not proportionately collaborate at the same pace. 
 
H2c: The existence of trust leads to a higher level of commitment 
There was a significant positive relationship between trust and commitment (r = .586, 
p < .01). This indicates that once trust increases, commitment also increases. The 
moderate positive correlation indicates that trust and commitment enforce each other 
in horizontal purchasing collaboration. It may also mean that trust and commitment 
easily influence each other. Trust and commitment can be improved and reduced 
relatively quickly by each other. Our findings match with literature (Andaleeb, 1996; 
Brennan and Turnbull, 1999; Whan and Taewon, 2005; Ylimaz and Hunt, 2001) that 
trust leads to adaptations to accommodate a partner and be committed to such a 
partner. The moderate (and not strong) correlation between trust and commitment is 
justified by the short time the collaborative initiatives have existed in Uganda.  
 
H3a: The existence of reciprocity leads to a higher level of collaboration 
There was a significant positive relationship between reciprocity and collaboration (r 
= .287, p < .05). This is an indication that when reciprocity increases, the level of 
collaboration also increases. From our results, the weak correlation may mean that in 
the Ugandan context where collaborative initiatives are relatively new, the giving and 
taking practice between the PDEs has a low effect on the level of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration.  
 
H4a: The existence of dependence leads to a higher level of collaboration 
There was a significant positive relationship between dependence and collaboration (r 
= .528, p < .01). This indicates that an increase in dependence leads to a higher level 
of collaboration. We note that the moderate correlation between dependence and the 
level of collaboration compared to correlations between trust, commitment, and 
reciprocity with the level of collaboration may indicate that PDEs practice 
collaboration, not mainly because of trust, commitment or reciprocative reasons, but 
importantly because the other PDEs provide important and critical resources for 
which there are few alternative sources of supply. So, dependence is an important 
factor for increasing the levels of horizontal purchasing collaboration. Note that 
although H4b is low, this still means that to some extent PDEs have scarce resources. 
In those cases, it might be (very) interesting to collaborate.  
 
H4c: The existence of dependence leads to a higher level of commitment 
There was a significant positive relationship between dependence and commitment (r 
= .584, p < .01). This may indicate that an increase in dependence leads to an increase 
in the level of commitment.  
 
H5a: The higher the level of collaboration, the higher the benefits of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration for individual entity 
There was a significant positive relationship between the level of collaboration and 
benefits of individual entity (r = .675, p < .01). This means when the level of 
collaboration increases, the benefits for an individual entity also increase. The 
moderate relationship may reflect the hindrances to collaborative purchasing like the 
policy guidelines which still require some of the procurement processes to be 
implemented separately.  
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Based on Aylesworth’s (2003) empirical results, we note that the collaborative 
initiatives in developing countries are largely local networks and voluntary 
cooperatives, which are informally organised. We note further that such levels of 
collaboration will lead to moderate benefits. Since horizontal collaboration requires 
systematic analysis and configuration, which would support agile implementation of 
procurement plans, and continuous time oriented designs (Hoffmann and Schlosser, 
2001), we find our results which show moderate relationship between level of 
collaboration and benefits there-from reasonable.  
 
In Table 6.18 below, we show a summary of the hypotheses that deal with 
correlations and show whether the hypotheses are supported or not. 
 
Table 6.18 Summary of results of hypotheses that deal with correlations 
Hypothesis Correlation 
(one-tailed)  
Hypothesis 
supported? 
H1a: The existence of trust leads to a higher level of collaboration 
in the early phases of horizontal purchasing collaboratives 
r=.467, p<.01 
 
Yes 
H2a: The existence of commitment leads to a higher level of 
collaboration. 
r=.252, p<.05 No 
H2c: The existence of trust leads to a higher level of commitment. r=.586, p<.01 
 
Yes 
H3a: The existence of reciprocity leads to a higher level of 
collaboration. 
r=.287, p<.05 No 
H4a: The existence of dependence leads to a higher level of 
collaboration. 
r=.528, p<.01 Yes 
H4c: The existence of dependence leads to a higher level of 
commitment. 
r=.584, p<.01 Yes 
H5a: The higher the level of collaboration, the higher the benefits 
of horizontal purchasing collaboration for an individual entity. 
r=.675, p<.01 Yes 
Regression results 
Our model tested hypotheses that related to two levels:  
· The predictability of the level of collaboration on benefits for individual 
entity;  
· The predictability of the behavioural variables (trust, commitment, 
dependence, and reciprocity on the level of collaboration).  
We therefore conducted a hierarchical regression analysis to test the fit of the model. 
The hierarchical regression analysis method is useful in such studies where the 
researcher has several known predictors at different stages of conceptualisation (Field, 
2005).  
We first entered the level of collaboration to predict the level of variability in benefits 
of an individual entity (model 1) followed by the level of collaboration, reciprocity, 
dependence, trust, and commitment as the predictors (model 2). 
The hierarchical linear regression model below indicates that the level of 
collaboration is linearly related to benefits of an individual entity (F change = 41.367, 
Sig. F change =.000) and explaining 40.4% of the total variance of benefits of an 
individual entity (R2 = .404). The model also indicates that trust, commitment, 
dependence, and reciprocity explain 53.9% of the total variance of the level of 
collaboration (R2 = .539). The remaining 46.1% of the total variance of the level of 
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collaboration is explained by other factors which we did not consider in our study like 
those suggested by Leonidou et al. (2006). We recommend such for the future studies 
(Chapter 9). 
 
Commitment and trust linearly significantly and positively relate to benefits (F change 
= 4.163, Sig. F change = .005) and explain 13.5% of benefits of individual entity. 
Since our model has a large F-ratio of above 1 as recommended (Field, 2005), we 
consider our model as a good one. 
 
Table 6.19 Hierarchical Linear multiple regression  
Model 
Unstand. coefficients Stand. co. 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.757 .278  6.320 .000   
Level of coll. .651 .101 .636 6.432 .000 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant) 1.350 .297  4.537 .000   
Level of coll. .476 .109 .465 4.370 .000 .715 1.399 
Commitment .197 .098 .279 2.005 .050 .418 2.393 
Trust .280 .103 .367 2.719 .009 .444 2.252 
Dependence .070 .090 .105 .775 .442 .443 2.260 
Reciprocity .109 .104 .150 1.041 .302 .387 2.582 
         
 R R2 
Adjusted 
R2 
Std. error 
of estimate 
R2 
change F change 
Sig. F 
change 
Durbin-
Watson 
 .636a .404 .394 .48279 .404 41.367 .000  
 .734b .539 .498 .43938 .135 4.163 .005 1.463 
a Predictors: (Constant), Level of collaboration 
b Predictors: (Constant), Level of Collaboration, Reciprocity, Dependence, Trust, Commitment  
c Dependent variable: Benefits of individual entity 
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We show our conceptual model with results in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1 – tailed) 
  * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1 – tailed) 
Fig. 6.2 Conceptual model results 
 
From the regression results, it is interesting to note that contrary to results from 
developed countries (e.g., Leonidou et al., 2006), there is a noticed importance of trust 
and dependence compared to commitment and reciprocity in influencing the level of 
collaboration. One of the reasons may be that trust is relatively more important than 
others because one of its dimensions (friendliness) is relatively high in developing 
countries and Uganda in particular (Turyatunga, 2008). This compensates for other 
dimensions like competence which may be relatively low.  
 
In developing countries, there is uncertainty of the outcome of collaborative practices 
(Luhmann, 1995). In Uganda, this is more pronounced as there are not enough 
interesting cases that demonstrate that collaborative initiatives result into the promised 
benefits. We argue that it is trust and dependence that are important, as compared to 
commitment and reciprocity, because these provide a cushion against the uncertainty 
of outcomes in developing countries (Luhmann, 1995; Monczka et al., 1998). 
 
We also note from literature (see Leonidou et al., 2006), that trust refers to feelings 
about the relationship, while commitment represents manifestations of actions within 
the relationship. Our results reflect this argument since unlike developed countries,  
in the developing countries and specifically in Uganda, collaborative initiatives are 
still relatively new, so feelings (trust) are more important than manifestations of 
actions (commitment) which are yet to fully evolve.  
 
We also note that dependence has more influence on the level of collaboration than 
other factors, because in developing countries, planning is not done in time, and 
sometimes is not done at all (Turyatunga, 2008). This makes time dependence an 
important dimension in predicting the level of collaboration. Based on RBV, seeking 
for resources which individual entities lack is a key motivator to collaboration, thus 
making dependence an important predictor. We also argue that dependence is more 
important in developing countries because it is about providing critical resources, 
which the developing countries largely miss, compared to developed countries which 
have relatively more resources. 
Level of collab. 
 R²=.539 
Commitment Reciprocity Benefits  
R²=.404 
 r=.467** 
r=.675** 
  
r=.287* 
r=.529** 
 
r=.586** 
r=.584** 
Trust 
Dependence 
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We also note that developing countries have a higher income per capita, compared to 
developing countries (Aycan, 2002). Consequently, they have few resources available 
to each of the public entities, creating a need to depend on each other. Therefore 
dependence in developing countries is likely to play a major role in reducing 
uncertainties and maximising individual PDE benefits in such resource scarcity 
conditions common in developing countries (Kanungo and Jaeger, 1990). 
 
6.5 Limitations  
 
We used a survey design in this chapter. Our unit of analysis was an entity (PDE), 
making our population limited to only 116 PDEs in central government. Of the 107 
PDEs, we received 63 responses which were fully filled for use, a response rate of 
59%. Though our study makes new insights in the context of emerging developing 
world literature on public purchasing collaboration and provides a basis for future 
researches in the area, we may not perfectly generalise our results.  
 
Our model also was limited to behavioural factors, mainly trust, commitment, 
reciprocity, and dependence. Even then, because of the parsimonious principle of 
research, we could not exhaust all the possible behavioural factors. The model left out 
non-behavioural factors especially the quantitative factors, which may also be 
necessary in explaining horizontal purchasing collaboration. However, our study gives 
a firm base for future researchers in the behavioural aspects in the developing 
countries like Uganda. 
 
We conducted a cross sectional survey, which has its inherent weaknesses. Some 
behavioural aspects like trust and commitment can well be explained using 
longitudinal studies, since they can best be ascertained after a long careful study. 
However, given the time and cost limitations of the study programme, our method 
was found to be optimal. 
 
6.6  Practical implications 
 
We note that the affective commitment construct causes more variability in the 
commitment variable than the other commitment dimensions which are instrumental 
(fear of switching costs) and normative commitment (based on strong values and 
beliefs). To managers of collaborating PDEs, this is a lesson to build a sense of pride 
and belonging of their PDEs in the collaborative initiative. The issue of fear of 
switching costs may not be crucial as the collaboration is not yet strong enough to 
bind members. 
 
We note from our descriptive statistics that the information sharing dimension has a 
higher mean score (mean = 3.19), compared to other dimensions that measure the 
level of collaboration like decision synchronisation (mean = 3.06) and incentives 
alignment (mean = 1.79). This indicates that sharing of information is crucial in the 
early phases of collaboration. PDEs should improve sharing of information on 
suppliers, specifications of products/services/works, price changes in the market, 
inventory related information, et cetera. Whereas in the developed world there is 
relatively more knowledge of the market and other aspects, there is notably 
information asymmetry in the developing world. This could be partly because of lack 
of competencies and poor information and communication technology capacities. 
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Collaboration leaders should emphasise this dimension, perhaps more than joint 
decision making and incentives alignment. 
 
Whereas behavioural factors remain important and our research equally confirms so, 
we note the correlation between behavioural factors and collaboration are largely 
weak and moderate. Since horizontal purchasing collaboration initiatives in Uganda 
are relatively new and building up, it could imply that in the initial phases of 
collaboration, behavioural factors should be concurrently matched up with the other 
factors to ensure sustenance of collaboration. Commitment specifically will need 
some time for actual actions that motivate collaborating entities to be explicit. This 
makes time an essential dimension while evaluating or understanding horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. Thus, PDEs should not give up quickly. It takes time to 
develop trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence on which a desired 
collaboration would be based. 
 
We also deduce that in developing countries, where competences lack (in terms of 
human resource capacity, technological capacity, information and communication 
technology capacity et cetera), motivation for collaboration may come from 
dependence. This is because PDEs have to be “forced” to collaborate because they 
have no competencies to manage on their own, yet they perceive or know that other 
PDEs have these capacities. Managers of PDEs should know this source of motivation 
because as time goes on, all PDEs may have adequate capacities to manage on their 
own, and thus see no need to collaborate. This is more possible for PDEs which are 
public and which may not perceive other benefits of collaboration like in the private 
sector. Other sources of motivation therefore should be focused on as well in 
managing collaborations in initial phases, so that by the time PDEs acquire adequate 
competencies to justify their independence from collaboration, they will have 
developed the collaboration momentum to be able to move on, as may be the case 
with developed countries. 
 
We note that benefits (outcomes) of collaboration is a function of the level at which 
collaboration has reached. Managers should attain higher levels of collaboration, and 
deeper and wider scopes of collaboration activities to enjoy higher benefits of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration.  
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Chapter 7 – A collaboration development process model 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
From the literature review (Chapter 3), two exploratory studies (Chapter 4), an in-
depth case study (Chapter 5), and the results of a survey (Chapter 6), we get insights 
that enable us to realise our final goal of the study (about application of knowledge). 
In Chapter 7, we aim at deriving a model and working checklist to guide managerial 
planning and decision making process during the development of a collaborative 
initiative. We include the outline of this thesis to show the position of this chapter in 
the thesis. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.1 Research outline 
 
7.2 Objective  
We note that despite existing knowledge on how collaborative relationships evolve 
(Das and Teng, 2007; D’Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987; Fu et al., 2006; Johnson, 1999; 
Pet and Dibrell, 2001; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Saz- Carranza and Vernis, 2006; 
Schotanus, 2007), gaps still remain on how to start and operate a horizontal 
purchasing collaborative initiative. As we discuss in the remainder of this chapter, 
these gaps mainly relate to specific tasks to be undertaken, the stakeholders to 
involve, and the unique challenges to developing countries in collaboration. We 
therefore fill in these gaps in the existing collaborative initiative models to derive a 
working checklist to guide managerial planning and decision making process. 
 
7.3 Literature review 
 
In this literature review, we present and analyse existing collaboration process 
models. The processual dynamics underlying the evolution of collaborations are still a 
relatively unexplored phenomenon (Das and Teng, 2007). Whereas most research has 
focused on antecedents of networks and the different structures of networks (Ebers 
and Jarrillo, 1997), much less research has been focused on the process through which 
the network evolves (studies that have been carried out on process evolvement have 
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been carried out by, among others, Das and Teng, 2007; D’Aunno and Zuckerman, 
1987; Fu et al., 2006; Johnson, 1999; Pet and Dibrell, 2001; Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994; Saz- Carranza and Vernis, 2006; Schotanus, 2007). Many models have been 
developed and supported, especially on factors that influence the performance of 
collaboration (Fontenot and Wilson, 1997; Lewin and Johnson, 1997; Vlosky and 
Wilson, 1997). However, no generally acceptable model of how collaborations 
develop has yet been published (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Wilson, 1995).  
 
We give a brief description of the stages used in existing process models in Table 7.1. 
We note that different terminologies are used, though they all describe similar 
characteristics and tasks.  
 
Table 7.1 Process model terminologies 
Stage/Scholar(s) Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Das and Teng (2007) Formation Operation Outcome 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) Emergence Evolution Dissolution 
Saz-Carranza and Vernis (2006) Creation Functioning Ceassattion  
Fu et al, 2006 Launch committee Process 
analysis/design 
Deployment 
Pet and Dibrell (2001) Exploratory Recurrent 
/relational contract 
Outcome 
Nollet and Beaulieu (2003); 
D’Aunno and Zuckerman (1987); 
Johnson (1999) 
Birth Growth Maturity/ 
concentration 
Quinn and Cameron (1983) Entrepreneurial 
collectivity 
Formalisation and 
control 
Elaboration of 
structure 
Schotanus (2007) Informal group 
emergence 
Formal cooperative 
transition  
Cooperative 
maturity/ cross 
road 
 
The stages of collaboration development process have distinct characteristics, 
behaviours and tasks. In the table below, we summarize the various scholars’ views 
(based on Das and Teng, 2007; D’Aunno and Zuckerman, 1987; Fu et al., 2006; 
Johnson 1999; Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003; Pet and Dibrell, 2001; Quinn and Cameron, 
1983; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Saz-Carranza and Venis, 2006; Schotanus, 2007) 
 
Table 7.2 Characteristics and tasks of collaboration evolution stages 
Stage Characteristics Tasks 
Formation/ 
Emergence/ 
Exploratory 
· Calculated expectation of 
risk, inefficiency, and 
inequality 
· specific learning takes place 
· Partner Partners are 
unfamiliar to each other 
· Relatively more distrust 
· There is back and forth; tit-
for-tat risk taking reciprocal 
pendulum 
· Formal mechanisms more 
common  
· Trust, commitment, 
reciprocity, and dependence 
still low 
· Initiative of few entities 
setting up collaborative 
initiatives because of 
· Scan the environment like the laws and turbulence  
· Pre collaboration meetings of potential partners to 
understand each other  
· Establish preliminary contact 
· Mutual identification and appraisal 
· Check for similarities/differences in aims/mission 
· Begin implementing the agreement 
· Partners seek to negotiate the collaboration 
· Prospective partners indicate need to be together  
· Establish the collaboration procedures and values  
· Initiate trial and trust building initiatives, but avoid 
quick returns 
· Encourage more communication, more time 
together, create a sense of identity, and ensure 
respect to others. 
· Have a shared mechanism of interpretation 
· Progressively move from formality to informality 
· Pool some human and material assets 
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anticipated benefits 
 
· Put collaboration governance structures with 
sufficient power and control 
· Main emphasis: tentative discussions 
Operation/ 
Evolution/ 
Recurrent/ 
relational 
contract 
· May be smooth or conflict 
prone affair 
· Members get sure whether 
to proceed or not 
· Content learning takes place 
· Inter partner conflicts are 
common because of 
factionalism, differences in 
culture and strategic 
orientation  
· Mistakes are through 
commission rather than 
omission 
· There is a lot of 
housekeeping and learning 
· Relationship solidifies 
· Broader involvement of 
parties 
· Problems come up due to 
discovery of differences 
· The high market mode 
governance like bidding and 
contracting reduces the 
speed of building 
behavioural dimensions 
· Conditions in the 
environment make 
collaboration an attractive 
alternative 
· Implement contractually binding commitments 
· Translate contractual commitments into concrete 
reality 
· Discover partners that have exploratory intent 
rather than exploitative intent 
· Actual procurement process takes place 
· Have mechanisms to bridge partners, through e.g. 
teamwork 
· Formalize the informal loopholes to avoid 
opportunistic individuals 
· Continuous development/review of partner 
objectives 
· Develop technological/tactical agreements 
 
Outcome/ 
Dissolution 
· Collaboration can be 
stabilized/reformed/decline/t
erminated 
· Collaborative management 
learning takes place 
· Violation of equity/decrease 
in collective strength can be 
perceived 
· Competition among 
collaborative initiatives, and 
sometimes results into 
mergers. 
 
· Evaluate success/failure 
· Partners can try to handle even the negative 
outcomes through collection of errors 
· More strength in the collaboration 
· Involvement of legal procedures for termination 
· Offer rewards 
· Develop new skills, core competences and tacit 
knowledge to support the new change 
· Invest more/revisit/terminate 
 
Gaps in existing knowledge 
Despite the existing knowledge on the development of collaborations, we note that 
there are gaps in the existing knowledge on how to start and operate a horizontal 
purchasing collaborative initiative. We explain these gaps below.   
 
We find that apart from being developed in a developed countries perspective, with 
other successes and experiences in collaborations (Walker et al., 2003), the existing 
models may not reflect the actual unique procurement tasks and requirements in the 
Ugandan context. For instance, Fukuyama (1995) found out that trust in developing 
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countries is difficult to earn. Babbar et al. (2008) further suggest that partners in 
developing countries are seen as less cooperative and less reliable. We also note that 
compared to developed countries, there seems to be a dominance of individualism in 
African countries. People are more likely to think of themselves as independent with 
their groups (Triandis, 2002). Therefore, they tend to shy away from long term 
relationships (Hofstede and Bond, 1988). 
 
Based on the Lambert and Cooper (2000) framework, we argue that linking processes 
with each of the members of a purchasing collaborative may work in a well organised 
collaborative initiative, with a clear structure (known size and member relationships) 
and established management components (organisation, group resources, and supplier 
relationships). In developing countries like Uganda, the structure is not yet clear, there 
is no clear collaboration size in and relationships between the PDEs are not yet strong. 
In such circumstances, tasks for different stakeholders at different phases of 
collaboration need to be understood, so that in the absence of a clear structure, they 
are carried out.  
 
We acknowledge the contribution of D’Aunno and Zukerman (1987) and Spekman et 
al. (1998). Their emphasis was on key factors in the development of collaboration and 
they provided examples of tasks. We notice that the examples given are not 
exhaustive and are not classified according to various phases of collaboration. 
Classifying factors according to phases of collaboration is relevant to Ugandan 
collaborative initiatives which are relatively new and mainly in initial phases.  We 
also note that the existing literature does not explicitly explain the relative importance 
of different tasks at different phases of collaboration development. Different tasks are 
likely to be more important at different phases than the others (Jap, 2001; Wilson, 
1995). Therefore we find it important to fill this gap. 
 
We also note that whereas other models have emphasised on the process, they have 
only mentioned that stakeholders are important in collaboration (Jap, 2001). How they 
should help the collaboration, is an issue not explicitly handled. Spekman et al. (1998) 
provide an interesting discussion on the role of alliance manager. Their discussion is a 
good starting point for us, to go beyond acknowledging the importance of the alliance 
manager, to appreciating the importance of other stakeholders. Understanding 
stakeholders’ importance is not the same as knowing when to involve them, make the 
collaboration work, and make it a more generally acceptable philosophy. This is 
because stakeholders may be important in different degrees and at different times (Fu 
et al., 2006). Note that stakeholders’ involvement in a collaborative initiative is 
important in developing countries, since the individual PDEs are largely not capable 
of being self sufficient. For example, donors not only are limited to financing the 
PDEs at the beginning of horizontal purchasing collaboration, but also have to 
continue to monitor how their resources have been utilised. Therefore, the lack of 
clear understanding of which stakeholders are required at a specific phase of 
collaboration is a gap we seek to cover in this chapter. 
 
Horizontal purchasing collaboration may be attractive, but it is not simple or easy to 
create, develop, and support (Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003). There are several 
challenges that should be attended to at all the stages of collaboration. However, most 
research concentrate on the benefits of creating and enhancing long term 
relationships. The existing models about evolution of collaboration (Das and Teng, 
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2007; Fu et al., 2006; Saz-Carranza and Vernis, 2006) do not directly include 
challenges in their models.  We also note that whereas several authors have discussed 
challenges of collaboration (e.g. Schotanus, 2007), the context for developing 
countries like Uganda may be different, because most of the challenges of 
collaboration in developing countries tend to be associated with the individualistic 
culture and lack of clear understanding of horizontal purchasing collaboration. These 
challenges therefore should be understood in the developing world and the Ugandan 
perspective.  
 
We further note that the tasks, stakeholders and challenges may be very important for 
developing countries like Uganda, where planning is not well done, and therefore 
risking leaving out important tasks (Tumwine, 2006) and stakeholders like donors are 
sometimes ignored.  
 
7.4 Method 
 
In this section, we explain the method used. We use a case based research 
methodology, by use of focus group discussions. The purpose was to obtain a depth of 
understanding of the tasks required, the stakeholders to involve, and the challenges 
faced in establishing and operating a horizontal purchasing collaborative initiative in a 
developing country.  
 
The nature of our objectives is in line with this methodology (Yin 1994). Horizontal 
purchasing collaboration research in developing countries and specifically in Uganda 
is in the early stages with instances of unfamiliar situations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Voss, 
et al., 2002). The level of theoretical development is low as we did not come across 
any other research in this area in Uganda apart from the MBA and M.A theses of 
Kalinzi (2005) and Tumwine (2006) respectively. We did not want to be limited by 
questionnaires and models (Voss, et al., 2002), as we were more interested in new and 
creative insights and have a high validity with the ultimate users of the results; the 
practitioners, (see Section 2.2 on the rigour-relevance debate).  
 
Choice of focus group technique to collect data 
A focus group is a group of individuals selected and assembled by researchers to 
discuss and comment upon, from personal experience, the topic that is the subject of 
the research (Gibbs, 1997). According to Zikmund (1997), the focus group technique 
has several advantages: synergy, snowballing, serendipity, stimulation, security, 
spontaneity, specialization, structure, speed, and scrutiny.  
 
With a focus group, the nature of interaction enables the group to produce insights 
that would be less accessible without the interaction (Morgan, 1988). We found the 
focus group technique useful because in addition to investigating what procurement 
officers (the participants) think, we also uncovered why they think as they do. 
Participants would explain to the group why they hold their views, would be 
questioned by fellow participants and sometimes challenged. In the process, we were 
able to explore and record the responses that were pertinent in answering our research 
objectives. 
We were able to clarify responses and have had the opportunity for follow up 
questions and to probe responses. The synergistic effect on the group setting resulted 
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in data that might not have been uncovered in individual based data collection 
methods. 
  
Size of focus groups  
We considered the literature on the size of a focus group to make this decision. Small 
groups of less than four participants may not reap the benefits of synergy and besides, 
the participants may be sensitive to dynamics among the participants (Morgan, 1988). 
On the other hand, larger groups may be harder to control and may develop subgroups 
within the group (Strokes and Bergin, 2006; Walker, 1985). According to the 
literature (Morgan, 1988; Saunders et al., 2003; Walker, 1985), an ideal group size 
ranges between four to twelve participants. For our research, we took the size of ten 
participants per focus group.  
 
Number of focus groups 
Focus group sessions can be regarded as cases (Berkowitz, 1996). Case studies do not 
need to have a minimum number of cases or to randomly “select” cases. The 
researcher is called upon to work with the situation that presents itself in each case 
(Tellis, 1997). Case studies can be single or multiple designs. Where a multiple design 
is used, it must follow a replication rather than sampling logic (Yin, 2004). Yin 
further pointed out that the generation of results, from either single or multiple 
designs, is made to theory and not to populations.  
 
Based on the arguments above, we considered eight cases, with carefully constituted 
members that represented all the PDEs in Uganda. These were within the 
recommended range of cases that goes up to fifteen (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Perry, 1998).  
 
Population and sample 
All the 80 participants were procurement officers in Ugandan PDEs. We ensured a 
relative equal representation from the different central government PDEs as shown in 
Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 Selected participants 
Category of central 
government 
Number of PDEs Number of selected participants 
Commission 14 10 
Hospital 12 8 
Ministry 25 17 
Parastatal 64 45 
Total 115 80 
 
The participants were practicing procurement officers in the PDEs, who were also 
undertaking academic studies in the Master of Science Purchasing and Supply Chain 
Management class at Makerere University. These participants have all had an 
experience within purchasing collaboration. Apart from six officers who had 
experience in purchasing collaboration for three years, the rest had over five years of 
experience. All these officers have a professional qualification (MCIPS). Eight focus 
discussion groups were formed, each one with participants from each of the identified 
categories in Table 7.3. 
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Meetings to discuss how to start and operate a horizontal purchasing collaboration 
initiative were guided by the researcher. Four sessions per group were held. The 
session would go on for about two to three hours, until additional data and ideas no 
longer added to the issue being discussed (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shenhar 1998).  
 
Validity of the research 
Validity in quantitative research refers to whether a given construct measures what it 
purports to measure. Here validity encompasses a broader concern for whether the 
conclusions being drawn from the data are credible, defensible, warranted, and able to 
withstand alternative explanations. We used a multiple case design, which is an 
important source of validity of qualitative research (McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993; 
Yin, 1989). This ensures that the data is valid. 
 
We always shared emerging catch words and conclusions from the focus group 
discussion sessions with the members of the group. We would ensure they agree with 
the summary. Sometimes they would help rephrase ours. This according to Yin (1994) 
improved the construct validity. 
 
Reliability of the research 
We ensured that we had key themes for the focus group discussions. These were:  
· Tasks at different collaboration stages; 
· The stakeholders to involve at each stage; 
· The challenges at these stages 
· The model.  
 
These themes created some standard, to ensure that the discussions did not go beyond 
the expected limits of discussions. We also tried to encourage involvement of all 
participants to avoid the large group effect, especially where certain participants 
would try to dominate the discussion (Saunders, et al., 2003) or others would keep 
quiet for long. Thus responses were attributed to the whole group, not a few 
participants. 
 
Matrix displays and tables were used to analyse the data as recommended in 
qualitative research designs (Miles and Huberman, 1984, 1994). We added quotes 
from discussions to add qualitative insights. All these added to the soundness of the 
research. 
 
Data analysis  
Unlike in quantitative analysis, where numbers and what they stand for are the 
material of analysis, the qualitative analysis deals in words and is guided by fewer 
universal rules and standardized procedures than statistical analysis.  
We have few agreed-on canons for qualitative data analysis, in the sense of 
shared ground rules for drawing conclusions and verifying their sturdiness 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), qualitative data analysis consists of three 
concurrent activities:  
· Data reduction;  
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· Data display; 
· Conclusion drawing and verification.  
Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, 
and transforming the data. This makes data manageable. Some focus group 
participants had a number of interesting things to say about the presentations, but 
remarks that only tangentially related to the issue of suitability were left out. 
Data display involves organising, compressing, and assembling of information to 
easily understand configuration to make conclusion. A display can be an extended 
piece of text or a diagram, chart, or matrix that provides a new way of arranging and 
thinking about the more textually embedded data. We used matrices to display data. 
By determining the frequency of support by focus groups on issues that were being 
investigated (Batonda and Perry, 2003), we were able to draw meaningful 
conclusions. 
Conclusion drawing and verification involve the extraction of meaning from 
displayed data by noting regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configurations, 
and propositions. We were able to extract meaning from the tables and charts to 
derive conclusions for our research objectives. 
Similar studies in collaboration development (e.g. Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003) have 
used Miles and Huberman (1994) approach to analyse data. According to Miles and 
Huberman (1994), the above three aspects make up the general domain called 
“analysis”. These are detailed in the subsequent sections. 
 
7.5 Results 
 
In this section, we explain the results of the study on gaps in the existing knowledge 
in the tasks required, the likely challenges, and the stakeholders to involve in starting 
and operating a horizontal purchasing collaborative initiative.  
 
We reduced the discussions from the focus groups using the matrix table method 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994).  We summarised all the tasks identified during the focus 
group discussions, tabulated them and scored them. To appreciate the relative 
importance according to our study, we present the tasks according to percentage of 
score. The first table (Table 7.4) describes the tasks required in starting and operating 
a horizontal purchasing collaboration in Ugandan PDEs. 
 
Table 7.4 Tasks identified in the focus group discussions 
Stage Tasks Score 
(%) 
Emergence Check values of other entities 100 
 Instil collaboration and make a philosophy of collaboration / norms 100 
 Analysis of procurement laws/procedures & set general guidelines/manual 87.5 
 Establish preliminary contact 75 
 Capacity building 62.5 
 Work on initial contradictions 62.5 
 Set working guidelines 62.5 
 Identify potential partners 62.5 
 Put structures – purchasing committee 62.5 
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Stage Tasks Score 
(%) 
 Create sense of identity 62.5 
 Frequent meetings 62.5 
 Team building efforts 62.5 
 ICT communication/website 62.5 
 Search evidence from other sources 50 
 Unified understanding & interpretation 37.5 
 Sign memorandum of understanding  37.5 
 Trial collaborations 37.5 
 Contact stakeholders 25 
 Avoid quick returns 25 
Operation Face to face interactions and frequent meetings 87.5 
 Increase interpersonal interaction 75 
 ICT mechanism/website 75 
 Attend to peripheral issues 62.5 
 Be fair to all parties 62.5 
 Implementation of tactical agreements 62.5 
 Set specific purchasing guidelines 50 
 Strong communication system 50 
 Meet appointments 37.5 
 Sensitization on stage one outcomes 25 
 Consolidate processes 25 
 Allocate resources well 25 
 Translate contractual commitments into action 25 
 Discover partners with wrong intentions 25 
 Readjust agreements  25 
Outcome Recognize failure and or success 75 
 Correct previous errors 75 
 Develop new strategies and strengths 75 
 Shift from formality to informality 62.5 
 ICT mechanism/website 62.5 
 Gain more competency 37.5 
 For failure terminate  37.5 
 Develop new skills 25 
 Handle unforeseen situations well 25 
The total percentage indicates how often each challenge was suggested by the focus groups. 
Note that these percentages are not meant to be precise measures of importance, because the focus 
group discussions were part of a search for meaning, rather than part of a statistical survey. Besides, in 
qualitative research, the numbers and what they stand for is not the key for analysis (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) 
From the results, the most identified tasks are about ensuring that values and norms 
and philosophy of the collaborative initiative are strengthened, and are scored higher 
at the emergence phase. On the other hand, operational tasks are scored relatively low. 
These have a lot to do with sustenance of the collaborative initiative.  
Table 7.5 describes the likely challenges in starting and operating a horizontal 
purchasing collaboration model. 
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Table 7.5 Likely challenges in implementing the model 
Challenge Reason/cause Score 
(%) 
Resistance to change Fear of the unknown 
Worries about job security 
Used to their style of work 
Reducing their income 
Reduced recognition 
Fear big work challenges 
Fear of “working with the enemy” 
Big entities feel they are big enough and can enjoy benefits of 
collaboration alone 
Suppliers do not wish to deal with a consortium, because it would 
force them to be efficient and loose money  
100 
Dependency on a 
few key entities 
 100 
Lack of trust  87.5 
Bureaucracy in first 
stages 
Many parties may not have same understanding 75 
Opportunistic 
behaviours 
Selfishness 75 
Lack of commitment  75 
Communication 
problems 
Because of the big structure 75 
Limited experience Big tenders may be beyond capacities  62.5 
Accountability/ 
responsibility 
Collaboration involves group accountability, with “I do not care” 
attitude 
62.5 
Differing needs Some entities do not largely use related supplies/services/works 62.5 
Elimination of low 
value suppliers 
Purchases will be in large quantities 62.5 
Risk of failure of 
supply: may affect 
many entities 
Keeping all eggs in one basket 62.5 
Political interference Politicians want to individually keep in control of individual entities 62.5 
Conflict of interests  32.8 
Staff loyalty: to non 
supervisors but who 
head collaboration 
 32.8 
No enabling law No clear provisions in the current PPDA Act 2003 32.8 
Longer lead times Most suppliers are small and do not have enough for combined 
purchases 
32.8 
Reduced flexibility Many parties interests have to be addressed even if the decision is 
need soon 
32.8 
Difficulty in contract 
management 
Many parties involved may lead to weak follow-up systems  25 
Differing sizes of 
entities 
 25 
High set up costs  25 
Loss of suppliers They all can not win tenders in a combined tendering system 12.5 
Large collaborations May cause monopolistic conditions 12.5 
The total percentage indicates how often each challenge was suggested by the focus groups. 
These percentages are not meant to be precise measures of importance, because the focus group 
discussions were part of a search for meaning, rather than part of a statistical survey. 
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Resistance to change is the most scored challenge in collaborative initiatives. 
Dependence and lack of trust also have high scores. We note that the behavioural 
issues are a major challenge, relative to operational challenges. Improvement on trust, 
commitment, dependence, and reciprocity could be one way of reducing this 
challenge. We discuss this in more detail in Chapter 8. 
 
Table 7.6 describes the stakeholders who should be involved in designing a horizontal 
purchasing collaboration model. 
 
Table 7.6 Stakeholders to be consulted at the different stages 
Stage Stakeholder Reason Score 
(%) 
Emergence PPDA Overseer of procurement activities 
Initiates revisions in law 
In better position to sensitise others 
100 
 Donors They need to know how their money is to be spent 
Capacity building 
100 
 Ministry of 
Finance 
Controls government budget 
Have financial experts 
62.5 
 Suppliers/ 
private sector 
Can be affected by decisions, and delay or fail to supply 62.5 
 Cabinet Originates policy 62.5 
 Procurement 
related staff 
Have expertise on operations 62.5 
 Heads of 
entities 
They should agree because they commit resources 62.5 
 Coordination 
committee 
Liase with relevant stakeholders 62.5 
Operation Procurement 
related staff 
They carry out the operations 
Need to develop skills 
100 
 Technical 
PDEs 
They offer technical advice 87.5 
 PPDA They supervise operational activities 
Can authoritatively sensitise 
62.5 
 Suppliers They need to also collaborate on supplying the combined big 
tenders 
To appreciate the changes 
62.5 
 Donors They need to know how their money is being spent 62.5 
 Members of 
parliament  
They are civic leaders, they need to account for public 
expenditure to their constituents  
62.5 
 Heads of 
entities 
Responsible for overall management of operations 62.5 
 Coordination 
committee 
Liaise with other stakeholders 62.5 
Outcome PPDA They need to confirm successes or failures  
To know quality/ level of execution 
100 
 Ministry of 
Finance 
Responsible for future improvements and correction of 
identified errors 
100 
 Donors They need to know how their money was spent 
More future funding  
62.5 
 Users They provide feedback 
Can suggest changes to improve 
62.5 
 Coordination 
committee 
Get feedback on its own performance 62.5 
The total percentage indicates how often each reason was suggested by the focus groups. 
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These percentages are not meant to be precise measures of importance, because the focus group 
discussions were part of a search for meaning, rather than part of a statistical survey. 
 
We note from the analysis above that donors are important stakeholders in 
collaborative initiatives. This may be more relevant for public entities in developing 
countries that largely depend on donor support. For example, more than half of the 
Ugandan budget is supported by donors (GOU Report, 2008). 
 
To design a horizontal purchasing collaboration model 
In the first sections, we aimed at investigating the attributes necessary for a horizontal 
purchasing collaboration model. In this section, we use these findings to design a 
horizontal purchasing collaboration for Ugandan PDEs. The model takes care of 
dynamic processes involved in collaboration (Anderson et al., 1984; Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1995). The block arrows show that collaboration is a process, but the 
ordinary arrows show that the process is back and forth. 
 
Since the findings are based on practitioners’ findings as well as literature, this model 
will be useful in managerial planning and decision making process in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration, which is needed in developing countries like Uganda 
(Turyatunga, 2008). The model is presented in Figure 7.2. 
 
 
Fig. 7.2 Challenges, tasks, and stakeholders for horizontal purchasing collaboration 
 
Emergence 
· Check values of others 
· Instil collaboration 
philosophy/norms 
· Make preliminary contacts 
· Harmonise laws/procedures 
· Build capacity 
· Harmonise initial contradictions 
· Set working guidelines/manual 
· Get more potential partners 
· Set structures/committee 
· Create sense of identity 
· Use frequent meetings 
· Work on team building  
· Create ICT communication/website 
· Find potential partners 
· Create sense of identity 
Operation 
· Face to face interactions and 
frequent meeting 
· ICT mechanism/website 
· Increase interpersonal 
interaction 
· Attend to peripheral issues 
· Be fair to all parties 
· Implementation of tactical 
agreements 
Outcome 
· Correct previous errors 
· Recognize failure and or success 
· Develop new strategies and 
strengths 
· Shift from formality to 
informality 
· ICT mechanism/website 
Stakeholders 
· PPDA 
· MOFPED 
· Donors 
· Suppliers/private sector 
· Cabinet 
· Procurement related staff 
· Heads of entities 
· Coordination committee 
Stakeholders 
· PPDA 
· Suppliers 
· Donors 
· Technical PDEs 
· Parliament 
· Procurement related staff 
· Heads of entities 
· Coordination committee 
Stakeholders 
· PPDA 
· Donors 
· Users 
· MFPED 
· Coordination committee 
Challenges to consider during collaboration 
Resistance to change lack of trust; conflict of interest, bureaucracy; dependency of a few entities; limited experience; 
opportunistic behaviours; accountability/responsibility; differing needs; difficulty in contract management; elimination of 
low value suppliers; risk of failure of supply; lack of commitment; differing sizes; staff loyalty; political interference; no 
enabling law; high set up costs; longer lead times; communication problems; reduced flexibility; loss of suppliers; large 
collaborations 
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7.6 Discussion and practical implications 
 
From our goal, which is to fill in the missing elements specific to the developing 
countries context in starting and operating a collaborative initiative process, we get 
interesting insights. The missing elements specific to the developing countries context 
are: 
· The importance of improving behavioural factors; 
· The importance of donors as stakeholders; 
· The importance of handling negative issues in collaboration as they come up; 
· The importance of face to face interactions and frequent meetings. 
  
These elements are discussed in the rest of this section.  
 
 
The importance of improving behavioural factors 
At the emergence stage, the tasks that are rated highly are “checking values of other 
entities” and “making a philosophy of collaboration norms” The following quotation 
from one of the focus groups seems to make these tasks clear: 
 
“To ensure the success of horizontal purchasing collaboration, PDEs 
intending to take part, must share a lot in common in their procurement needs, 
and be of the same mission. 
There is need to create a knowledge base, a critical mass in collaboration to 
give the horizontal purchasing collaboration “energy” to go through the likely 
challenges. All stakeholders should be fully convinced that collaborating is the 
way to go, whatever it takes.” 
 
This is in agreement with Hoffmann and Schlosser (2001) who noted that agreement 
on clear and realistic objectives for the initial phase is very important for 
collaboration. Hoffmann and Schlosser further noted that objectives assure concrete 
steps for implementation and early success, advancing development of the 
collaboration. 
 
A practice of togetherness should progressively emerge. A way of talking, sharing 
resources and ideas should be part of the practice in the initial days of the 
collaboration. The following quotation from one of the members puts this in 
perspective: 
 
“Working together should be obvious, familiarity with each other, the 
excitements to have collaboration succeed, plus inside jokes and laughter 
should accompany horizontal purchasing collaboration practices and 
meetings.” 
 
Collaboration norms and values are also highly supported by all the focus groups, 
because some of the PDEs have their individual orientations which may hinder 
collaboration efforts. One quotation from the discussions makes a reference to this: 
 
“To ensure the success of horizontal purchasing collaboration, all 
participating PDEs come to a central understanding, put off their differences 
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and work in a common direction to make their collaborative purchasing a 
success. Participating entities should put forward their views. Consensus is 
vital among all PDEs if mutuality is to be achieved” 
 
We note that in developing countries like Uganda, there seems to be an inherent lack 
of consensus in most public decisions (GOU Report, 2008). An example is the 
parliamentary records, where about 20 percent of the decisions taken are after the 
members have expressed disgruntlement. In some cases, the opposing members move 
out. This unique situation for Uganda makes consensus management an important 
dimension for survival of voluntary collaborative initiatives in Uganda and other 
developing countries. 
 
 
The importance of face to face interactions and frequent meetings  
At the operation stage, “face to face interactions and frequent meetings” comes out 
clearly from all focus groups. Face to face interactions and frequency of meetings 
create a high degree of positive feelings towards each other. As Hutt et al. (2000) put 
it, collaborations fail to meet expectations because little attention is given to nurturing 
the close working relationships and interpersonal connections that unite the 
collaborating entities. This is one way of building trust, which is necessary during the 
emergence stage of collaboration. Several meetings could be arranged, both official 
and unofficial. One of the focus groups made the following observation: 
 
“Pre collaboration meetings involving members of contracts committees, 
heads of user departments, technical departments, accounting officers from 
various PDEs would be necessary in the beginning, perhaps on a monthly 
basis to check for their similarities/differences in aims and objectives. 
Through these meetings, partners would encourage more communication and 
create a sense of identity in the collaboration. These meetings would put up 
collaborative governance structures with sufficient power and control and 
create a shared mechanism of interpretation. Top managers of PDEs should 
be fully involved in all arrangements. If possible, procurement related staff 
should be part of top level meetings. The top support from the “board room” 
is much needed. These informal and formal meetings would instil the virtue of 
togetherness in the PDEs.” 
 
Contextualising the argument of face to face interactions, we find that unlike in 
developed countries where even if there are no face to face physical contacts, 
collaborative initiatives can use technology like video conference facilities, this 
technology largely lacks in developing countries and its adaptation is not always 
realised. To the best of our knowledge, video conferencing systems were installed in 
three PDEs, and still, the systems were not being used for procurement related 
activities. Therefore, in the absence of technological systems to increase the level of 
interactions, developing countries should increase on level of meetings; formally and 
informally. We also note that a face to face interaction is hampered by lack of 
attendance of meetings. In Uganda, attendance of meetings by public officers is still 
wanting (GOU Report, 2008). It is reported that public officers do not attend and 
worse still do not always send representatives to attend on their behalf. This reduces 
on the level of interactions, which is important for collaboration. 
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We note that most tasks are concentrated at the emergence stage. Emergence, 
operation and outcome phases have 54%, 25% and 21% of the tasks. We therefore 
derive that the initial stage of horizontal purchasing collaboration requires more 
different efforts than the last phases. Hoffmann and Schlosser (2001), though on a 
different dimension on critical factors (not tasks), found out that critical success 
factors are concentrated in the early stages of alliance evolution, making it evident 
that systematic preparation and careful planning are important for collaboration 
success. This was also the view of Jap (2001) and Wilson (1995), who emphasized 
that of all the stages of collaboration, the first stage is most important, especially in 
the creation of trust. The collaboration must be carefully planned at the beginning, so 
that it has the momentum to proceed through the next stages.  
 
We did not find differences between the developed countries and developing countries 
regarding the high number of tasks at the emergence stage. This emphasizes that the 
emergence stage is important in setting up a collaborative initiative, in both developed 
and developing countries. From this finding, we argue that managers of collaborative 
initiatives should allocate more resources to a collaborative initiative at the emergence 
stage, even when they have not yet got the assurance that the collaboration will work 
out.  
 
The importance of handling negative issues in collaboration as they come up 
At the outcome stage, the task emphasized is to “correct previous errors”. In the 
collaboration, errors and misunderstandings which could have come up, should be 
amicably corrected. This finding is relevant to Uganda, as noted by Tumwine (2006), 
that Ugandan managers tend to leave complaints unresolved for long and end up in 
crises. Errors should be corrected as they come up and should be considered as 
learning points. The members of the collaborative initiative should avoid making 
them in the next round of dealings. 
 
The challenges most identified are: 
· Resistance to change;  
· Dependency on a few key entities; 
· Lack of trust; 
· Communication problems; 
· Lack of commitment; 
· Opportunistic behaviours; 
· Bureaucracy in first stages; 
· Limited experience; 
· Accountability / responsibility; 
· Elimination of low value suppliers; 
· Risk of failure of supply: may affect many entities and political 
interference. 
 
Resistance to change is highly identified because of fear of the unknown as a result of 
lack of trust in the future dealings. This requires improvement of the behavioural 
factors. This is dealt with in Chapter 8. 
 
The following quotations from the focus group discussions seem to put the challenge 
of resistance to change: 
 
 
125
 
“Stakeholders may not easily allow change because of differing values. Some 
of the heads of PDEs are driven by personal interests and are not driven by 
the organisational interests. 
Resistance to change can take a variety of forms and reasons. There might be 
an internal belief a collaboration could not know the entities’ business well 
enough to make the right decision; there might be a fear of intellectual 
property and or confidential information loss; there might be a fear of 
“working with the enemy”; there might be a belief that the entity’s volume is 
already so large and so well leveraged that a collaboration will not be able to 
bring any additional value especially for big entities.” 
 
Dependency on a few key entities was also a major challenge. Some entities like the 
Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Works do a lot for other 
small entities through drafting and advising on the contracts, provision of expertise in 
unique purchases, and other areas. These may perceive less benefits if reciprocation is 
not explicit. All these challenges need to be identified in the model, so that a 
mechanism to mitigate them is devised, for the model to work well. 
 
The importance of donors as stakeholders 
Donors are most supported at the emergence stage because they provide resources, 
and must be sure of the method that will be used to utilise them. Besides, they need to 
be fully involved as a way to convince them to provide more resources. 
 
At all the three stages, we note that PPDA is a key stakeholder, which must be 
involved. It is most supported at the emergence stage, because it oversees 
procurement activities, initiates revisions in law, and it is in better position to sensitise 
others and outcomes. At the outcome stage, the PPDA comes in because it is the 
regulatory body to evaluate the performance of the purchasing activities in the 
collaboration.  
 
The procurement related staff, especially the procurement and disposal unit staff, 
contract committee members, accounting officers, evaluation committee members, 
and the accounts staff that deal with procurement are vital to a less extent at the 
emergence, but to a large extent at the operation stage. This is because they are 
responsible for implementing the decisions of the collaboration. They also need to 
learn through being involved. 
 
The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development is also a key 
stakeholder. It controls the overall procurement budget. In Uganda, it has a pool of 
financial and procurement experts. It makes policy which a horizontal purchasing 
collaboration requires. As earlier suggested by Mitchell et al. (1997), power and 
legitimacy are the core attributes of stakeholder identification typology. All the 
stakeholders that score highly in our study (Ministry of Finance, PPDA, Procurement 
related staff), have both power and legitimacy. 
 
We note that unlike the tasks considered above, where more of the emphasis is put on 
emergence, for stakeholders, equal emphasis is required at both the emergence and 
operation stages. We also note that whereas the stakeholders are important for 
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collaborative initiatives at all the stages, the task of contacting them is not seen as key. 
Contacting stakeholders is least scored, an indication that even when they are 
important, other actions like harmonizing values of different stakeholders and 
ensuring they have the same collaboration philosophy seem to be more emphasised 
tasks than contacting stakeholders.  
 
7.7 Limitations 
 
We were aware of the general criticism of case study/focused group discussion 
design. It does not apply adequate rigour. Bias may not be easily avoided in the 
analysis and derivation of theory/model (Amaratunga and Baldry, 2001). We took 
extra care to minimise the effect of such limitations to our findings. 
 
Our judgements were largely objective. We would pick up a theme that came up from 
several focused group discussions. Because of the attendance of the researcher in all 
the sessions, it was easy to analytically conclude that the issue had become prevalent 
in all the discussions and therefore pick it up. We avoided feelings and emotions that 
we had preconceived, by accepting facts the way they evolved. We did not “fight 
data”.  
 
The use of eight objectively constituted focus group discussions did not only ensure 
replication (Yin, 2004), but also ensured manageability of the data. These are 
important steps to ensure validity of research findings in focused group discussion/ 
case study designs (Yin, 1994). This argument is further supported by Miles and 
Huberman (1994): 
 
“One can not ordinarily follow how a researcher got from 3.600 pages of field 
notes to the final conclusions, sprinkled with vivid quotes though they may 
be”. 
 
As suggested by scholars for such studies (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
McCutcheon and Meredith 1993), we did not select the focus group discussions 
according to statistical reasons, but to relevance. It is therefore important to note that 
our model building does not necessarily follow the traditional scientific statistical 
generalisation (Yin 1994), but rather should be to analytical generalisation. 
 
Finally, we developed our model without directly using previously developed models 
for developed countries. In other words, we did not check whether an existing model 
fits with the Ugandan context, but we started developing a new model from scratch. 
After developing this new model, we compared the outcomes of the new model with 
existing models. We did this to be able to purely check (the respondents were not 
influenced by previous results from developed countries) whether a model developed 
in a developing country has other (new) actions than models developed in developed 
countries. A disadvantage of our method is that we could not check whether actions 
that were not mentioned are not important in the developing country context or that 
the respondents simply did not think of it. This leaves an interesting opportunity for 
further research.  
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7.8 Conclusions 
 
We found out that at the emergence stage, there is a need to have a critical minimum 
effort to support future operations. We argue that it is even more necessary in 
developing countries and specifically in the Ugandan context where business 
associations mainly fail at the initial phase (Turyatunga, 2008), to pay sufficient 
attention to the emergence stage.  
 
We also note that different stakeholders should be involved in the collaboration 
process. We further note that the correct choice of which stakeholders to involve at 
the different three stages should be properly made. Omitting an important stakeholder 
may have adverse effects to the process. We state that the developed countries based 
literature does not seem to emphasize the importance of donors as key stakeholders. 
This may be because the developing countries do not use donor aid. We argue that 
donors should be involved in collaboration structures in the developing countries, 
since they contribute a lot. They need to follow up on the performance of their aid. 
 
Existing literature recognises the importance of information and communication 
technology as a means of improving trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence 
in the collaboration. However, we note that this may not be applicable to the 
developing countries like Uganda where this technology is inadequate and sometimes 
non existent. We argue that physical interactions should be increasingly used in 
developing countries. The fact that the adoption and use of even the available 
information and communications technology is not yet appreciated by the workers 
(Turyatunga, 2008) further justifies our argument. 
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Chapter 8 – Improving behavioural factors 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 7, we aimed at filling in the gaps in existing collaborative initiative 
models. These gaps were related to the tasks, the challenges, and the stakeholders that 
are specific to developing countries. We then derived a model to guide in starting and 
or sustaining a horizontal purchasing collaborative initiative, in the developing 
countries’ context. 
 
The results of Chapter 7 show that the most important tasks in collaboration are about 
values, norms, and philosophy of collaborating. We noted that these tasks have a lot to 
do with trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence.  
 
From Chapter 7, we also note that the given reasons for the challenge of resistance to 
change are mainly about fear of the unknown and worries about the future operations 
between the PDEs. These may be mitigated by improving the level of trust, 
commitment, reciprocity, and dependence. Consequently, suggesting actions to 
improve these behavioural factors is important. These actions fit with our goal of 
applying the understanding from our study to start and or enhance horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in developing countries (Uganda). 
 
In this chapter, we link actions to the behavioural factors and discuss how the 
behavioural factors can be improved based on the literature. We call this result the 
‘guidance’. Next, we empirically check the relevance of the guidance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.1 Research outline 
 
 
8.2 Objective  
 
Many have spoken about having trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence, 
instead of speaking about building them (Karlsen et al., 2006; Varheim et al., 2008; 
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Varheim, 2009). For example, the literature on trust development seems to portray 
behavioural attributes as situations that just result out of circumstances and are not 
planned for and developed (Nguyen and Rose, 2009).  
 
Based on theory and our study findings, we suggest a practical approach and key 
actions for handling horizontal purchasing collaboration. According to the model we 
developed in the previous chapters (see Chapter 6), the level of benefits of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration is influenced by the level of collaboration and the 
behavioural factors, we aim at suggesting ways based on the literature and our 
previous findings (see Chapter 7) to improve these factors. Once these factors 
improve, the level of collaboration and the related benefits are also likely to improve. 
 
We aim at developing and empirically testing guidance on how to handle horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. The guidance includes a practical approach and key actions 
for improving behavioural factors for horizontal purchasing collaboration. As Gadde 
and Hakansson (2001) suggested, we go further than the survey, and make our 
research context-specific to explore apparent truths (Christopher and Juttner, 2000).  
8.3 Literature review 
 
In our literature review, we use three theories from which we derive the actions we 
suggest that should be taken to improve behavioural factors in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration. Note that there are several theories that can be used to explain how to 
improve behavioural factors. However, several authors in the area of purchasing 
collaboration (Ingram and Roberts, 2000; Khalfan et al., 2007; Lawler, 2001; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Nguyen and Rose, 2009; Scott, 1995; Werner, 2008) 
have used social exchange theory, institutional theory, and resource dependence 
theory. Below, we shortly describe the theories. In the rest of this section, we discuss 
the actions derived from these theories.  
 
Social exchange theory 
Social exchange theory is about a joint activity with at least two parties and each party 
has something the other values (Lawler, 2001). We explain this theory in detail in 
Section 3.2. 
 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory suggests that in order to survive, organisations should conform to 
the rules and belief systems prevailing in the environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Scott, 1995). The theory focuses on the deeper aspects of social structure and 
provides guidelines for social behaviour. We explain this theory in detail in Section 
3.2. 
 
Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory is based on the premise that the control over critical 
resources of one focal organisation is the most important determinant of 
organisational behaviour (Werner, 2008). We explain this theory in detail in Section 
3.2. 
 
How to improve behavioural factors based on social exchange theory 
Long term orientation 
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According to Anderson and Weitz (1992), to have a lower level of opportunism and 
develop trust, a long term orientation should be adopted. Collaborating entities should 
have the same long term vision. Long term goals should be aligned, as Braendshoi 
(2001) argues, that the willingness to take risk by partners may be an indicator of 
aligned goals. PDEs in horizontal purchasing collaboration initiatives should have a 
long term orientation towards their relationships. This enables development of 
personal relationships among personnel in the PDEs (Khalfan et al., 2007). This will 
increase trust and commitment among the PDEs. However, PDEs should note that 
developing long term relationships requires a long period of time for partners (PDEs) 
to appreciate each other. 
Friendship 
Friendship leads to trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence. It was noted by 
Handy (1995) that trust needs touch and commitment requires personal contact and 
friendship to make it real. Individuals within PDEs should work together and share 
leisure time. Based on Khalfan et al. (2007), people in collaborating organisations will 
tend to trust people rather than the organisation. Corporate sports competitions 
between the PDEs can be one way to ensure friendships. Borrowing from Khalfan’s 
suggestion, we argue that friendships will make procurement related personnel in 
PDEs consider feelings of those in other PDEs before taking decisions. However, we 
warn PDEs to avoid free riding issues that may be encouraged through friendship 
especially in the initial times of horizontal purchasing collaboration (Ingram and 
Roberts, 2000). 
 
Loyalty 
We note from our research that the collaboration initiatives in Ugandan PDEs are still 
relatively new. They are prone to breakages. They need to be protected and built up. 
Loyalty will contribute to this aspect. This will go further to build trust and 
commitment. Once loyalty is strong, as Pesamaa and Hair Jr (2007) say, opportunism 
and selfishness, which we noticed in our findings in Chapter 4, will reduce. Loyalty 
will ensure that PDEs in horizontal purchasing collaboration “save face” to avoid 
conflicts and always seek to find mutually beneficial solutions. 
 
Shared goals 
According to the social exchange theory, trust between parties develops through 
regular discharge of obligations and through gradual expansion of exchanges (Lawler, 
2001; Lazonick, 1990). The regular discharge of obligations invoke an obligation of 
the other party to return the favour (Nguyen and Rose, 2009), which develops 
reciprocity.  
 
According to Khalfan et al. (2007), every member in a collaborative initiative should 
be seen to be fulfilling a joint task, rather than viewing their own role as separate from 
the rest. We also note that the challenge to building trust is about creating dialogue 
necessary to create a shared future (Holton, 2001). The frequent and meaning 
interaction encourages open sharing of goals and insights (Holton, 2001; Quinn et al., 
1996). We noted division of tasks in collaborative initiatives. We noted that PDEs 
have different goals. This can also be demonstrated by the diverging mission 
statements for the PDEs. There is need to have a dialogue that aims at having shared 
goals, or at least each PDE being aware of the goals of the others. 
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Whereas it is logical that each entity will come to collaboration with a set of motives, 
values and needs, efforts should be made to progressively make these entities shift 
their individual philosophies to the general one, shared largely by all, to have a shared 
and consistent knowledge base (Braendshoi, 2001). One way to do this is for them to 
align their operations to those of the collaborating PDEs. For example, they can 
standardize specifications for routine products. We found out that specifications for 
even routine products like stationery differ in different PDEs. 
 
Reasonable behaviour 
Reasonable behaviour, based on Khalfan et al. (2007) is about understanding what 
others understand as reasonable. Khalfan et al. suggest that members in collaboration 
should behave professionally. 
 
We noted that some procurement officers while meeting others in collaborating PDEs 
tend to be confrontational. For example, in one of the PDEs, the procurement officer 
expected to be instantly assisted by the technical procurement officer in the other 
PDE. The issue was about specifications and terminologies one of the suppliers had 
used (we noted this is a common problem for drugs that have different names yet they 
are the same in composition and purpose). This took over a week for the procurement 
officer in the National Drug Authority to confirm and advise. This was perceived as 
an intended and unnecessary delay, leading to confrontational scenes. We suggest 
PDEs should be more patient and appreciate the speed with which a collaborating 
PDE works.  
 
Do more than expected 
We found out that some PDEs do exactly or less than what is expected of them. PDEs 
in horizontal purchasing collaboration should do more than their usual expectation to 
each other. This has been supported by literature on developing trust (Khalfan et al., 
2007); that trust emerges when peoples’ expectations from actions of others in the 
relationship are met or exceeded. This increases the level of reciprocity, and creates a 
sense of security as a PDE which has got more service than it expected feels a sense 
of dependence on the others.  
 
PDEs should have a practice to reciprocate. A PDE should appreciate that once it goes 
an extra step to help others, this will be its “mutual insurance” against its own future 
gaps that require intervention of other PDEs. As Miller and Whitford (2002) stated, a 
more successful hunter shared the results of the hunt with those who proved less 
successful.  
 
Informality 
Whereas it is good to have formal structures and operations, PDEs should equally 
have informal ones. Each PDE should know its responsibilities with little reference to 
the contract. As Khalfan et al. (2007) say, the contract should be put on one aside to 
work on developing trusting relationships. They further argue that there is no need to 
refer to the contract all the time. For example, there was no initial contract for 
horizontal purchasing collaboration between the university PDEs considered in the 
study, but the collaboration went well and rolled over to even purchases of items that 
were not under the original project. As Nguyen and Rose (2009) argue, PDEs should 
establish personal rapport with each other, which leads to a perceived sense of 
personal bonding, identification and attachment. This develops trust and commitment. 
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Familiarity 
We note that the PDEs are not yet close to each other to the level that is required to 
develop trust. For example to contact the procurement personnel in the Ministry of 
Public Service, the counterparts from the Ministry of Health had to seek approval 
from the Permanent Secretary. This creates bureaucracy and discourages commitment 
to collaboration. PDEs should through constant interactions ensure familiarity with 
others. Interactions should be both official and unofficial. This is according to 
Comstock and Fox (1995), who suggest that to develop dependence, there should be 
personal interaction to learn, respect and make use of relationship diversity. There 
should be small but many interactions between the PDEs as opposed to fewer bigger 
ones. Many interactions, however small they may be, make PDEs come closer 
together. This will increase information known about each other. This, according to 
Gefen (2000), will decrease uncertainty of future outcomes of horizontal purchasing 
collaboration between PDEs.  
 
Efficient and effective communication 
According to Lander et al. (2004) study, communication was found out to be an 
important trust building mechanism because good communication enables parties to 
understand each other. Korsgaard et al. (1995) call it “the sharing of relevant 
information and knowledge, necessary for trust building”. 
 
From our exploratory findings, we noted that in terms of importance to horizontal 
purchasing collaboration, communication is rated at medium level; (mean = 3.6854; 
on a scale of 1 for Not at all important to 5 for Very important). Though this seems a 
satisfactory outcome, we still suggest it should be stepped up, if it is to improve trust, 
commitment, reciprocity, and dependence.  
 
PDEs should have an improved system to disseminate information to all members of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration. Benefits so far realised from existing 
collaborations like in the case of JLOS should be used as an advocacy tool. PDEs 
should explore the use of Information and Communication Technology to improve 
sharing of information. For example the Integrated Financial Management System 
(IFMS) system which has improved sharing financial information in Uganda could 
also be extended to procurement function. According to Senge et al. (1994) support 
this; that use of communication tools is essential to building trust and commitment in 
collaboration.  
 
This information should be updated. For example there is information asymmetry 
regarding the new suppliers that have come onto the market. Not all PDEs have 
reliable information about the most recent performance of a certain supplier in a 
different PDE. We noted instances where a black listed supplier in Uganda National 
Examinations Board PDE was given a contract to supply by National Council for 
Higher Education PDE. We noted that at the later gave out the contract, it had not yet 
received information from the former, yet they collaborate.  
 
Communication will align perceptions and expectancies among collaborating PDEs. 
This will increase both trust and reciprocity. The information shared should be of high 
quality, authentic and complete (Mukherjee and Nath, 2007), to be depended on. 
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We find the Johari Window Model interesting in explaining and advising PDEs on 
how communication and awareness within the relationship should be handled. Note 
that though the Johari Window Model was designed for individuals, it is useful and 
has interesting insights for government and other corporations (Vujnovic and 
Kruckeberg, 2005). 
The Johari Window Model suggests that individual collaborating units’ awareness 
about each other is crucial in increasing mutual understanding (during our research, 
we noted PDEs have little information about each other). We argue as previous 
research has shown that mutual understanding leads to trust, commitment, reciprocity, 
and dependence among PDEs. The main point is, once a PDE opens its windows to 
others and others open theirs, trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence will 
increase. The model uses four perspectives: open, blind, hidden, and unknown. 
 
 
Fig. 8.2 The Johari Window Model 
 
The open area 
The open area has information a PDE knows about itself, which other PDEs already 
know. Public information is in this area, like; contracts committees’ establishment, 
accounting officer status, location of PDE, size of PDE, nature of purchases, spend 
budget as provided for in the national budget et cetera. Therefore there is absolute 
certainty in dealing between such PDEs. Therefore levels of trust, commitment, 
reciprocity, and dependence are maximised. 
 
Ugandan PDEs should increase trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence by 
expanding this area. There are options to doing this: 
· Reducing the blind area: Under this option, PDEs should disclose to each other 
all or most processes of procurement, information about suppliers, experiences 
with suppliers, performance levels, preferences of suppliers, specifications, et 
cetera; 
· Reducing the hidden area: The PDE should disclose itself to the PDEs, on the 
basis of which they perceive an obligation to equally disclose themselves to 
the PDE. 
 
The hidden area 
This is when the PDE has information about itself, but other collaborating PDEs do 
not. The PDEs cannot know the insider information, and this should be disclosed to 
make the relationship closer, for example the experiences of a PDE with some 
suppliers. In Ministry of Education PDE, a supplier had long been blacklisted for lack 
of capacity. This information was not known to Ministry of Works and other PDEs 
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which had not dealt this the supplier. During one of the joint meetings, this 
information was disclosed, which came in time before Ministry of Works concluded a 
contract with the supplier, and was reconsidered. This made Ministry of Works also 
disclose its own blacklisted suppliers. This enhanced the relationship. 
 
Hidden information between PDEs should be disclosed. Hidden agendas and 
individual PDE intentions and visions should be shared. This creates a more candid 
relationship. Fewer issues will remain secretive, and this will improve the levels of 
trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence. To avoid vulnerability fears, because 
of over disclosing private information to others, PDEs should disclose at a pace and 
depth they find relevant and comfortable at the time of so doing. 
 
The blind area  
This is a situation where other PDEs have more information about a PDE, which it 
had not realized. For example a PDE may not be aware of its human resource 
capacity, goodwill or reputation, but other PDEs are aware. Ministry of Education and 
Sports PDE did not realize it had one of the best perceived procurement officers until 
at a joint meeting where all other PDEs hailed them. 
 
To improve the blind window, PDEs should be ready to receive feedback. A culture 
of non judgmental feedback should be encouraged, through training and making PDEs 
appreciate the importance of disclosure in horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
Periodical meetings where collaborating PDEs freely express about each other should 
be arranged. This is important for the developing countries where negative feedback is 
seen as destructive criticism rather than constructive remark for further improvement 
(Aycan, 2002). Suggestion boxes should equally be used as has been recommended 
by previous researchers (Emiliani, 1998) to enhance feedback. 
 
The unknown area 
This is full of unknown issues about the PDE itself and other collaborating PDEs 
about it. This area, if uncovered, could be a major motivation for horizontal 
purchasing collaboration, because it involves exploration and new insights about each 
other in the collaboration.  
 
As we found out in our results, PDEs should aim at increasing the level and intensity 
of collaboration before basing on its benefits. The benefits may be unknown at the 
beginning of horizontal purchasing collaboration. The consequences of actions the 
collaboration is to take may not be predicted with a lot of certainty. The differences 
between the PDEs at the start plus the unknown outcomes should motivate 
collaborating PDEs to explore together. Whereas such a situation may be the 
justification for PDEs to avoid collaboration, we encourage PDEs to venture and 
explore the unknown together, which will greatly build bonds of relationship between 
them. 
 
Unknown situations may be relevant to PDEs which are relatively new and lack 
experience in horizontal purchasing collaboration. As PDEs participate in discovering 
the unknown aspects about themselves, care should be taken to ensure that the 
discovered areas are not transferred to hidden or blind area. They should be taken to 
increase the open area to increase the level of trust, commitment, reciprocity, and 
dependence. 
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PDEs should be given an opportunity to try new ways of doing work. The atmosphere 
should be a free one, so that new ways of collaborating emerge to increase the level of 
trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence. In the figure below, we show how 
the open area can be increased, so that trust, commitment, reciprocity, and 
dependence can be improved. 
 
 
Fig. 8.3 Improve communication using the Johari Model  
 
Challenges of using the Johari Window Model to build relationships 
One of the challenges is that disclosure of some information to collaborating PDEs 
may sometimes not be strategic. This may include increased awareness of negative 
aspects and therefore rejection (Kruckeberg and Vujnovic, 2005). However, we note 
that whereas this may be more of a problem in the private sector where information 
asymmetry can be used as a competitive tool against similar organisations that lack 
information at a certain time, in the public sector, holding onto information may not 
benefit a PDE much, after all, profit is not the key ultimate target. But if this is a 
source of worry, PDEs can strategically disclose private information to each other in 
incremental fashion, so that the outcomes of the previous disclosure are evaluated to 
determine the extent of subsequent disclosure(s). 
 
PDEs should be willing and emotionally ready to receive feedback on the blind sports. 
Feedback should not make the PDE perceive incompetence and inadequacy. Trust, 
commitment, reciprocity, and dependence will increase if feedback is received in 
good faith, and if it uncovers flesh possibilities and options. 
 
Use of the incremental approach 
Based on Greenbank (2003), a more in-depth understanding of collaborative issues is 
needed, and therefore suggests an incremental approach to foster trust and 
commitment and ability of the involved parties to learn from their experience.  
 
From our findings, in the university collaboration, guidelines and structures were put 
in place for purchase of the NPT project related items. However, collaboration rolled 
over to other non-project activities. We therefore suggest that PDEs in collaboration 
should not necessarily include all purchases at once, especially in the initial phases of 
their collaborative relationship. They should first concentrate on a few and 
increasingly add the remaining purchases. 
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How to improve behavioural factors based on institutional theory 
Problem solving mechanism 
Once a PDE realizes it has made a wrong response, it should seek to remedy the 
situation with the concerned PDEs. PDEs should point out themselves the errors made 
to those wronged. Mistakes at the previous encounter should first be solved before 
proceeding, so that the negative perceptions about others are reduced. This increases 
reciprocity, which in turn stabilises relationships (Longenecker et al., 1994) 
 
PDEs should be swift at solving problems that may come up between them. We noted 
that in the JLOS collaboration, the PDEs were “pointing fingers” at each other, which 
may not be supportive to the development of trust, commitment, reciprocity, and 
dependence. Alternative resolution mechanisms could be useful. Problems should be 
regarded as opportunities to learn from and avoid similar situations in future. 
 
Implement promises 
Trust can be built through promise fulfilment (Papadopoulou, 2001). According to 
Papadopoulou’s three step model of trust building, promises made, should be enabled 
and should be kept. Carlzon (1987) argues that enabling promises allows 
organisations to depend on and trust each other, and that keeping promises is 
perceived as a positive signal for future interactions. 
 
Each PDE should have an action plan and do what it promised to do. We note from 
our results the question “The PDEs we collaborate with always keep their promises” 
was scored low (mean=2.86, on a range of 1 – 5). This is an indication that promises 
are not well kept and should be improved, to further improve reciprocity.  
 
Involve top management 
From our study, we note that procurement officers are not members of top 
management teams in PDEs. Important decisions are made by the steering committees 
(for ministry PDEs) or boards (for parastatal PDEs) or councils (for university PDEs). 
Only 5 out of 116 PDEs (4%) considered in our study had principal procurement 
officers at the time of research. Officers at this rank and below do not usually sit in 
the top management meetings to have a “helicopter view of the PDE and therefore 
make authoritative decisions regarding the collaboration. As Rozenmeijer (2000) 
stated, attention of top management is needed to stimulate and support commitment to 
and trust in the cooperation. Thus the top officers of respective PDEs should be 
available to give support and guidance. One long lasting solution to this problem 
would be to promote procurement officers to higher ranks like assistant 
commissioner, commissioner or director of procurement ranks, to give them the 
legitimacy to take strategic decisions regarding horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
 
As found out from the JLOS case, lead time of supplies greatly improved from over 
60 to 30 days, because of the structures put in place. We further recommend that 
PDEs in horizontal purchasing collaboration should institute committees including top 
officials, who are able to take decisions instantly. Including different experts from 
PDEs will enable actions executed in one or few meetings, since expertise is readily 
available from the pool of diverse membership. From the same case, we suggest that 
committees should be chaired or constituted of top officials to give the collaboration 
political support and policy guidance. The Permanent Secretaries (for ministry PDEs), 
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University Secretaries/Principals (for university PDEs) and Executive 
Directors/Company Secretaries (parastatal/commission PDEs) should be part of the 
various committees.  
 
Involve stakeholders  
The JLOS success story could partly be explained by the involvement of stakeholders. 
Stakeholders should be involved because they have interests in the collaboration, so 
they can affect it or can be affected (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders should be 
sensitised about horizontal purchasing collaboration and won over. They can affect 
the collaboration if they are not made part of its philosophy. Such stakeholders 
include: users of supplies/works/services, donors, civil society and the suppliers. 
Identification of stakeholders should involve a systematic gathering of information to 
determine whose interests should be taken into account while starting and operating a 
horizontal purchasing collaboration. This will make them believe in the collaboration 
and get committed to it.  
 
How to improve behavioural factors based on resource dependence theory 
Experience 
PDEs should regularly work together. This creates more trust, as Khalfan et al. (2007) 
argued that in a relevant period of time, people build trust by working together. One 
needs experience and to learn to trust. Procurement officers should not be frequently 
rotated especially if they have not yet had enough experience. This will make them 
grasp the art of collaboration and develop tacit knowledge that is particular and vital 
to the specific collaborative initiative. Since it is a Government of Uganda 
requirement to transfer its civil service personnel after some time, we suggest that 
these officers could be transferred from a PDE to another PDE within the existing 
collaborative relationship. For example, an officer in the Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs could be transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs or any 
other PDE within the Justice Law and Order Sector. This will create continuity and 
repeated fulfilment of obligations amongst collaborating PDEs. 
 
Walk the talk 
Trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence in collaborations will be earned over 
time. This is supported by Karlsen et al. (2006), who in addition, argue that these will 
develop by listening, talking and making sure that you “walk the talk”. This is also 
noted by Berkun (2005), that trust will not be developed through inconsistent 
behaviour on matters of importance, saying one thing and doing another. 
We note that these are still low or moderate in Ugandan PDEs. This may be because 
of the short time of collaboration. One way to increase trust, commitment, reciprocity, 
and dependence in a short time and subsequently the benefits of collaboration is to 
“walk the talk”. Actions by PDEs should match the deliberations reached at horizontal 
purchasing collaboration meetings. This gives the collaborating PDEs the confidence 
that things will work well even for future activities. This also reduces the “testing 
period” for which PDEs give themselves before they totally get committed to the 
collaboration. We note that most resolutions are not put into practice. For example, 
only 45% of the deliberations in the Justice Law and Order Sector collaboration are 
implemented (JLOS Report, 2006).  
 
Timely interventions  
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There should be timely and substantive responses. In the JLOS case, after 
collaboration under the SWAP arrangement, response to cases improved to 14 days 
from 29, 37, 39 under the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Ministry of 
Gender and Social Welfare and Uganda Prisons Service PDEs respectively. As a 
result, some misunderstandings arose. In such circumstances, Bohm et al. (1991) 
suggests that collaborating parties should move more rapidly to resolve such 
dissonance in the collaboration. Bohm et al. further advise that this intervention 
should start by instinctively seeking commonality rather than diversity to increase 
chances of positive results. Mistakes should be looked at as a consequence of being 
human (Khalfan, et al., 2007). 
 
Deadlines make all PDEs work towards meeting them. The PDEs in collaboration 
should set interim joint deadlines and celebrate when these are met.  
 
There should be “stretch goals” that challenge PDEs to get committed towards the 
tasks of the horizontal purchasing collaboration and makes PDEs move out of their 
comfort zones. This working together towards a time bound but important target for a 
group develops the level of trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence among 
PDEs in the collaboration. 
 
Develop competences 
Based on the transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985), partners especially in initial 
phases of collaboration will try to maximise individual benefits while minimising 
individual risks (Eisenhardt, 1989). The collaborating parties therefore look up to 
institutional development of the relationship to seek the confidence, since institutions, 
even through both formal and informal means guide patterns of behaviours (Scott, 
1995). Therefore institutional competences through capacity development will 
facilitate trust development (Zucker, 1986). Building competences is more needed in 
the developing countries where they largely lack. 
 
We found out that competence influences trust more than other trust dimensions. If 
there is a technically competent officer in a PDE, others get committed to keep in the 
collaboration. We recommend that PDEs should start capacity building programmes 
to make the employees more competent. PDEs should start a competence based 
human resource management system, which largely lack in the Ugandan public sector. 
The competences of a job should be first established and the personnel to take it up 
should match its requirements. This is not currently being done in the Ugandan PDEs. 
For example some administrative staff in the Judicial Service Commission PDE were 
transferred to work in the procurement and disposal unit, with no sufficient short and 
long term training programmes.  
 
In the figure below, we show how horizontal purchasing collaboration should be 
handled. It indicates that once the antecedent actions are carried out, the behavioural 
aspects (trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence) will increase. This in turn 
increases the level of horizontal purchasing collaboration and subsequently increases 
the benefits of the collaborative relationship. 
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Fig. 8.4 How to improve behavioural factors (based on theory) in collaborative initiatives  
Our suggested recommendations on how to improve trust, commitment, 
reciprocity, and dependence 
Based on the findings of our study and anchoring these findings to the existing 
literature, we summarise in Figure 8.5 below our recommendations on how trust, 
commitment, reciprocity, and dependence can be improved in the Ugandan PDEs 
collaborative initiatives. This is our guide to practitioners of horizontal purchasing 
collaboration on how to build trust, commitment, reciprocity, and dependence in the 
different development phases of a purchasing collaborative. 
 
 
 
 
Benefits Collaboration 
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Commitment 
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Reciprocity 
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Shared goals 
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Walk the talk 
Involve top management 
Timely interventions 
Incremental approach 
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Fig. 8.5 A guidance for improving behavioural factors  
 
We note that improving behavioural factors of horizontal purchasing collaboration is a 
practice managers should do during their day to day operations. There should be 
stability and a long-term perspective to collaboration which necessitates support of 
top management. To have stability, it may require the purchasing related staff to keep 
in their work positions for relatively long period, to be able to grasp issues in the 
collaboration.  
Being fair to each other is an important practice in collaboration, which further 
increases behavioural, factors especially commitment and reciprocity. This is more 
relevant for developing countries like Uganda where lack of consistence in 
partnerships has been noticed (Tumwine, 2006). We also argue that a mix of formal 
and informal dealings amongst PDEs in collaborative initiatives is important for 
collaboration growth. We further note that negative issues that come up in 
collaboration should be well handled and in time, before they get out of hand. 
Based on social exchange 
theory 
· Long term orientation 
· Friendship 
· Loyalty 
· Shared goals 
· Reasonable behaviour 
· Doing more than expected 
· Informality 
· Familiarity 
· Communication 
· Incremental approach 
Based on institutional theory 
· Problem solving mechanism 
· Implement promises 
· Involve top management 
· Involve shareholders 
 
Based on the resource 
dependence theory 
· Experience 
· Walk the talk 
· Timely interventions 
· Developing competences 
· Stay in collaboration for long (not mentioned in 
Chapter 7) 
· Ensure fairness to each other (operations phase) 
· Encourage respectful practice 
· Aim at achieving beyond normal results 
· Share leisure time e.g. corporate games 
· Mix formal and informal structures 
· Establish personal rapport with each other 
· Have constant face to face interactions (operations 
phase) 
· Network PDEs for easy information dissemination 
· Update information at least per 14 days 
· Increase disclosure and minimize secrets 
 
· Institute a process by which problems are solved 
as they arise 
· Develop and use action plans 
· Check that all promises are met, at least monthly 
· Sensitise top management to win their support 
· Upgrade procurement positions to Commissioner 
· Shareholders should be kept informed 
· Transfer of PDE officers should be minimized or 
should be to PDEs in same collaborative initiative 
· Be consistent 
· Do what you say 
· Respond to issues within 14 days 
· Set deadlines and celebrate when they are 
achieved 
· Increase disclosure 
· Continuous on the job and off the job training 
 
Antecedent actions to improve 
trust, commitment, reciprocity 
and dependence (theory based) 
Our suggested actions to improve trust, 
commitment, reciprocity and dependence (based 
on results of Chapter 7 and logical deduction from 
theory) 
 
 
141
Mixing formal and informal structures makes PDEs in collaboration devote more time 
together and improves mutual confiding and reciprocal services. As argued by 
Malhotra (2009), the PDEs are then likely to see each other as well intentioned. We 
also argue that establishing personal rapport is important, because it ensures that even 
while unconscious of the surrounding factors, in reality PDEs still connect with each 
other. They all operate at the same level and expectations. This creates a basis for 
sustaining behavioural factors.  
Based on institutional theory, we also argue that once problems are solved as they 
arise, and promises are met, the doubts about future operations, especially for the 
newly established collaborative initiatives, begin to disappear and more trust can be 
developed. 
Based on resource dependence theory, we argue that being consistent and doing what 
you promised to do, will increase the level of behavioural factors. This may be more 
relevant for Uganda where planning is not done or if done often not followed 
(Turyatunga, 2008). 
8.4  Method 
 
Data collection and procedure 
There are several methods possible for carrying out the check. One method is to ask 
PDEs to do what we have found out from the study and later check how it has 
improved collaboration. This may take a long period of time, as testing would require 
a longitudinal design.  
 
In our study, we use existing horizontal purchasing collaboration initiatives to cross-
check our guidance with what has been happening and whether it is possible and 
practical to adopt our guidance. We used the interview method to collect data. We 
explained our findings about antecedent actions for improving behavioural factors and 
suggested a model for starting and operating a collaborative initiative to the 
respondents before the start of each interview session.  
 
We used three guiding questions that dealt with missing, redundant, and most 
important parts of the suggested guidance. These are stated below: 
· What do you miss in our guidance on (a) the suggested actions for improving 
behavioural factors and (b) the model to start and operate a horizontal 
purchasing collaboration initiative? 
· What activity out of the list of suggested actions by the guidance is least 
important for improving the success of a horizontal purchasing collaborative?   
· What parts of our guidance in particular would you recommend to new 
starters? 
 
Data source 
We used four cases to check the suggested guidance. The use of four cases is adequate 
(see Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Perry, 1998), since the replication 
rather than sampling logic, will yield reliable conclusions (Yin, 2004). The use of a 
case study as a tool to check understanding is well established (Voss et al., 2002) and 
the use of small numbers of case studies as a knowledge building tool to understand 
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deeply as is required in developing countries with not yet established strategies is 
increasing in operations management (Decoene and Bruggeman, 2006; Yauch, 2007). 
 
The four cases include the JLOS case (ten PDEs with about eight years of existence 
and formal structure), the ministry collaboration (seven PDEs with about four years of 
existence and informal structure), the state enterprises collaboration (five PDEs with 
about two years of existence and informal structure) and the statutory bodies 
collaboration (four PDEs with about two years of existence and informal structure) 
(see Appendix I for an overview of the members of the collaborations). The JLOS 
case was involved in the development of the model whereas the other three cases were 
not involved in the development. The later three also had experiences with horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. The JLOS case was included in the check to have their 
comments on the correctness and usefulness of the suggested guidance, since there 
was a time difference of close to two years between the data collection for the model 
development and testing the results.  
 
We interviewed key informants from each of the PDEs in the four cases, mainly the 
Head of Procurement section or the Chairman Contracts Committee or any other 
senior and procurement knowledgeable personnel. In total, we interviewed 26 key 
informants. We perceived the views of senior and relatively more knowledgeable 
members as representative enough of their respective PDEs. The interviews were 
carried out in 2009 and early 2010. Each interview took about one hour. The guiding 
questions were used in the interview sessions. We recorded the responses on paper, 
since the option of tape recording was not appreciated by some of the respondents.  
 
8.5 Results and discussion  
 
In this section, we discuss the findings and implications of our check. We present our 
results according to each guiding question we posed to our respondents. The first 
question deals with actions that need to be added to the guidance. The second question 
deals with redundant actions. The final question deals with actions that are perceived 
to be very important.  
  
Missing actions   
In general, the respondents found our suggested actions for improving the behavioural 
factors relevant. However, they suggested that the following be added.  
 
They argued that establishing a central office for coordinating the joint purchasing 
activities is important. Such an office would have a coordinator, who checks on the 
activities on a day to day basis and makes a follow up. In addition to this, the 
respondents indicated that physical resources for the collaborative initiatives like 
furniture, stationery, et cetera should be put in place.  
We argue that respondents think it is important to have a central office for 
coordinating the joint purchasing activities, since the central office makes sure enough 
resources are available to make the collaborative initiative a success. This confirms 
the importance of building capacity which is part of our guidance. 
 
It was also noted that the collaborating PDEs should avoid having dominant entities as 
this may hamper trust and commitment. However, we note that this may not be a 
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major factor since most government PDEs are similar, with similar mandate and 
almost the same level of resources. 
 
Respondents also missed having opinion leaders included in the whole organisational 
arrangement. Respondents argued that in the developing countries, opinion leaders are 
important in convincing the rest of the people that a strategy is worth undertaking, 
since most of the people lack adequate analytical skills to make optimal decisions 
(Turyatunga, 2008). Opinion leaders are important stakeholders in an organisational 
unit.  
 
Right timing was also mentioned as a factor necessary for horizontal purchasing 
collaboration. Usually in times of urgency, the need to collaborate and solve an urgent 
common problem is explicit. Indeed, when there are no bigger challenges foreseen, 
there is less interest in starting a collaborative initiative, but when there are urgent 
challenges, as is usually the case for developing countries where planning is not done 
well (Tumwine, 2006), then a new collaborative initiative may thrive. The 
respondents perceive importance in creating a sense of urgency/relevance for 
collaborative purchasing.  
 
Other missing tasks mentioned by the respondents include establishment of a series of 
sensitisation seminars to “sell” collaborative purchasing in the initial stage and to 
“sell” the positive outcomes and allay fears for the negative outcomes at the 
operational stage. Whereas we appreciate these suggestions, we note that our guidance 
already includes establishing structures and committees (as was the case with the 
JLOS initiative); establishing an ICT communication website, which are likely to 
reduce the need for a central coordinating office. Besides, basing on the transaction 
cost theory, a common information and communication platform supports 
standardisation, thus further reducing the need to have a central coordinating office. 
 
In our guidance, the respondents also missed the challenge of handling influence from 
the “bigger” PDEs, those that are likely to influence others in the collaboration. 
Therefore a sense of equity should be instilled in the operations of the collaboration, 
for example by having rotational responsibilities, so that all member PDEs perceive 
equality. We argue that although trust will (partly) substitute the formal control 
mechanism as the collaborative initiative develops, it is still important to address a 
sense of equity in intensive collaborations that are not coordinated by a third party. 
Therefore, we add the suggestion of the respondents to our guidance. 
Redundant actions   
We requested the respondents to indicate the activity out of the list of suggested 
actions that is least important for improving the success of a horizontal purchasing 
collaborative in Uganda. The actions that are perceived to be most redundant are 
shown in Table 8.1 (see Appendix L for the complete list of frequencies). 
 
Table 8.1 Redundant actions 
Description  Mentioned (in %) 
Increase disclosure and/or minimize secrets 27 
Network PDEs for easy information dissemination 15 
Update information at least per 14 days 8 
Respond to issues within 14 days 8 
Transfers to PDEs in same collaborative initiative 8 
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Note that actions with a frequency of 0 or 1 are not listed in the table. 
 
We note that the suggested actions “increase disclosure and/or minimise secrets” and 
“network PDEs for easy information dissemination” were most frequently mentioned 
as least important activities. When we further asked the respondents why they think 
disclosure may not be as important as other actions, they said the time the PDEs have 
been collaborating is too short to disclose a lot of information to each other. The 
PDEs may also fear disclosing information due to the opportunism within the 
collaborative initiative (Pesamaa and Hair, Jr, 2007; Schotanus, 2007). With diverging 
strategic objectives, even in the public sector in developing countries, most 
information is regarded as secretive. This finding differs from results of studies in the 
public sector in developed countries (e.g., Schotanus, 2007), where disclosure is 
typically not an important issue.   
 
We note that all the other actions are mentioned by no, one or only two respondents. 
Therefore, we argue that these other actions are not redundant.   
 
Most important actions 
We gave our respondents a list of our suggested actions for improving collaborative 
initiatives and asked them which actions they consider to be important for new 
collaborative initiatives. The actions that are perceived to be most important are 
shown in Table 8.2 (see Appendix M for the complete list of frequencies). 
 
Table 8.2 Most important actions 
Description  Mentioned (in %) 
Sensitise top management to win their support 22 
Align goals of all collaborating PDEs 20 
Establish personal rapport with each other 19 
Develop and use action plans 19 
Respond to issues within 14 days 18 
Have constant interactions 18 
Note that actions with a frequency of 15 or lower are not listed in the table. 
 
The actions that respondents suggested most to new starters include “sensitise top 
management to win their support”, “align goals of all collaborating PDEs”, “develop 
and use action plans”, “establish personal rapport with each other”, “have constant 
interactions” and “respond to issues within 14 days”.  
 
We note that the factors “increase disclosure and/or minimise secrets” and “respond to 
issues within 14 days” are identified as least important activities to be done on the 
suggested actions for improving horizontal purchasing collaboration (see Table 8.1). 
These factors are also recommended for new starters (see Table 8.1 and Appendix M). 
This may be that in the first case, respondents indicated that they are not very willing 
to share secrets and respond quickly, while in the later, they indicate that it still may 
be important to share secrets and respond quickly. 
 
We note that the first three actions aim at making collaborating start off well. This 
momentum (also see Section 6.6) gives the collaboration strength to survive the 
remaining stages. We note that the other three actions aim at operating the 
collaboration in a professional manner. These actions help in providing the 
collaboration sufficient resources to carry out the joint tasks.  
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Sensitisation of top management to win support is rated as the most important action 
for starting collaborations. As a contribution to literature, we argue that for 
developing countries where the procurement staff who carry out operational activities 
are at lower ranks in their respective organisational hierarchy, there should be 
adequate sensitisation of top management to appreciate the rationale of collaboration. 
This may be different in developed countries where the procurement officers may be 
relatively at higher positions in the organisational hierarchy. In such a case, 
sensitisation of top management may not come first. 
 
8.6 Limitations 
 
We carried out a check on our suggested guidance, using a snapshot method. We 
nonetheless appreciate an alternative method of checking whether our suggested 
guidance was useful for collaborative units after a reasonable period of its adoption. 
This could not be done, given the time and other resource limitations of our study. 
 
Whereas a number of four cases as we used in our study is acceptable in qualitative 
study designs (Eisenhardt, 1989), we note that our conclusions may be limited to 
analytical rather than statistical dimensions (Yin, 1994).  
 
8.7  Conclusion 
 
We set out to suggest practical actions to improve behavioural factors for horizontal 
purchasing collaboration through literature, and also to check the relevance our 
suggested guidance.  
 
Regarding the actions to improve behavioural factors, we conclude that the 
purchasing related staff should keep in their positions for a relatively long period to 
create stability and grasp issues of collaboration. We also note that staff of the newly 
established collaborative initiatives in the developing countries need more interactive 
time, both formal and informal to confide in each other, the privately held perceptions 
on collaboration. We also conclude that being consistent and doing what collaborating 
entities promised to do to each other, could develop the trust and commitment in the 
collaborative initiatives  
 
Regarding the practical, we note that we had missed including opinion leaders as 
important stakeholders, which is a party that to the best of our knowledge has not 
been recognised in the existing literature. We also recognise from our check that 
timing of when to collaborate is an important factor in deciding when to start a 
collaborative initiative. 
 
In our check, we got positive feedback that our suggested guidance was largely 
realistic, apart from the aspects relating to information disclosure. We therefore argue, 
contrary to public sector literature based on the developed countries context, that 
disclosure of information should be done cautiously. 
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Chapter 9 – Wrap up  
 
 
9.1  Introduction 
 
In this last chapter, we wrap up the whole thesis, to give a summary of what our work 
involved. We introduce the chapter, and then give a summary of our research goals, 
questions, and hypotheses. We mention the method used in all the chapters and also 
give the main findings and conclusions of the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.1 Research outline 
 
Horizontal purchasing collaboration is a popular practice in many countries. 
Considering its well-publicised benefits, developing countries and Uganda in 
particular, should be the home of horizontal purchasing collaboration. Nevertheless, 
horizontal purchasing collaboration has not yet been frequently and well practiced.  
 
Whereas several studies have been carried out on horizontal purchasing collaboration 
in the public sector in developed countries, there is still a remarkable lack of literature 
on horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries and Uganda in 
particular. Existing studies do not give a clear explanation for the lack of well 
functioning horizontal purchasing collaborative initiatives in developing countries. 
Although, there is an indication that behavioural factors may play an important role. 
This thesis therefore investigates the role of behavioural aspects in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. 
 
In this thesis, we define horizontal purchasing collaboration as the operational, 
tactical, and/or strategic cooperation between two or more organisations in one or 
more steps of the purchasing process by pooling and or sharing their purchasing 
volumes, information, and or resources in order to create symbiosis (Schotanus, 
2007). 
 
To enable easy reading, in the next sections we restate our research, questions, and 
hypotheses. Since we have used different methods for different chapters, we include a 
summary of the methods used for each chapter. We also highlight the major findings, 
limitations, and future research. 
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9.2  Research goals, questions, and hypotheses 
 
The overall research goals of this thesis are threefold. First, to understand what is 
happening with respect to behavioural aspects in horizontal purchasing collaboration 
in developing countries (Uganda in particular). Second, to understand why and how 
the behavioural aspects influence horizontal purchasing collaboration. Third, to know 
how to apply the understanding of the behavioural aspects in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in developing countries (Uganda in particular). 
 
The first goal requires a descriptive design since it seeks to increase understanding of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration, provides a basis for improving practice, and 
gives more insights to horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda. The second 
goal requires an analytical design since it seeks to develop a collaboration 
development process model. The third goal requires both a prescriptive design and an 
analytical design since it seeks to explain how to apply the understanding of 
behavioural aspects. It provides a practical guidance on how to improve behavioural 
aspects in horizontal purchasing collaboration, and also carries out an empirical check 
of the suggested guidance.  
 
The thesis is arranged according to chapters, each with an objective as follows: 
· To present and justify the research strategy we adopt to realise our goals, to 
link our work to the general philosophy of science, to show how our research 
differs from other researches done, and to present our methodological points 
of departure (Chapter 2); 
· To review existing literature on horizontal purchasing collaboration, to place 
our study into the context of existing knowledge, to identify knowledge gaps, 
to formulate hypotheses, and derive insights for application of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration (Chapter 3); 
· To better understand the current state of horizontal purchasing collaboration in 
Uganda, through two exploratory studies, to further develop hypotheses and  
derive insights for the application of horizontal purchasing collaboration 
(Chapter 4); 
· To draw lessons from a practical case of the Justice Law and Order Sector 
(JLOS) to further develop hypotheses and derive insights for the application of 
horizontal purchasing collaboration (Chapter 5); 
· To carry out a survey to test the hypotheses posed (Chapter 6); 
· To suggest a collaboration development process model in the developing 
countries context, by filling in the gaps identified in the existing knowledge 
(Chapter 7). 
· To provide a guidance on how to improve behavioural factors and to 
empirically check the relevance of the guidance (Chapter 8). 
 
9.3  Research approach 
 
In this thesis, we use several methods. Mixing approaches is acceptable due to the 
ontological uncertainties that still exist in social sciences (Arndt, 1985; Creswell, 
1994; Hunt, 1991). In relationship and management studies, there is a notable 
consistent use of combined methodological approaches (Milliken, 2001; Schurr, 
2007). 
 
 
148
 
Most of Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are explorative in nature and are written in the context of 
discovery (Reichenbach, 1938). This is justified since it matches with our research 
goal of understanding. The design is qualitative and explanatory. Chapter 6 is a survey 
and largely takes a quantitative design. Chapters 7 and 8 take the qualitative and 
explanatory design to explain the application of the results of the previous chapters. 
We provide a short overview of specific methods used in each of the chapters in the 
remainder of this section. 
  
In Chapter 4, we aim to better understand the current state of horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in Uganda through two exploratory studies, thereby developing 
hypotheses for testing and deriving insights for the application of horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. 
 
In exploratory study 1, we pose specific research questions aimed at understanding the 
state of horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda. We studied 21 ministries and 
two universities. We used a self administered questionnaire (to Procurement and 
Disposal Unit staff) and interviews to obtain a deeper understanding of the issues and 
to improve validity of our findings (Den Hertog and Van Sluijs, 1995; Webster, 
1991). Interviewees were at the topmost levels; at the rank of principal procurement 
officer in their PDEs, and therefore assumed to be more authoritative in procurement 
issues.  
 
In exploratory study 2, we specifically set out to understand the factors for initialising 
horizontal purchasing collaboration in Uganda. A questionnaire was used to get 
responses from 89 procurement officers representing 77% of the central government 
entities in Uganda at the time of the study.  
 
In Chapter 5, we analyse a practical case of the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) 
to draw lessons for hypotheses development. To obtain a deeper understanding of the 
issues that seemed novel at our beginning of the study, a case based research 
methodology, was selected for use (Mukherjee et al., 2000; Yin, 1994). We selected 
the JLOS case because JLOS is relatively experienced in purchasing collaboration 
compared to other collaborative initiatives in Uganda. We used JLOS reports, 
research papers, and procurement records to carry out a document analysis and deduce 
meanings. We also interviewed two key informants, one from the JLOS secretariat 
and another one from the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs policy and 
planning department. These were important in establishment and operationalisation of 
JLOS collaborative initiative. 
 
In Chapter 6, we carry out a large scale survey to test the hypotheses posed. The study 
population includes all the PDEs in the public sector. We operationalised variables 
according to different and previously used literature sources to ensure construct 
validity in our measurement. We used a researcher-administered questionnaire to 
collect data. We carried out a pilot test mainly to ensure content validity (Mitchell, 
1996) of the questionnaire. We pre-tested the questionnaire on a focus group and 
made the necessary adjustments, before the final questionnaire was used. To ensure 
internal consistency of the instruments, we used the Chronbach’s alpha test. We used 
factor analysis to test for construct validity of the variables. The tests showed that the 
data collection instrument was valid. 
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In Chapter 7, we develop a collaboration development process model. We carry out a 
qualitative study to fill in the identified knowledge holes (about tasks, stakeholders, 
and challenges).  
 
We use the focus group technique, because in addition to investigating what 
procurement officers (the participants) think, it uncovers why they think as they do. 
We used eight focus groups, each with ten participants. Four sessions per group were 
held, each session discussed a research objective. To ensure reliability, we developed 
themes that matched the objectives, and these kept the discussions within expected 
limits. We encouraged involvement of all participants to avoid the large group effect. 
Matrix displays and tables were used to analyse the data (Miles and Huberman, 1984, 
1994).  
 
In Chapter 8, we carry out a study, based on theory, to suggest how behavioural 
factors should be improved. We then empirically check the relevance of the guidance.  
 
We use the already existing horizontal purchasing collaboration initiatives, to cross-
check our guidance with what has been happening and how possible and practical it is 
to adopt our guidance. We used the interview method to collect data. We used four 
cases to check the suggested guidance; JLOS, ministries, state enterprises, and 
statutory bodies. We interviewed key informants from each of the PDEs, mainly the 
Head of Procurement section or the Chairman Contracts Committee or any other 
senior and procurement knowledgeable personnel.  
 
9.4  Findings and conclusions 
 
In this section, we repeat the main findings and corresponding conclusions of the 
thesis.  
 
Understanding what is happening with respect to horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in developing countries 
We found out that collaboration in general has existed in government departments; it 
is not entirely a new concept when applied to the purchasing function. We found out 
that urgency is an important factor to motivate PDEs to go join a collaborative 
initiative. We therefore argue, similarly as Schotanus (2007) but contrary to several 
other sources, which list the initialising conditions for collaborative purchasing, that 
urgency of the deal should be one of the recognised and published critical factors 
and/or benefits for horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries. This 
is relevant in Uganda, where planning is often done poorly, and by the time 
procurement tasks are undertaken, urgency is needed to expedite them.  
 
We found out that collaborative activities are mainly in the initial stages of the 
procurement cycle, and that contractual issues that involve secrets inhibit horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in the final stages of the procurement cycle.  
It was interesting to note that in the university category, where there was a formal 
structure of how collaboration was to be done, collaboration was not only in the 
purchases of items that were originally planned for, but also extended to other items 
that were out of this collaborative arrangement. We therefore argue that starting 
collaboration on a small scale can be “an eye opener” to the benefits of collaboration. 
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The PDEs can start on a small scale and use the incremental approach to roll out to 
other activities. This argument may be relevant for developing countries, where there 
are relatively fewer human and financial resources than in developed countries, and 
starting relatively complex processes at a small scale is likely to be the realistic 
decision.  
 
We noted that behavioural factors are important for successful horizontal purchasing 
collaboration, especially in the initial stages of collaboration. Whereas behavioural 
factors are important, we also noted that from the findings, the levels of trust, 
commitment, reciprocity, dependence, and level of collaboration are medium in 
Uganda. Thus there is still need to further improve these factors. The actions we 
suggested can help managers of collaborative initiatives in improving the factors.  
 
We also considered an in-depth case about horizontal purchasing collaboration. From 
the case, we found out that there should be peer reviews and wide consultations across 
all institutions in the collaboration for the member institutions to “own” the decisions. 
While each institution remains independent, it should monitor each other’s 
performance. From our interviews with the JLOS officials, we noted that the 
frequency with which the inter-institutional meetings take place is very important. 
This makes institutions develop positive feelings towards each other and trust is 
learned and reinforced over successive iterations of transactions.  
 
We noted that as the collaborative initiative starts, conflicts are likely to come up 
between the participating members. From the case, we learn that a forum for all the 
stakeholders of the collaborating entities helps to resolve emerging conflicts.  
 
We also note that contrary to findings by Schotanus and Telgen (2007), free riding 
may not be an important motivator for PDEs not to collaborate. This is because 
though collaboration in Uganda is still relatively new, the collaborating entities know 
each other fairly well, and since they are all public entities, they are sure of continued 
future collaboration.  
 
Whereas we agree with Fine and Whitney (1996) that PDEs may not find horizontal 
purchasing collaboration interesting because of fear of dependence of knowledge on 
collaborating PDEs, and therefore reducing capacity for own future challenges, we 
note that this may not be important for Ugandan PDEs where no single PDE 
monopolises knowledge, since all procurement officers are relatively new. As such, 
there may be less fear of dependence of knowledge to reduce capacity for future 
challenges. 
 
Understanding why and how the behavioural aspects influence horizontal 
purchasing collaboration 
Our results show that affective commitment (pride in the collaboration), more than 
instrumental commitment (fear of costs of switching off from current collaboration) 
and normative commitment (based on strong values and beliefs) cause variability in 
commitment. This could be because pride is more important in the initial phases of 
collaboration compared to the fear of switching costs; which would be minimal at the 
initial stage, and with less time for values and beliefs to evolve. Indeed, most 
collaborative initiatives in the developing countries are in initial stages. To managers, 
it is a lesson that they should build a sense of pride and belonging of their PDEs in the 
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collaborative initiative. Managers of collaborative initiatives should ensure that PDEs 
develop a sense of independent self reflection and positive evaluation to develop 
pride. This is relevant to starting collaborative initiatives in Uganda as it compensates 
for the instrumental commitment dimension, which is likely to reduce motivation for 
collaboration. To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies about collaboration 
have come up with this finding. 
 
We also argue that individual competences within the collaborating PDEs is an 
important factor in determining trust and horizontal purchasing collaboration. Even 
when most personnel in PDEs have similar qualifications, not all of them have yet 
attained the required level of skill and experience to perform specific technical tasks 
and function successfully. Thus, PDEs are motivated to collaborate with those that 
have specific expertise.  
 
We noted that the correlation between trust and the level of collaboration is higher 
than the correlation between commitment and the level of collaboration. This can be 
explained by the existing literature. Trust refers to feelings about the relationship and 
commitment represents a manifestation of actions within the relationship. With 
relatively new collaborative initiatives in developing countries, fewer actions and 
experiences have been exposed. Therefore trust is likely to improve the level of 
collaboration more than commitment. This should encourage managers of 
collaborative initiatives, in the start up phases to ensure that participating entities have 
positive feelings about each other. This reduces the entities’ interest in the option of 
mainly considering financial and other analytical justifications to collaborate. 
 
We note that reciprocity has a low correlation with collaboration. This may be 
because the give and take actions do not take place in the initial phases of 
collaborations. This could also be explained by the PDEs which do not respond to 
each other in similar ways or take long to reciprocate. Managers of collaborative 
initiatives should ensure that the reciprocating behaviour should be developed, 
especially the “positive for positive” rather than the “negative for negative” type of 
behaviour. Reciprocity will ensure that the social norms: the behavioural expectations 
within the collaborative initiative are maintained.  
 
We note that the relatively higher correlation between dependence and collaboration 
compared to correlations between commitment and reciprocity with collaboration may 
indicate that PDEs practice collaboration, not mainly because of trust, commitment or 
reciprocative reasons, but more importantly because the other PDEs provide important 
and critical resources for which there are few alternative sources of supply.  
 
The moderate correlation especially for collaborations that are still emerging signals 
the need for collaborating PDEs to develop a critical minimum mass in carrying out 
pooled activities together to realise significant benefits. 
 
We note that there is a remarkable difference between correlations of behavioural 
variables (commitment, trust, dependence, and reciprocity) with the level of 
collaboration and the benefits of collaboration. The lower correlation of the 
behavioural variables with the benefits of collaboration than with the level of 
collaboration may be attributed to the moderating role of the level of collaboration. A 
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higher level of collaboration involves a higher degree of involvement by the entities 
and is likely to increase the benefits of collaboration.  
 
To know how to apply the understanding of the behavioural aspects in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in developing countries (Uganda). 
At the emergence stage of a collaborative initiative, we found out that emphasis 
should be put on developing a practice of togetherness through aligning values and 
converging to a similar inter-organisational philosophy. At the operation stage, the 
key tasks should aim at creating a high degree of positive feelings towards each other. 
Donors are most needed in the emergence stage, because they provide resources and 
want to be sure of the method that will be used to utilise them.  
 
From the study, in addition to understanding what is happening with respect to 
behavioural aspects in horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries, 
we have added new insights in this area. From the study, the reader can appreciate 
why and how the behavioural aspects influence horizontal purchasing collaboration. 
The study has an important message it portrays; that in developing countries, 
horizontal purchasing collaboration should be targeted more at sharing the burden of 
individual procurement benefits whereas in developed countries, the focus is more on 
additional benefits. The study has opened points of departure, for future research in 
horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries. Since we have provided 
an empirically checked guidance on how to improve behavioural factors, we hope to 
provide an empirical basis for practical interventions to issues that have hindered the 
well functioning of horizontal purchasing collaboration in developing countries.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A:  Survey data collection questionnaire 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Dear respondent 
This questionnaire instrument is to collect data on behavioural issues in horizontal purchasing 
collaboration in developing countries, the case of public units in Uganda. 
In this survey, we examine the behavioural factors and how they influence horizontal collaborative 
purchasing in Uganda, with a view to applying this knowledge to establishing/improving such 
initiatives. 
Thank you in advance, for accepting to be part of this survey. Your answers will be treated with 
strict confidence. You will get a copy of the final results. Please kindly spare some of your valuable 
time and answer the questions. 
 
A. General information 
Name of Respondent (Optional) ………………………………............................................................... 
 
Name of the entity……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Present title………………………………………………………………………..................................... 
 
Does your entity collaborate with other entities?  YES / NO 
 
If yes, list the entities you collaborate with 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
If yes, in which activities do you collaborate with other entities 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
… 
Give a brief description on how the collaboration is carried out. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
A. Commitment 
Commitment is the belief that the collaborating partners are willing to devote energy to sustaining the 
relationship. That is through commitment, partners dedicate resources to sustain and further the goals 
of the collaboration. 
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Here are some of the indicators of inter organisational commitment. Please kindly tick the 
appropriate response (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=not sure, 4=agree and 5=strongly 
agree). 
 
Instrumental commitment 
Instrumental commitment is where an actor is constrained by the costs and inconveniences of leaving 
the current collaboration. In our case, the PDE will keep going on, because leaving will be 
inconveniencing and will involve financial and non financial costs.  
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Changing the horizontal collaborative purchasing with other PDEs 
now would be too disruptive for our activities, so we continue to 
work with them. 
     
We need to keep working with the other PDEs since leaving would 
create hardship for our organisation. 
     
Normative commitment 
Normative commitment is based on the PDE’s value in the collaboration. A value is a preference of one 
mode of behaviour over another. Normative commitment is about obligations that members feel to 
remain with an organisation and build on generalised cultural expectations. 
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Our relationship with PDES we collaborate with is mainly based on 
the similarity of our values. 
     
The reason we work with other PDEs is because of what they stand 
for, their values. 
     
Our procurement values, and those of the PDEs we collaborate 
with are becoming more similar. 
     
The objectives other PDEs stand for are important to us.      
If the values for PDEs we collaborate with were different, we 
would not be as attached to them. 
     
 
 
Affective commitment 
Affective commitment relates to commitment by a PDE in relation to the identification and 
involvement with the others. It is a feeling of belonging, and a sense of attachment to the collaboration. 
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
We take up our collaboration with other PDEs, to friends and 
acquaintances, as a great relationship to be connected with. 
     
We feel that the PDEs we collaborate with, view us as being an 
important team member rather than just being another PDE. 
     
We are proud to tell others that we are associated with the other 
PDEs. 
     
 
 
B. Trust 
Trust is one’s belief that the other PDE will act in a consistent manner and do as promised. It gives the 
confidence that the other PDE can be relied upon. Trust is operationalised in five dimensions: 
dependable/reliable, honest/candid, competent, partner orientation, and likeable/friendly.  
Here are some of the indicators of inter organisational mutual trust. Please kindly tick the 
appropriate response (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=not sure, 4=agree and 5=strongly 
agree). 
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Mutual trust 
This is about the level of dependability/reliability, honesty, competency, partner orientation and 
friendliness your PDE has over the collaborating ministries. 
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
We have confidence in the PDEs we collaborate with      
The PDEs we collaborate with always inform us immediately if 
problems occur in their purchasing operations that may have an 
impact on the collaboration 
     
The PDES we collaborate with are very competent.      
The PDEs we collaborate with are always obliging.      
The PDEs we collaborate with always provide information we 
require. 
     
The PDEs we collaborate with are always cooperative.      
The PDEs we collaborate with always keep their promises.      
We always receive a good response from the PDEs we collaborate 
with. 
     
The PDEs we collaborate with are always polite.      
 
 
C. Dependence  
Dependence is the extent to which a partner provides important and critical resources for which there 
are few alternative sources of supply. It is the reliance on actions of another party to achieve certain 
goals or gratification.  
 
Here are some of the indicators of dependence. Please kindly tick the appropriate response 
(1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=not sure, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree). 
 
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Our PDE’s activities have a strong time based synchronisation with 
the other collaborating PDEs’ activities. 
     
Our PDE has a close relationship with the PDEs we collaborate 
with. 
     
Our PDE’s relationship with the collaborating PDEs is regulated in 
a written contract. 
     
Our PDE is well aware of the collaborating PDEs’ strengths and 
weaknesses. 
     
Our PDE has a high degree of technical agreement with the PDEs 
we collaborate with. 
     
Our PDE’s activities are developed through the knowledge that is 
interchanged with the collaborating PDEs. 
     
Collaborating PDEs influence our PDE’s reputation.      
Our PDE strives to maintain a common information technology 
standard of hard and soft ware with the collaborating PDEs. 
     
 
 
 
D. Reciprocity 
 
This is about an actor or an organisation giving to the other one in return for something. Each party gets 
something from the other.  
Here are some of the indicators of reciprocity. Please kindly tick the appropriate response (1=strongly 
disagree, 2=disagree, 3=not sure, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree). 
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Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Our PDE regards ‘never forget a good turn’ as our motto.      
We keep our promises to each other in any situation.      
If the PDEs we collaborate with give assistance when my PDE had 
difficulties, then I would be responsible for returning its kindness. 
     
Even if we don’t anticipate immediate benefit, we offer our service 
to the collaborating PDEs. 
     
We don’t have to get a return of equal value as we offered from the 
PDEs we collaborate with. 
     
We don’t investigate discrepancies in performance of activities we 
are involved in with the collaborating PDEs. 
     
 
 
E. Level of Collaboration 
 
Collaboration is the degree to which partners are able to work together in a joint fashion toward their 
respective goals. Information sharing, decision synchronisation and incentive alignment. We study the 
level of collaboration by considering the extent to which interaction exists while undertaking the 
collaboration tasks. 
Here are some of the indicators of collaboration. Please kindly tick the appropriate response 
(1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=not sure, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree). 
 
Level of information sharing 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
In our PDE, we very frequently share information on suppliers with 
other PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently share information on 
product/service specification with other PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently share information on contracting 
with suppliers; with other PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently share information regarding price 
changes with the PDEs we collaborate with. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently share information regarding 
supplier performance with other PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently share information regarding on 
hand inventory levels with other PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently share information regarding market 
developments with other PDEs. 
     
 
Level of decision synchronisation 
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
In our PDE, we very frequently jointly carry out plans on needs 
specification with other PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently use supplier list with other PDEs      
In our PDE, we very frequently jointly carry out plans on 
contracting with other PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently have common purchasing goals 
with the other PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently share best practices with other 
PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently carry out joint training programmes 
across all collaborating PDEs. 
     
 
Level of incentive alignment 
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
In our PDE, we very frequently share the savings made on reduced 
costs with other PDEs. 
     
 
 
180
In our PDE, we are ready to share risks of the collaboration with 
the other PDEs. 
     
In our PDE, we very frequently have made some investments (e.g. 
in knowledge accumulation) with other PDEs. 
     
 
Benefits of individual entity 
 
Our PDE has achieved the following benefits from collaboration initiatives: 
 
Statement 1 2 3 4 5 
Sharing of information reduces transaction costs.      
There is existence of state of the art purchasing process (e.g. 
through . uniform purchasing procedures and common training) 
     
There is standardisation of requirements and sharing suppliers 
across PDEs 
     
Better purchasing procedures are carried out  and at minimal costs      
There are proper quantities of supplies      
Sharing resources (e.g. human resources) with other PDEs      
 
 
Thank you for your time 
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Appendix B: Data collection tool for importance of different factors to horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in Ugandan PDEs 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Dear Procurement officers and members of contracts committees 
 
This questionnaire is part of the on going study to examine the importance of different 
factors to horizontal purchasing collaboration in Ugandan Procuring and Disposing 
Entities (PDEs). 
 
Please rate how important each of the named factors is to horizontal purchasing 
collaboration to Ugandan PDEs. 
Note:  
 
1 = Not at all important 
2 = Unimportant 
3 = Not sure 
4 = Important 
5 = Very important 
 
 Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Collaboration knowledge      
2 Collaboration structure      
3 Commitment      
4 Communication      
5 Dependence      
6 Governance      
7 Government intervention      
8 Internal support      
9 Reciprocity      
10 Sharing mechanism      
11 Size       
12 Trust      
13 Uniformity of the members      
 
 
Thank you so much for your participation 
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Appendix C:  List of abbreviations 
 
AC Affective Commitment 
ACCA Association of Certified Chartered Accountants 
CHOGM Commonwealth Heads Of Government and Ministers 
CIPS Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply 
CTB Central Tender Board 
CVI Content Validity Index 
D Dependence 
DFID Directorate For International Development 
DPP Directorate of Public Prosecution 
DS Decision Synchronisation 
e.g.   For example 
Fig.   Figure 
GOU   Government Of Uganda 
H Hypothesis 
IA Incentives Alignment 
IC Instrumental Commitment 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
IE Individual Entity benefits 
IFMS Integrated Financial management Systems 
IMP   International Marketing and Purchasing 
IRM International Relationship Marketing 
IS Information Sharing 
IT Interactive Trust 
JLOS   Justice Law and Order Sector 
JSC Judicial Service Commission 
KYU   Kyambogo University 
MAAF Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries 
MBA Master of Business Administration 
MCIPS Member Chartered Institute of Supplies and management 
MEMD Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development 
MES Ministry of Education and Sports 
MGLSD Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development 
MILT Member Institute of Logistics and Transport 
MOFPED Ministry Of Finance Planning and Economic Development 
MOIA Ministry Of Internal Affairs 
MOJCA Ministry Of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
MRO Maintenance Repair and Operational 
MT Mutual Trust 
MUBS   Makerere University Business School 
MWHC Ministry of Housing Works and Communication 
MWLE Ministry of Water Lands and Environment 
NC Normative Commitment 
NHPC National Housing and Population Census 
NPPIS National Public Procurement Integrity Survey 
NPT Netherlands Programme for Institutional Strengthening Post 
Secondary Education and Training Capacity 
NWSC National Water and Sewerage Cooperation 
PDE   Procuring and Disposing Entity 
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PDEs   Procuring and Disposing Entities 
PDU   Procurement and Disposal Unit 
PPDA   Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets 
R Reciprocity 
RBV   Resource Based View 
SWAp   Sector Wide Approach 
TCA   Transaction Cost Analysis 
TCE   Transaction Cost Economics 
TCT   Transaction Cost Theory 
UPF Uganda Police Force 
UPS Uganda Prisons Service 
UShs.   Uganda Shillings 
VRIO   Value Rare Inimitable Organisational support 
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Appendix D: Variables and Parameters 
 
Asymp.   Asymptotic 
df   Degrees of freedom 
N   Total number of units in a group 
r   Correlation 
Sig.   Significance 
std.   Standard deviation 
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Appendix E: The procurement cycle; roles and responsibilities 
 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE PROCUREMENT CYCLE
Procurement Requisition. 
Filled with clear 
Specs/TOR/SOW
Review of:
• Specifications/TOR/SOW
• Procurement  method
• Evaluation Criteria
•Potential supply market
Preparation of Bidding Documents e.g:
• Instruction to Bidders
• Price Schedule
• Terms and Conditions
Advertisement and 
Invitations for Bids
Receipt and 
opening  of bids
•Sign Contract
•Communicate Award
•Administrative review
Contract
Management 
• Delivery
• Payment
User Department
Procurement & 
Disposal Unit
Accounting Officer
Review of Evaluation 
report (approval or 
rejection)
Contracts 
Committee
Boards / Councils
Evaluation 
Committee 
(ADHOC)
Confirmation of 
Availability  of 
funds
Contract
Monitoring
4
Procurement 
Plan and 
Budget
Award of Contract
Procurement method 
Approval
Approval of Bidding Documents
1
Evaluation of 
bids
Contract
Performance
Evaluation
Produced by Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA), 1 Pilkington Road, Workers’ House 14th
Floor, P.O Box 3925, Kampala, Email; info@ppda.go.ug Tel. 041- 311100, website: www.ppda.go.ug
Note:                                           
In case this cycle is not adhered 
to, please inform the Accounting 
Officer or PPDA.
2 3
5
7
810
2 3
6
89
11
12
13
15
14
Boards / Councils
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Appendix F: An overview of the multidimensional construct of trust 
 
Trust Dimensions Source 
Ability e.g. Sitkin and Roth (1993); Cook and Wall (1980); and Deutsch, 1960 
Altruism e.g. Frost et al. (1978) 
Acceptance e.g. Bonoma (1976) 
Benevolence e.g. Mayer et al. (1995) ; Solomon (1996) and Strickland (1958) 
Business sense and judgment e.g. Gabarro (1978) 
Character e.g. Gabarro (1978) 
Competence e.g. Butler (1991); Butler and Cantrell (1984); Lieberman (1981); 
Rosen and Jerdee (1977) and Kee and Knox (1970) 
Confidence Dwyer and Lagace (1986); Luhmann (1979); and Kwant (1965) 
Congruence Sitkin and Roth (1993) 
Consistency e.g. Butler (1991) and Butler and Cantrell (1984) 
Fairness e.g. Butler (1991) and Hart et al. (1986) 
Faith e.g. Zaltman  
Integrity e.g. Butler (1991); Hart et al. (1986); Butler and Cantrell (1984); 
Gabarro (1978) and Liebermann (1981) 
Intentions or motives e.g. Cook and Wall (1980); Kee and Knox (1970); Giffin (1967) and 
Deutsch (1960) 
Liking e.g. Swan and Trawick (1987) and Swan et al. (1985) 
Loyalty e.g. Butler and Cantrell (1984) 
Motivation to lie e.g. Hovland et al. (1986) 
Openness of Management e.g. Hart et al. (1986) 
Predictability e.g. Coleman (1990); Dasgupta (1988); Gambetta (1988); Good (1988); 
Lewis and Weigert (1985); Luhmann (1979); Deutsch (1973); Rotter 
(1967); Parsons (1964) and Deutsch (1958) 
Respect e.g. Jackson (1985a, b) 
Security e.g. Zand (1978) 
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Appendix G: Detailed responsibilities of categories of respondents 
 
 
Respondents Purchasing tasks 
Procurement officers (PDU) Manage procurement activities of the entity  
Support the functioning of the contracts committee 
Implement the decisions of the contracts committee 
Liaise  directly with the PPDA on matters within jurisdiction 
Act as a secretariat to the contracts committee 
Plan the procurement activities of the entity 
Recommend procurement procedures 
Check and prepare statements of requirements 
Prepare bid documents 
Prepare advertisements of bid documents 
Issue bidding documents 
Maintain a providers list 
Prepare contract documents 
Issue approved contract documents 
Contracts committee Authorise the choice of procurement procedure 
Authorise solicitation documents before issue 
Authorise technical, financial or combined evaluation reports 
Authorise contract documentation in line with the authorised evaluation 
report 
Authorise any amendment to an awarded contract 
Recommend for the delegation of a procurement function by the 
accounting officer whenever the necessity arises 
Award contracts in accordance with applicable procurement procedures 
as the case may be 
Finance officers Participate in procurement plans 
Participate in initiating procurement requirements 
Monitoring purchase deliveries 
Arrange for payments to providers 
Participate in supplier evaluation 
Accounting officer Establishing a contracts committee and appointing members 
Causing to be established a PDU staffed at an appropriate level 
Advertising bid opportunities 
Communicating award decisions 
Certifying the availability of funds to support procurement acataivities 
Signing contracts for procurement activities on behalf of the entity 
Investigating complaints by providers 
Submitting a copy of any complaints and reports of the findings to PPDA 
Ensuring the implementation of the awarded contract is in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of the award. 
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Appendix H: Adjustments to the standard research instruments 
 
 
Variable Question Reason(s) for removal 
Trust Even if we wanted to leave our collaboration with other 
PDEs, we wouldn’t because our losses would be 
significant 
It overlapped with 
another one in the 
Ugandan context 
Trust We always get correct information from the PDEs we 
collaborate with 
It overlapped with 
another one in the 
Ugandan context 
Level of 
collaboration 
In our PDE, we very frequently jointly decide on the 
inventory order levels of products/services with other 
PDEs 
It is largely not about 
horizontal purchasing 
collaboration 
Level of 
collaboration 
In our PDE, we very frequently consult on the 
monitoring systems of the suppliers with other PDEs 
 
Benefits for 
individual 
entity 
There is an information centre, which was started as a 
result of collaboration, which has other benefits for our 
operations 
It largely does not exist 
in the Ugandan practice 
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 Appendix I:  Practical check collaborative initiatives cases 
 
The JLOS PDEs  
· Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
· Ministry of Internal Affairs 
· The Judiciary 
· Uganda Prison Services 
· Uganda Police Force 
· The Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
· The Judicial Services Commission 
· The Uganda Law Reform Commission 
· Ministry of Local Government – Local Council Courts 
· Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development 
 
The ministry collaboration PDEs 
· Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries 
· Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 
· Ministry of Water Lands and Environment 
· Ministry of Works Housing and Communication 
· Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development 
· Ministry of Education and Sports 
· National Water and Sewerage Corporation 
 
The state enterprises collaboration PDEs  
· National Housing and Construction Company 
· Uganda Printing and Publishing Company 
· Uganda Property Holdings Company 
· Uganda Electricity Generation Company 
· Uganda Electricity Transmission Company 
 
The statutory bodies PDEs  
· Cotton Development Organisation 
· Dairy Development Authority 
· Uganda Coffee Development Authority 
· Uganda Investment Authority 
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Appendix J: Responses on what were being missed before undertaking 
purchasing collaborative initiatives  
 
 
JLOS collaboration Ministry collaboration State Enterprises 
collaboration 
Statutory bodies 
collaboration 
· Before 
collaboration, we 
could not share 
information on 
suppliers, for 
example other 
PDEs would buy 
similar products at 
cheaper prices. 
· Costs of operations 
were higher than 
now 
· Activities that 
require joint effort 
yet done 
individually were 
malfunctioning 
· There was shortage 
of supplies because 
every PDE thought 
it was the role of 
others to purchase 
· Lack of skilled 
personnel was 
rampant 
· There was no 
harmonisation of 
specifications 
· We lacked trust of 
the donors as they 
could not trust one 
PDE 
· Resources could 
not be shared 
· Fewer suppliers 
with their 
associated 
inefficiencies 
· Operational costs 
like for individual 
meetings were much 
higher 
· No known experts in 
the area of 
purchasing to consult 
in case of 
complications 
· Information would 
be with a few PDEs 
and others would not 
know 
· Information got in 
individual entities 
would be sometime 
inaccurate, and there 
was no other PDE to 
compare with 
· Most professionals in 
purchasing were not 
known, yet they 
existed. 
· No adequate 
staffing, so there 
were a lot of 
errors in tenders 
· Lack of 
consultation 
created a lot of 
delays in 
meeting 
deadlines  
· Disclosure 
culture was a big 
problem 
 
· Due to lack of 
technical 
knowledge, some 
of the PDEs 
incurred costs 
because they were 
sued of 
incompetence 
· Some donor funds 
were not received 
because of 
incompetence by 
the procurement 
staff 
· Different 
specifications of 
similar and related 
products 
· The low price and 
high volume 
suppliers could not 
work with single 
PDEs 
· Resources could 
not be shared like 
the IFMS 
· There was no 
learning from each 
other 
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Appendix K: Responses on what was being missed on our suggestions on how ho 
handle horizontal purchasing collaboration 
 
 Actions for improvement of 
factors 
Mechanism to start and 
operate collaborative 
initiative 
Method of public 
purchasing tender 
JLOS · Set a central office for the 
collaboration activities 
· Avoid having main 
leading PDEs, treat all 
equally 
· Coaching should be used 
to give officers hands on 
experience 
· Include opinion leaders in 
meetings 
· Take care of existing 
systems of work 
· Handle outcomes of 
the collaboration 
· Establishing a 
conflict resolution 
committee 
· Some aspects of 
contract management 
like follow up of 
contract 
implementation, 
certification of work, 
making variations to 
the contract and 
contract clause 
amendment can be 
done jointly 
Ministries · Start a forum for 
brainstorming on 
collaboration issues 
· Ensure equal influence 
from all members 
· All layers of PDE (top, 
middle and low ) should 
be involved 
· Include opinion leaders 
· Establishing 
brainstorming forum 
is crucial 
· Balancing of power 
of member PDEs is 
important 
· The opinion leaders 
miss on stakeholders 
at all stages of the 
model 
· It is possible to 
implement central 
procurement model 
since the PDEs have 
same source of funds 
and all work towards 
similar government 
goals.  
 
 
State 
enterprises 
· Put a conflict resolution 
structure in initial years 
before trust develops 
· Do fewer activities 
· Put in place physical 
resources of collaboration 
like office, chairs, 
stationery etc 
· Ensure right timing to 
start collaboration like 
CHOGM urgent situations 
· Accommodate existing 
methods of individual 
PDEs 
· Prioritising 
activities of 
collaboration 
· Establishing a 
central coordinating 
office is important 
in the tasks at the 
emergence stage 
· The opinion leaders 
miss on stakeholders 
at all stages of the 
model 
· In addition to joint 
contracts committee, 
include advisors from 
each PDE to the 
entity, who are 
specialists in the 
goods/services/works 
being purchased 
· Participating PDEs in 
a tender should pay 
some fee in addition 
to signing a register as 
a sign of commitment 
for planning purposes 
Statutory 
enterprises 
· Handle adequate tasks 
according to level of 
collaboration 
· Appoint a collaboration 
coordinator 
· Sensitisation seminars 
· Realign mission 
statements of PDEs  
 
· Prioritising 
activities of 
collaboration 
· Collaboration 
coordinator should 
be part of 
stakeholders 
· Increase on 
sensitisation 
workshops to reduce 
uncertainties at the 
emergence stage 
· The joint prices data 
bases should reflect a 
range, because prices 
in Uganda are not 
stable, since they 
depend on the 
exchange rates 
· PDEs should shift to 
the central contracting 
model after some 
three years of group 
contracting model 
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Appendix L: Responses on what is least activity to be done on the suggested 
actions for improving horizontal purchasing collaboration 
 
Suggested action frequency 
Network PDEs for easy information dissemination 4 
Increase disclosure and minimize secrets  4 
Increase disclosure  3 
Transfers to PDEs in same collaborative initiative 2 
Update information at least per 14 days 2 
Respond to issues within 14 days 2 
Sensitise top management to win their support 1 
PDEs should be fair to each other 1 
Encourage respectful practice 1 
Develop and use action plans 1 
Do what you say 1 
Be consistent 1 
Share leisure time e.g. corporate games 1 
Mix formal and informal structures 1 
Establish personal rapport with each other 1 
Align goals of all collaborating PDEs 0 
Stay in collaboration for long 0 
Upgrade procurement positions to commissioner  0 
Monthly check that all promises are met 0 
Aim at achieving beyond normal results 0 
Have constant interactions 0 
PDE officers should not be frequently transferred 0 
Set deadlines and cerebrate celebrate when they are achieved 0 
Total 26 
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Appendix M: Responses on what in particular would be recommended to new 
starters 
 
Suggested action frequency 
Sensitise top management to win their support 22 
Align goals of all collaborating PDEs 20 
Develop and use action plans 19 
Establish personal rapport with each other 19 
Have constant interactions 18 
Respond to issues within 14 days 18 
Stay in collaboration for long 15 
Mix formal and informal structures 14 
Encourage respectful practice 12 
Share leisure time e.g. corporate games 12 
Upgrade procurement positions to commissioner  11 
Be consistent 11 
Transfers to PDEs in same collaborative initiative 11 
PDE officers should not be frequently transferred 10 
Set deadlines and celebrate when they are achieved 10 
Increase disclosure  10 
Aim at achieving beyond normal results 9 
Do what you say 9 
Minimize secrets  9 
PDEs should be fair to each other 8 
Network PDEs for easy information dissemination 8 
Monthly check that all promises are met 7 
Update information at least per 14 days 7 
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Appendix N: Recommendations for further research 
 
· Vertical purchasing collaboration 
In our thesis, we considered horizontal purchasing collaboration in the public 
sector, where all PDEs are at the same level and the upward and downward supply 
chain is not very applicable. It would be interesting for future studies to consider 
behavioural factors in vertical purchasing collaborations, in the private sector. The 
private sector especially in the developed countries is not bound by rules like in 
the public sector, and allows flexibility by procurement officers to take decisions 
about collaboration; perhaps this would have a different impact on behavioural 
factors than in the public sector. 
· Holistic way to handle behavioural factors 
In this thesis, we considered four behavioural factors. These are trust, 
commitment, reciprocity, and dependence. However, we recognise that there are 
other factors in the developing countries that could as well explain horizontal 
purchasing collaboration. These include communication, understanding, conflict, 
adaptation, satisfaction, et cetera. We also note that most research on behavioural 
aspects has been fragmented to give concrete and conclusive results on 
relationships (Leonidou et al, 2006). Future research could study these 
behavioural factors together and use the structural equation modelling statistical 
tool to assess the relationships comprehensively in a systematic and holistic way 
(Hair et al., 2002). 
· Competences and horizontal purchasing collaboration 
From our study, we found out that competences of the PDEs is one of the main 
reasons to justify horizontal purchasing collaboration. One would be interested to 
carry out research to answer questions like: What would happen if after sometime 
in the collaboration, every PDE has developed minimal competences to enable it 
to operate on its own? Would there be need for horizontal purchasing 
collaboration? 
· Relative importance of behavioural factors at emerging and operational 
phases 
In our study, we found out that behavioural factors are important at the beginning 
of horizontal purchasing collaboration. This is because they predict more than half 
(53.9%) of the variability in the level of collaboration. Operational and financial 
factors on the other hand may or may not become more important with time. It 
would be interesting to carry out a longitudinal study to check the relative 
importance of behavioural, operational, and financial factors in horizontal 
purchasing collaboration in the developing countries context, over time. 
· Low to medium level of behavioural factors in Ugandan PDEs 
In the study, a low to medium level of the considered behavioural factors in PDEs 
in horizontal purchasing collaboration was noted. It would be interesting to study 
if the level of these behavioural factors will increase after some time. A similar 
study in a period of about five years would give insightful conclusions, as to 
whether the low level of behavioural factors on collaboration is because of the 
time dimension or other reasons. 
· Building behavioural factors 
In the study, we show how horizontal purchasing collaboration should be handled, 
by showing how trust, commitment, dependence, and reciprocity should be 
increased in the collaboration. We derived these actions from our findings. Future 
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research projects in carrying out large scale surveys to test how these actions can 
influence each of the factors could be interesting.  
· Personal trust and professional/organisational trust and commitment 
In our research, and in most existing literature, the emphasis is on organisational 
trust predicting the level of collaboration. We noted, however, that staff members 
of a PDE tend to collaborate with the other PDE because of personal qualities of 
its staff. This is even more relevant for emerging collaborations where there are no 
sufficient structures for organisational trust. It would therefore be interesting to 
use the individual staff in collaborating PDEs as the unit of analysis and check 
whether the improvement of horizontal purchasing collaboration is more related to 
the personalities than the whole organisational credentials. This is likely to show 
insightful results as individual behaviours in developing countries may differ from 
the individual behaviours in the developed countries. 
· Extensions to the conceptual model 
Our model tests relationships we were interested in, but more relationships can be 
hypothesized. For example, more moderating and intervening variables can be 
introduced to better understand the relationships. 
· Model for starting and or sustaining a horizontal purchasing collaborative 
initiative 
In the development of our suggested model for starting and or sustaining a 
horizontal purchasing collaborative initiative, we did not check whether an 
existing model fits with the Ugandan context. We started developing a new model 
from scratch. We could not check whether actions that were not mentioned are not 
important in the developing country context or that the respondents simply did not 
think of it. This leaves an interesting opportunity for further research.  
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